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ABSTPACT
States have adopted purchase-of-service contracting for a wide
variety of human services, and as much as two-thirds of Title XX funds
may be spent through purchase of services. The prcmise of purchased
services - many small providers delivering a variety of services in
innovative ways at lower cost and higher quality than state delivered
services - has not been met.
To examine this failure, this study looked at the interrelationships
and the effects on the provider market of several control mechanisms
which are or could be used by state agencies to shape provider behavior.
Two states which exhibited very different provider markets were used as
case studies. Actual use of control mechanisms was compared to
potential use, and explanatory reasons were found for the shortfall
between actual and potential use.
Implementation models were also used to provide a more general
framework in which policies, such as purchase of service contracting,
are put into force. Although each of the models used could explain the
behavior found in the case studies, the models focused attention on
different aspects of the contracting system and offered different points
of intervention for changing the system through improving state agency
ability to shape the behavior of its vendors.
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Title: Associate Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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CHAPTER 1: THE NEED FOR STUDY OF THE PUPCHASE-OF-SERVICE
CONTRACTING SYSTEM FOR SOCIAL SERVICES
A. Introduction
Various State departments currently purchase services for a variety
of social service programs. Regardless of the specific program, the
departments must be capable of effective management of these services.
In order to achieve this goal, they must assess the effects of their
policies and learn to identify those actions of the contracted services
system which they control.
Two major factors have drastically increased the number and
kinds of purchase-of-service contracts. The first was the passage of
the 1967 amendments to the Social Security Act which authorized states
to purchase services from public and voluntary agencies and subsequent
passage of the Title XX program (the 1975 amendments to the Social
Security Act) which accelerated purchase-of-service arrangements by
allowing states to increase the types of services which could be bought
by the states using federal money (Benton, Feild and Millar, 1978).
Voluntary agencies, which grew out of the volunteer social service
movement, are non-profit social service organizations with long-standing
traditions of conmunity service.
The second factor is deinstitutionalization: the process of moving
people from large institutions (usually, "total instituticns" in the
Goffman sense) to smaller institutions (such as nursing homes), group
homes and other community facilities. Goffman (1961) defines a "total
institution" as "... a place of residence and work where a large number
of like-situated individuals, cut off fram the wider society for an
appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally
administered round of life." Deinstitutionalization was a response to
dissatisfaction with the institutions as a service delivery system, to
the belief that conmnunity-based services would be cheaper, to changes in
the prevailing treatment philosophy, and to the effects of the Title' XIX
Amendments (Medicaid) to the Social Security Act. The state
institutions could not meet federal and state standards for
reimbursement under Title XIX, but facilities such as nursing homes
could meet these standards and became dumping grounds for the states'
patients (Kinzer, 1978). Nationwide, over two-thirds of Title XX
service funds are spent on purchase-of-service contracts (Benton, Feild
and Millar, 1978). This heavy reliance on purchased services is
expected to increase (Buckle and Buckle, 1977), bolstered in several
states by court orders for improved or less restrictive care.
B. Background
Deinstitutionalization was expected to improve social services by
producing conpetition among vendors which would lead to innovation,
variety, and greater responsiveness to client needs (Arthur D. Little,
Inc., 1977). The states expected that the innovativeness of the private
providers would better facilitate the implementation of new programs and
the cutback of unneeded ones (Buckle and Buckle, 1977). However, these
expectations have not been met. The state departments' management
control mechanisms have engendered conformity among programs (Finch,
1979; the Governor's Task Force on Contracting Out, 1976; Social
Planning Services, 1976; Children's Services Task Force, 1978), and have
encouraged the development of large vendors offering similar services in
all of their facilities (Buckle and Buckle, 1977). This conformity and
size characterize the very problems with the direct service system which
led the states to develop the private delivery system (Childrens
Services Task Force, 1977).
A Massachusetts study of purchase of services determined that most
of the available money went to a few large providers. This was, in
part, due to loyalties to the original providers. Small providers could
not handle the cash flow problem caused by slow state payments.
Furthermore, this study found that there was considerable confusion over
which roles should be played by the contractor and vendor (Childrens
Services Task Force, 1977). It was unclear whether the contractor
should be controlling vendors or whether the state agencies and the
vendors are all in the same boat battling the turbulent legislative seas
(Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation, 1980).
As service delivery through contracted comnuity-based services has
not been working as expected, it has become the focus of considerable
adverse publicity. The typical crisis response by the departmental
administrators (and the response usually demanded by the newspapers) is
a piece-meal intensification of particular management control
mechanisms, e.g., more monitors, or, higher rates, or higher input
standards (Providence Journal, April, May and June 1979). A piece-meal
response has a very limited effectiveness because it ignores the effects
of different control mechanisms, the inter-relationships among the
control mechanisms, the impacts of changes in particular mechanisms on
the future vendor industry, and the many functions that each particular
mechanism may service in different parts of the bureaucracy.
For example, there is a direct relationship between the degree of
regulation, the cost of operations and the number of facilities: lower
(higher) levels of regulation lead to lower (higher) cost of operations
and more (fewer) facilities -(Katzper, 1981).
This study looks at how best to use specific models of implementa-
tion and control mechanisms to shape the behavior of particular
providers while maintaining a viable provider market. Ideally, this
would result in cheaper, higher quality, and more accessible services.
CHAPTER 2: SFTING THE CONTEXT:
POSSTRT MODELS OF IMPLEMENTATION AND CONTROL
A. Introduction
Several models of organizational and interorganizational behavior
incorporate factors which influence the effectiveness of control
mechanisms. Four generally accepted models can explain such
implementation: 1) the systems management model, 2) the bureau- cratic
process model, 3) the organizational development model, and
4) the bargaining and negotiation model (Elmore, 1978).
B. The Systems Management Model
Management control represents an attemrpt to apply the elements of
physical control theory to the operation of organizations. The main
element of physical control theory is the use of feedback to make
adjustments. A thermostat operates on this principle.
The main elements of a mangement control system include:
1. Purposes of the Control System
2. Boundaries of the Control System
3. Key Variables and Key Measures of Key Variables
4. Feedback about Efforts of the Control System Based on the
Key Measures
5. Changes in the Controlled System based on Feedback
6. Reward/Punishmient Incentives for Implementing Change
These ideas may be displayed as in Diagram 2a.
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DIAGRAM 2a: The Systems Management Model
ENVIRONMENT
Boundary Exogenous Variables
Endogenous
Variables
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system
Variables outside the boundary of the control
system which may impact the control system
Endogenous Variables that are considered most
important for controlling behavior
Purpose Key
Meas-
urers
This model asserts that organizations are effective to the extent
that they maximize performance with regard to their central goals and
objectives. There is hierarchical control where top management makes
policy and subordinate units are allocated tasks based upon specific
objectives. For each task, there is an optimal allocation of
responsibilities that maximizes an organization's performance with
regard to its objectives. Implemntation consists of defining a
detailed set of objectives; assigning responsibilities and standards of
performance to sub-units consistent with these objectives; monitoring
system performance and making adjustments that enhance the attainment of
goals. Changes within the environment impose new demands that necessi-
tate constant adjustments. There is a mix of hierarchical control and
subordinate discretion which results in "responsibility centers" which
are held responsible for a certain level of performance. This provides
a means of exercising control by focusing on the performance of
sub-units rather than on their complex internal operations.
Effective implementation must contain five main ingredients:
clearly specified tasks and objectives, a plan to allocate tasks and
performance standards to sub-units, an objective means of measuring
performance, a system of controls and social sanctions sufficient to
hold subordinates accountable for their performance, and a means of
receiving and evaluating feedback.
The pre-conditions for satisfactory performance are 1) the manager
understands organizational expectations in terms of output, quality,
costs, deadlines or other appropriate yardsticks; 2) the manager is
given adequate resources, necessary freedom and the authority to deploy
available resources; 3) the manager has reliable means of monitoring
performance so that corrective action can be taken in time (Williams,
1972). In this way, control becomes a process of monitoring feedback
frcam activities; trying to implement strategies and realizing
objectives; making decisions regarding whether the organization is on
target and taking corrective action. Controls, then, represent an early
warning system which must be built into the job so that subordinate and
superior will know whether or not progress is satisfactory (Williams,
1972). In order for this to occur, the criteria of effective
performance must be objective and attainable and thus valued (Williams,
1972). The emphasis in systems work must be on the transmittal of
information to the right places, in the right form, and with the right
content for taking action (Hurni, 1956). In management control the
feedback loop requires both the report on control criteria and
managenent action to be effective (Anthony and Dearden, 1976).
One or both of two types of feedback characteristics must be
corunicated in order for performance to be considered unsatisfactory:
1) the manager of the responsibility center must be motivated to take
corrective action
2) and/or the plans may be revised (Anthony and Dearden, 1976).
Although it may be impossible to design a perfect system, it is
important to design a system that is self-correcting: a system that
knows its goals, can measure its performance and has incentives to apply
this information to improving its performance (Jacobs, Christoffel and
Dixon, 1976).
As in physical control theory, the key is in the use of feedback to
make changes through an adjustment mechanism (reward/punishment).
One advantage of a management control system over a physical
control system, however, it that it is possible to change the
controlling system when discrepancies persist.
Another way of visualizing management control is to remember that
stating a purpose is making a projection about future behavior. Unless
there are ways of assessing that behavior, the projection can never be
validated. The development of key variables and measures (criteria),
feedback, and reward/punishment mechanisms provide the projection with
an assessment.
The primary use of management control has been in a single
organization which is controlling its divisions in their interaction
with the environment. In the health care sector there has been an
increased use of regulation as a means of shaping provider behavior.
The terms "control" and "regulate" have similar meanings in the physical
sense, and, in this model, in the organizational sense. Health
facilities regulation was intended to identify key variables of behavior
and to find means of shaping behavior along the key variables. As a
consequence, criteria for expected behavior (standards), means of
reward/punishment (rate-setting, client placement), and feedback
(auditing/monitoring) were established.
C. The Bureaucratic Process Model
The second model involves implementation process as a bureaucratic
process. This model asserts that all important behavior in
organizations can be explained by the discretion exercised by individual
workers and the routines that these workers develop to maintain and
enhance their position in the organization. Power tends to be dispersed
among many small units exercising strong control over specific tasks.
The amount of control any unit can assert over another, laterally or
hierarchically, is lessened by the fact that, as units become more
specialized, they are able to exercise more control over their own
operations. Organizational decision-making tends to be incremental
since it must consist of controlling discretion and changing routines.
Proposals for change are judged by organizational units in terms of
the degree to which they depart from established patterns. Implementa-
tion consists of identifying where discretionary decision- making occurs
and which routines need to be changed. Newly developed routines must be
sufficiently attractive to induce organizational units to replace old
routines. The dominant characteristic of organizations is resistance to
change, not simply passive resistance or inertia, but an active process
of trying to remain the same.
In order to reduce the discretion practiced by lower organizational
units, higher units tend to implement more controls in the form of
increased monitoring of performance through reports, work rules, and
increased involvement of superiors in the work of subordinates. The
elaborate substructure of regulations, guidelines and management
controls tend to have a weak and unpredictable effect on service
delivery. This type of control is based on acceptance of the belief
that erployee behavior cannot be changed with consequent attempts to
police it by reducing the degree of variability in an organization.
However, this type of control has two dysfunctional effects:
1) controls become an end in themselves and procedures are
followed when they are clearly inappropriate - the organization becomes
procedure-orientated, and cannot respond adequately to its environment;
2) subordinates rebel against the interference in their work
caused by control mechanisms and either became apathetic or attempt to
evade the regulations - either type of response is perceived by higher
units as indicating the need for more of this type of control (Yorks,
1976).
D. The Organizational Development Model
The third model involves inplementation as organizational
development. It is based on the assertion that organizations should:
1) satisfy the needs of people for autonomy and control over their own
work, 2) offer participation in the decision-making process, and 3)
stress conmitment to the purposes of the organization. Organizations
should be structured so as to encourage participation at all levels.
When hierarchical control is minimized, responsibilities and decision-
making can be distributed throughout all levels of an organization.
Managers must be able to translate performance criteria into
personal "spheres" of accountability (Williams, 1972). In order to
obtain a qualitative feel for their unit' s performance, they require
both positive and negative feedback which can then be utilized to
exercise control and solve problems (Yorks, 1976).
The implementation process is one of consensus-building and
accommodation between policy-makers and implerentors. Implementation
should consist not of developing more sophisticated techniques for
managing the behavior of subordinates, but of enhancing the
self-starting capacity of lower units. At the project level, this
implementation would require: 1) a sense of involvement and ownership
of the project 2) the centrality of face-to-face work groups which would
break down the traditional isolation of many street-level bureaucrats
and 3) the willingness to reformulate objectives and tasks.
The most any one level of governmnt can do to effect
implementation at another level is to provide supports that enhance the
internal capacity of organizations to respond to change.
E. The Bargaining and Negotiation Model
The fourth model involves implementation through conflict,
bargaining, and negotiation. It is based on the assertion that
organizations are arenas of conflict in which people and subunits
ccmpete for relative advantage in the exercise of power and the
allocation of scarce resources. The distribution of power is never
stable and is dependent not only on formal hierarchical position but
also on specialized knowledge, control of material resources, and the
ability to mobilize external political support.
Decision-making consists of bargaining within and among organiza-
tional units. Bargaining does not require agreement on a common set
of goals, nor that all parties concur in the outcome of the bargaining
process. It only requires that the parties agree to mutually adjust
their behavior to preserve the bargaining process as a means of
allocating resources. Implementation consists of a series of bargaining
decisions reflecting the preferences and resources of participants.
Success can only be defined relative to the goals of one party. Imple-
mentation does not progress from a single declaration of purpose to a
zresult, but is instead characterized by constant conflict of purposes
aznd results in the pursuit of relative advantage.
The behavior observed in the implementation process is designed to
shape the expectations of the other actors. An agency might put a great
deal of effort into developing an elaborate system of management
controls knowing full well that it doesn' t have the resources to make
them binding on other parties. However, the expectation that the
controls might be enforced is sufficient to influence the behavior of
the other actors. The outcomes of bargaining are seldom optimal but are
simply convenient, temporary points of closure.
F. Ccmnon Factors
All four of these models appear to have at least three factors in
common:
1) feedback from and to the environment
2) contingency, that is, adaptation to changes in the environment
3) hierarchical regulations which have an impact on services,
although the impact may only be to reinforce existing
practices.
The concepts used in this analysis will draw on these three factors.
The four models will be used to develop alternative explanations for the
presence of the mechanisms and responses observed in the case studies,
and alternative ways of changing the contracting system.
G. The Role of Contingency in Implementation
This study of management control mechanisms is designed to increase
the effectiveness of states' purchase-of-service contracting by
improving a state agency' s ability to shape the behavior of its vendors.
Effectiveness is a key indicator of the adequacy of a delivered service
and is usually interpreted as indicating how well actual outputs match
desired outputs (Blum, 1971). The measure of effectiveness to be
employed here is based on the system attainment model (Baker, 1974),
rather than the goal attainment model. The goal attainment model
assesses whether an agency has reached a preset goal. The system
attainment model assesses whether an agency has optimally distributed
its resources and control mechanisms to provide for attainment of goals
under a given set of internal and external conditions. By examining the
effects, interactions, and exogenous variables (size of industry, for
example) , it is the intended result that a better "positioning" of
mechanisms for possible success can be suggested.
Providers react to the control system with their own contingency
models of their environment. Part of the providers' environment is the
constraints imposed by state agencies. The more broadly the constraint
is imposed, the smaller the chance for evasion and distortion of the
delivery system by providers (Leveson, 1978). Narrow constraints
imposed by a single program to control the health industry are
inadequate because the system is too easily manipulated to meet that
regulatory effort while the industry remains essentially on the same
course as before (Schweitzer, 1978). Highly specific constraints, such
as the staffing patterns dictated by nursing home standards, do not
allow management the discretion to choose optional ways of producing an
output (Leveson, 1978). However, the pieces of the control system are
not always identified as belonging to a single system. Consequently,
the pieces have acquired a "life" of their own and often are spread
across many organizations. When this point, is reached, simply trying
to keep the other pieces of the control system informed can become a
major waster of resources. Seldom is action concerted or cross-impacts
duly recognized (Special Cammittee on the Regulatory Process, 1977). As
a consequence, the control system tends to work against itself, but
seldom in such a way as to be beneficial to providers (Kinzer, 1977).
In purchase-of-service contracting for social services, this
disembodiment of the control system is not quite as advanced and varies
considerably from state to state. Larger states tend to have more
formalized and evolved (separate entities for each mechanism) control
systems.
This study next looks at the use of the various management control
mechanisms. A set of relationships among the control mechanisms and
between the control mechanisms and the provider market is established.
Then, these relationships are conpared to the relationships found in a
brief review of six states. Finally, preferred combinations of control
mechanisms are established within three different constraints.
Chapter 3: The Use of Management Control Mechanisms in
Purchase-Of-Service Contracting
A. Introduction
To review the variations in the control mechanisms, I have
created for this chapter only a hypothetical state administrator,
Mr. Pretend Admin. The administrator is faced with the problem of
reshaping a vendor system in which all parties to the system appear
to be dissatisfied with the services being delivered. Mr. Pretend
Admin recognizes that the cost of social service residential care
has increased considerably and a lesson might be learned from
studying similar increases in costs in the health care industry.
He decides to draw on some of the information available about
health care. However, he understands that there are many
differences between a control system for regulated institutional
health care and a control system for the purchase of services in
social service residential care.
In order to do all this, Mr. Pretend Admin has to determine
the critical points where vendor behavior can be shaped and the
effects of different techniques for controlling these critical
points. He then has to determine what his alternatives are for
each of the control mechanisms, to structure these alternatives in
same way and to structure the relationships between the control
mechanisms. To help him in all this strenuous mental activity, Mr.
Pretend Admin has hired an assistant, Ms. Rhea Alty. Her sole job
function is to be a good sounding board for his ideas, and to offer
sage advice whenever it is specifically requested. After a couple
of quick calls to his friends in the state health and welfare
departments, Mr. Pretend Admin begins what he hopes will be the
speedy task of jotting down his ideas in an admirably organized
manner.
B. Endogenous Variables
At least five control mechanisms influence the behavior of
providers. These mechanisms are standard-setting, rate-setting,
monitoring and the use of data generated by monitoring, contracting
processes and client placement.
In state health and welfare departments, these mechanisms have
usually been used only to inhibit certain provider behaviors, such as
mismanagement of funds, excessive costs, and low quality services.
However, these management control mechanisms can also serve constructive
functions aimed at molding the vendor delivery system (which consists,
often, of fiscally marginal vendors) toward the service goals which the
departments are beginning to identify for their programs. Some of these
control goals would still be oriented to restrictive functions (such as
cost containment) ; and these functions may be at odds with the
constructive goals. Since the same control mechanisms are used for many
different regulatory goals, the choice of particular variants of the
control mechanisms takes on additional meaning. Rate-setting may not
only establish a means of payment, it may also restrict payment.
Standards are not only guide-lines for behavior, but also restrictions
on them.
To use the control mechanisms effectively, at least three aspects
of the two-way effects between the control mechanisms and the provider
market must be understood.
1. The main effects of individual management control mechanisms
on providers and on the shape of the provider market.
2. The relationships that different provider markets may have
with control mechanisms.
3. The interrelationships anong the different control mechanisms.
In addition to shaping the behavior of individual providers, the
viability, size and characteristics of the entire provider market will
be affected by the choice of control mechanisms. For example, setting
rigorous input standards increases the cost of entering and staying in
the market, which may drive many small vendors out of the industry, even
when these small vendors could meet standards based on performance. As
another example, setting unrealistically low rates drives vendors from
the marketplace, or induces them to reduce services below acceptable
levels in order to remain solvent. The impacts of the provider market
on the effectiveness of the control mechanisms will be taken up under
the heading "Exogenous Variables."
There are interrelationships among the mechanisms and among the
effects of the mechanisms. For example, standards for services form the
basis for monitoring; new input standards require certain items which
have cost impacts, and the rate-setting and contracting mechanisms must
be able to recognize these higher costs for providers.
With a kncwledge of the effects and the cross-impacts of control
mechanisms, it becomes possible to anticipate consequences and
coordinate the control mechanisms.
The main complication is that sone management control mechanisms
perform more than one function by serving more than one master. For
example, the rate-setting process may be used to cap costs by the
Department of Administration, to audit fiscal aspects of programs by the
fiscal staff in the line agencies, and to provide an incentive for
better or more varied services by the program staff in the departments.
"This may not be as easy as I thought", Mr. Pretend Admin
told Rhea Alty. "You'd better tell the boys I can't make it for
coffee this morning."
C. Exogenous Variables
The boundaries of the purchase-of-service contracting system are
drawn so that characteristics of the provider market are considered
exogenous variables. While the characteristics of the provider market
influence and are influenced by the control mechanisms, there is little
in the short run that can be done about those characteristics. Two
major characteristics of the provider market need to be examined.
1. Level of Competition
"Rhea Alty, would you not agree that the number of
providers available to service a particular area
determines the degree of managerial freedom that a state
department has in controlling vendors?" asked Pretend.
"Just what do you mean?" wondered Rhea Alty. But
before she could verbalize her thoughts Pretend
continued.
"For example," said Mr. Admin, "if there are only a
few providers, the state may use its management control
mechanisms to preserve provider viability, while if there
are many potential providers, the state may use its
management control mechanisms to take advantage of
provider competition."
"That sounds logical to me", Rhea agreed.
2. Regional Market Participation
"It seems to me, Rhea Alty, that if demand or supply
is part of a multiple state, regional market, then one
,state may drive vendors away fran doing business with it
through the particular control mechanisms that are used,"
Mr. Pretend Admin stated.
"I think there may be some truth to that," Rhea
responded.
D. Differences Between Health-Related and Social
Service Residential Care Facilities
As Mr. Pretend Admin walked by with two armfuls of books, Rhea
Alty couldn' t help but notice that the majority of them appeared to
be about hospitals and nursing homes.
"Mr. Admin," Rhea called out, "I see that you have same books
on health care institutions. Aren' t there any differences between
health care institutions and other human services?"
"Oh my, yes," stated Mr. Pretend Admin, "I suppose I' d better
write some of them down so that I won' t forget about them. I do
know that in 1977, Piasecki and Pittinger concluded that group
homes and nursing hames shared cost determining variables, based on
a study using three nationwide surveys, one of nursing homes and
two of group homes and half-way houses."
Unlike hospital services and some nursing home services, residen-
tial social service programs require fewer technical supports and less
technical training or workers; care is more likely to be long-term than
acute; and protocols for care are less developed. Other differences
include the mitigated role of the physician in client placement, and the
absence of utilization review and certification of need. Much of the
demand for hospital services is controlled by physicians who benefit
financially from their decisions. This is much less true for nursing
hame services; and, for the most part, it is untrue of client placement
in other residential human services. Utilization review, the review of
appropriateness of care, has a low priority in non-health care
residential human services because the state is substantially involved
in client placement, leaving less discretion to the providers and other
care givers. Certificate-of-need legislation has not yet been applied
to most types of residential human service care. As of yet there is no
comparable mechanism for restricting expansion. Residential mental
health and retardation facilities and some centers for alcohol abuse,
however, have now been included in the certificate-of-need legislation
making it important to review the effects of the certificate of need
process.
"Mr. Pretend Admin, I've read your passage on some of the
differences between health care and other forms of residential
care," informed Rhea.
"And, what do you think?" asked Mr. Pretend Admin.
"Well," suggested Rhea Alty, "I think that if
certificates-of-need have been expanded into parts of residential
care, then you ought to at least mention some of their effects."
"I thought you might, Rhea Alty, so I've already written a
piece," gloated Mr. Pretend Admin.
One study (Salkever and Bice, 1978) of certificate-of-need laws
found that this mechanism did not reduce the total investment in a
facility. The mechanism accomplished its aim of restricting investment
in new beds, but investment increased in auxiliary services and non-bed
facilities, such that the plant and assets per bed increased. Further,
net revenue and changes in income had no appreciable effect on
investment; while insurance coverage, residents and interns per bed had
a more direct relationship to assets per bed than with the number of
beds. Certificates of need have reduced the volume of inpatient
services, but also slightly increased the cost of services. Further,
the impact of certificate-of-need regulation is limited to facilities
seeking changes. These are more likely to be innovative or modernizing
facilities. Certificate-of-need legislation protects existing hospitals
from new competition (Rosenthal, 1978) , and is welcomed if it limits
competition among existing providers (Posner, 1978).
"Rather like nailing jello to a tree, this business of
changing provider behavior, isn't it?" questioned Rhea Alty.
"I think you might have something, Rhea, after all, any group
that can turn something negative into a tool that works for them
must move pretty quickly," sighed Mr. Pretend Admin. "Rhea Alty, I
think part of my problem is that you make things more difficult
instead of more clear," said Pretend.
"Just doing my job, sir," said Rhea Alty with a small smirk.
"Well, in the future," offered Pretend, "why don't you wait
until after I've written something down before you try to change
things?"
E. RATE SETTING
The first type of control mechanism is rate setting which consists
of four axes of variation: the method of rate negotiation, the method
of pricing, the method of reimbursement, and the payment period.
Rate-setting is the set of activities by which a state agency
establishes the basis and amount of money it will pay for the provision
of services. Traditionally, the prices paid in social services
contracts are inadequate to cover costs. Funds from endownment, United
Way allocations and fund-raising activities are used to make up the
difference. Contract agencies often operate on the financial margin.
Generally, prices are negotiated, and there are too few suppliers to
allow much competition (Fisk, Kiesling and Muller, 1978). The rate-
setting act is the fulcrum on which the purchase of service contracting
system balances (Massachusetts Task Force on Social Service
Rate-Setting, 1978).
1. Method of Rate Negotiation
This axis reflects decreasing flexibility in negotiation as one
moves from left to right (see Graph 3a). There are six types of rate
negotiation: prior rate, bid and negotiation, informal principles of
reimbursement, bid, unilateral determination, and formal principles of
reimbursement. The first type of rate negotiation is based on a
vendor's prior rate and the state's projected budget. In some cases a
projected vendor budget is used as well. In this type of rate
negotiation, there is a natural pull on vendors to keep their costs as
high as possible in order to insure that the next year' s rate is
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sufficiently high to cover projected costs. The rate change guidelines
might include changes in the level of services among the pool of
vendors, as well as inflation and budget change guidelines.
The second method of rate negotiation is by bid and subsequent
negotiation. Bidding may favor larger providers if economies of scale
exist. This method offers the advantage of price and quality
competition associated with bidding, but also allows some room for
providers and the state to refine their expectations of the service to
be provided. Changes usually concern the components of the service to
be offered and the resulting cost changes.
The third type of rate negotiation is based on informal principles
of reimbursement whereby changes follow specified rate change guidelines
for different cost centers: increases and decreases may still be
negotiated with providers. Lacking formal rate change guidelines, this
type of rate negotiation is still vulnerable to vendor manipulation
through lobbying with the legislature.
The fourth method of rate negotiation is by bid. Bidding locks the
provider and the state into a price and type of service that both agreed
should be sufficient. Bidding may favor larger providers if economies
of scale exist. Bidding requires standardized unit-of-service costs or
standardized inputs to be specified by the state agency.
The fifth method of rate negotiation is where the rate is set
unilaterally by the state. In this method, the state assigns a rate to
a service. The state may also request proposals from vendors to deliver
the service at the fixed price. If rates are set to reflect budget
limitations, then rates and services will be set by fiat, on the basis
of scarce resources. The burden of economizing is decentralized to
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providers in health care who must adjust their costs and quantity of
services to that allowed by the prevailing rates (Mead, 1977).
In health care, restrictive fee schedules have limited the supply
of physicians willing to participate in the Medicaid program and have
contributed to a high volume, less personal practice style among
participating physicians (Schweitzer, 1978).
The sixth type of rate negotiation is based on formal principles of
reimbursement. While this method provides non-negotiable rate change
guidelines, it is also renowned for causing delays in reimbursement.
Such delays may result in a less innovative provider industry. Since
programs which resemble those in a pre-existing category can be dealt
with more quickly in the rate setting process, vendors learn that
innovation does not pay - literally. Since these delays subject vendors
to cash flow problems, larger vendors with their larger reserves are
more likely to survive than small vendors (Buckle & Buckle, 1977).
Further, though this system is formalized, there appears to be a
tendency for it to be easier for vendors to get rates for new facilities
established if they have a good rapport with the rate-setters (Buckle &
Buckle, 1977). Since the rate increase mechanism is locked in by
administrative law and is often tied to the Consumer Price Index, this
type of rate negotiation increases costs very quickly (Barile, 1981).
The major problem with tying rate increases to inflation is that the
mechanism does nothing to improve hospital operating efficiency - rather
it perpetuates existing inefficiencies (Bauer, 1978).
"Do you think that the literature from health care is
applicable to our department?" questioned Rhea Alty.
"It's terribly basic stuff," conented Mr. Pretend Admin, "I
can't think of anything that would make it any less applicable to
any residential human services."
"Mr. Pretend Admin," suggested Phea Alty, "I think you forgot
to mention the two-way effects effects between rate negotiation and
the provider market."
"You're right," admitted Mr. Pretend Admin, "I'll get right on
it."
The less flexible the negotiation the more likely that the
negotiation process will diminish competition by making it more
difficult to enter and to stay in the provider market. As competition
decreases it is necessary for the state to make negotiations more
flexible so that state agencies can ensure that they are getting what
they want at a reasonable price. However, having a large number of
providers might make it difficult for a small state agency staff to
adequately negotiate with any provider.
2. Method of Pricing
This axis of rate setting reflects an increasingly required
efficiency of resource use as one moves from left to right (See Graph
3b) . There are seven methods of pricing: delivering capability,
delivering inputs, resources consumed, improvements to services, level
of quality, and relative efficiency. The first method of pricing is
based on the capability to do a service. This would include delivering
a service capacity in facilities, i.e., a certain percentage of full
occupancy. One major problem in delivering occupancy is that the larger
the facility is, or the larger its potential occupancy, the higher the
occupancy rate ought to be when it is compared to what would be
considered full capacity, as a result of queueing and reasonable waiting
lists (Maryland Purchase of Care Study, 1976). The use of block grants
with utilization quotas, so that full payment is received only when the
quota is filled, is particularly a problem when a private
agency determines client eligibility for its services. This method sets
up an incentive for private agencies to insure that they can find enough
occupants/clients to neet the quota (Childrens Services Task Force,
1977).
Occupancy minimaums are usually not effective controls, because
those facilities in which there is a volume shortfall eventually may
obtain an upward adjustment (Bauer, 1978). Occupancy rate has a small
negative effect on average costs in nursing homes (Bishop, 1980). Where
penalties are imposed for under-utilization, the incentive is to keep
beds filled. The penalty may work where demand can not be artificially
inflated by providers (Bauer, 1978). As occupancy goes up in a
for-profit nursing hame, the price charged increases, with each
successive bed being treated as a rarer conmodity (Koetting, 1980).
The state agency uses a rate based on delivering capability when
the state wants to be guaranteed that the capacity will be present when
needed (Sellinger, 1979). To reduce costs when using the percentage
capacity pricing method, removing a complete facility has more impact
than simply removing parts of the facility due to the fixed costs
associated with facilities. Consequently, reducing the variable costs
(direct staff, for example) does not have a large cost impact (Denver
Regional Council of Governments, 1978).
The second method of pricing is delivering inputs for a service.
The state agency pays for the delivery of a certain set of inputs. This
is particularly important where it would appear that differences in
expenditures are related to, or can be accounted for, by differences in
the type of care. In general it has been found that costs for
residential services vary according to the intensity of care and
supervision required (Piasecki and Pittinger, 1977). Research on
residential foster care in New York City indicated that differences in
expenditures could not be accounted for by differences in the type of
client, when type referred to the severity of client problems (Finch,
1979).
One study looked at "best practice" facilities and found that
nearly half of the variation in client contact time could be explained
by differences in patient characteristics. This was not true for
facilities in general (McCaffree, Winn and Bennett, 1980). Butler
(1980) found no relationship between expenditures and quality after the
physical facility requirements and an initial basic service had been
adequately reimbursed.
"I'm all confused," Rhea Alty told Mr. Pretend Admin.
"Me too," said Pretend. "I think it's time for another
coffee."
"Before you go," said Rhea, "you ought to write a bit more so
that I can help you clean up your act."
No standards exist for inputs to services which compare facilities
and/or service providers and comparable costs for group homes for the
psycho-socially disabled (Piasecki and Pittinger, 1977). There is,
however, a linear, positive relationship between facility size and per
diem costs for each of these cost elements: non-nursing labor, nursing
labor, and the group of operating, fixed and miscellaneous costs,
singularly and in total in nursing homes (Piasecki and Pittinger, 1977).
This suggests diseconomies of scale.
"Don' t I remember reading that there really weren' t
diseconomies of scale, Rhea? I think that larger homes had more
staff and paid their staff more, if I recall correctly. Don't you
think so?" Pretend Admin asked. "Rhea? where are you when I need
you?"
Resources consumed reflect a third method of pricing. Payments
based on resources consumed include: paying for the delivery of a
certain number of hours worked. While this discourages efficiency by
inducing providers to consume more resources, it provides considerable
flexibility since the state agency pays only for those resources
actually consumed (Fisk, Kiesling and Muller, 1978).
The fourth method is unit pricing in which a vendor is paid for
each unit of service it delivers. The unintended inducement is to
maximize the number of units of service delivered, without consideration
of quality. If vendors are financially marginal, there is an incentive
to reduce quality as a means of reducing cost.
The fifth type of pricing is based on changes in services. A
vendor is paid a bonus, or given a penalty for non-ccpliance, for:
1) changing the service provided; 2) improving the service; 3) reducing
services; or 4) changing the quality of service; or 5) changing the
inputs used to deliver services. The relationship of costs to the care
provided is ambiguous (Vladeck, 1980).
The sixth method of pricing is determined by the quality of
services rendered. Vendor services are rated according to quality and
investment in the improvement of quality. Higher quality is rewarded by
higher payment. One deciding factor of quality, according to some
studies of nursing homes and group hcmes for the psycho-socially
disabled, is the auspices under which a provider operates, e.g.,
proprietary, non-profit, government or religious (Piasecki and
Pittinger, 1977; Gottesman, 1974). In a nationwide study of mental
health half-way houses operated by governmental units, non-profit
organizations and proprietary organizations (Piasecki and Pittinger,
1977), auspices of those organizations were related closely to operating
costs. Governmental units operated homes with the highest cost per
client day, the smallest number of clients, and the lowest occupancy
rate. Proprietary homes were at the other end of the coninuum on all
three factors. Non-profit homes were at the median point on all three
factors. However, this pattern was only significant for the number of
residents because of the small number of homes operated by governmental
units and proprietary organizations. Auspices is an environmental
variable, which is not malleable in the short term by the control system
(unless profit-making facilities are completely excluded as a vendor).
Non-profit and hospital-based nursing homes have higher costs than
for-profit homes, even after controlling for patient mix and quality of
care (Bishop, 1980). Another study of nursing homes found that
non-profit nursing homes were more likely to be of high quality, but
that all things being equal, including quality, non-profits are more
expensive than for-profit nursing hames even after including a
reasonable profit level for proprietary homes (Koetting, 1980).
A program adopted by the Massachusetts Rate-Setting Conmision for
nursing hames rewarded "quality" nursing homes with an incentive
payment. Quality was defined as a high score on an accreditation
survey, low to average costs, and a high percentage of Medicaid
patients. The inclusion of a high proportion of Medicaid clients as a
criterion was to reward nursing homes for accepting state patients and
incurring the ensuing cash flow problems state patients generate due to
slow payment by the state (Massachusetts Federation of Nursing Homes,
1979).
One state chose to adopt a rate setting mechanism which established
financial sanctions for not meeting minimum quality levels; providers
then refused to admit clients with complicating conditions (Pollak,
1981).
Two further issues in tieing quality and rate-setting together were
addressed by Vladeck (1980). First, because no one knows with certainty
what "quality" is, no one knows what "high quality" services should
cost. Second, suppliers of health or nursing homes services may not be
able to improve services without additional expenditures. "But there is
no guarantee that those additional expenditures will improve quality."
Thus creating a chicken and egg (which came first?) problem.
The seventh method of pricing rates the relative efficiency of
providers when campared to each other. The rate-setting agency might
group providers into pairs or larger groups to determine which provider
or set of providers is most cost effective (quality versus cost)
resulting in a reward of additional financial resources (Willemain,
1979). Another version of this method of pricing is the "prudent buyer"
approach suggested by Medicaid where reimbursement is limited to the
prices charged by the most efficient providers in given types of care
(Mead, 1977).
The method of pricing includes relationships with inputs, quality,
outputs, or relative efficiency, so the monitoring system must capture
this information. There is also a link to the method of negotiation,
because the higher-level methods of pricing may require considerable
negotiation.
"Pretend Admin," Rhea Alty called, "you had better come see
me. I think that the method of pricing has some relationship with
standards."
"How' s that?" responded Pretend Admin.
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"You see," Rhea Alty continued, "it doesn't make sense to pay
for something if it's not needed, and if its not needed it doesn't
make sense to pay for it."
"Well, that makes sense to me!" asserted Pretend Admin. But
then he thought a little more about it. "Rhea Alty," Pretend
asked, "can you explain that again, but this time at sub-light
speed?"
"Of course, boss," Rhea responded, "I'll even write it down
for you."
If a state agency requires a set of inputs from the provider, then
the state agency ought to pay for these inputs through the method of
pricing. If the method of pricing singles out certain inputs to be
reimbursed, then the standards ought to suggest that these specified
inputs are necessary to the service delivery system.
The risk averseness that higher level (right side of the axis)
pricing mechanisms may generate among providers will push providers to
take a more active role in client placement decisions.
"Aha," said Pretend Admin, "I can tell this is going to take
quite soe time. I'd better go down with the boys for a coffee
break."
"But we're done with the method of pricing for now," Rhea Alty
called after him.
Pretend Admin heard but chose to ignore her conment, and
continued walking toward the elevator.
3. Method of Reimbursement
The third axis of rate setting, the method of reimbursement, has
six options which range from a basis on the facility' s overall costs to
that of the costs incurred for each specific client. It indicates an
increasing recognition of the differences among clients (see Graph 3c).
The first method of reinbursement is one in which the facility is
paid for the overall services that are provided. When the method of
reimbursement is by facility or by level of care, then the method or
pricing will most likely be determined by the provider' s delivery of the
capability to perform a service, delivery of a set of inputs, or by the
resources consumed in the facility. The method of reimbursement and the
method of pricing are more closely related when reimbursement is linked
to a facility rather than to a client. As the reimbursement method
moves to the right it becomes less dependent on the provision of
resources.
"Ahem! Pretend Admin, I thought we agreed to put all this
linkages and relationships business at the end of each section?"
queried Rhea Alty.
"You're right, as usual, Rhea Alty, but this set of
relationships appears to exist only at one end of the axis, so I
included it where it was appropriate," answered Pretend.
"Well, of all people, you should know better than to try to
confuse me by breaking a pattern!" Rhea Alty snapped.
The second method of reinbursement is by level of care where all
clients are grouped into general classes with pre-established
reimbursements. A general tedency of providers is to push clients into
higher levels of care than their needs indicate. Consequently,
providers garner more resources than necessary to keep a client healthy
or stable.
Level of care does appear to have an effect on costs in nursing
homes. Intensive care nursing facilities have slightly higher costs
than internediate care facilities (Bishop, 1980). However, the
presumption is that level of care determines cost. Skilled nursing
facilities have been paid at a higher rate which gives them more money
to spend, which in turn increases costs (Bishop, 1980). It is open to
question whether there are measurable differences in costs in skilled
versus intermediate care nursing facilities, yet skilled care homes have
been reimbursed at a higher rate.
One level of care reimbursement method is "class" rates for all
vendors having similar programs. This has created a great deal of
anxiety among providers who believe that it will be a homogenizing
process: 1) reducing more highly reimbursed, high quality programs into
lower reimbursed, mediocre programs; and 2)upgrading the reimbursement
of low quality programs (Massachusetts Taks Force on Social Service
Rate-Setting, 1978).
The difficulty experienced by hospital staff in placing intensive
need Medicare residents in nursing hames relates to the preception among
vendors that reimbursement is linked too closely to average levels of
need, and does not respond well to increases in need or to clients at
the high demand end of the need scale (Willemain, 1979).
The third method of reimbursement is per case (capitation).
Capitation removes financial incentives and disincentives to the use of
particular services. However, it requires agreement on the components
and modality of treatment. This may be complicated by the multiplicity
of funding sources for different components of treatment (Richardson,
1981). For example, the development of ICF-MRs (i.e., the
classification of comunity facilities for the mentally retarded as
"Intermediate Care Facilities - for the Mentally Retarded") has resulted
in funding for residential costs from medicaid, for rehabilitation costs
from federal vocational rehabilitation funds, and for education costs
from state sources and local school systems. Capitation payment in
health maintenance organizations (H M 0' s) may not be the most important
factor that produces major reductions in hospital utilization. The fact
that an HMO is an organized, multi-specialty, group practice with
salaried physicians may be of greater significance (Gaus, Cooper and
Hirschman, 1978).
Capping the revenue per admission, a variant of capitation, creates
an incentive to reduce the length of stay in hospitals, but would also
create an incentive to limit the admission of patients needing a long
stay (Congressional Budget Office, 1978), or who need more intensive
services (Vladeck, 1980). The incentive to limit acceptance of patients
who are more needy would remain even if the revenue per admission were
set by casemix, according to the Congressional Budget Office study.
This method cannot differentiate between legitimate savings, unwise
or coincidental reductions in utilization, and the shifting of costs to
other providers. It is entirely possible that a provider could increase
total comunity expenditures while reducing its own total expenditures
per client under this method of reimbursement since clients could remain
needy (Hitt, 1977).
The fourth method of reimbursement is based on a per diem
reimbursement where the provider is paid for each day of care, for
example, per patient per day reimbursement. It has been suggested that
such methods of reimbursement induce providers to reduce the volume of
the services they use, in order to maximize the excess resources that
could be garnered over the resources that have to be used. There is
also an incentive to increase the length of stay.
With per diem rates, providers may take in more clients than the
occupancy level for which a rate has been established. This may result
in the accumulation of captial for improvements, economies of scale and,
sometimes, profits. Sometimes this results in "hot beds," that is, a
bed is never kept empty (Massachusetts Task Force on Social Service
Rate-Setting, 1978). High turnover of clients is associated with higher
per diem costs due to fixed administrative charges per admission and
because the early days of care tend to be higher cost (Bishop, 1980).
Per diem reimbursement is insensitive to changes in the severity of
the casemix, and cost reductions which might be possible by decreasing
the length of stay go unrecognized (Smejda, 1977). It creates an
incentive to increase both the length of stay per client and the volume
of clients (Bauer, 1978).
Per diem cost variation in group hcmes for the psycho-socially
disabled was best explained by the occupancy rate, staff-to-client ratio
and the type of staff (professional/para-professional) primarily used
(Piasecki and Pittinger, 1977).
The fifth type of method of reimbursement is by type of case,
which is sometimes referred to as "casemix" reimbursement. Providers
are reimbursed based on the specific type of problem or the specific
attributes of a problem which their mix of clients displays. This
method of reimbursement may set up incentives for keeping residents
"ill" on paper (Butler, 1980; Vladeck, 1980).
This counter-productive incentive is established because vendors
thus have reason to make it appear that their casemix is a more severe
than it actually is. Consequently, vendors can earn more resources than
they have to use to maintain residents at their actual level of illness.
Casemix variables are strongly related to costs per day only when
placement works well - so that clients are placed in facilities that
provide the care they need (Bishop, 1980). For casemix reimbursement to
escape this problem, an active quality assurance program must be in
place, and a state agency must perform the patient assessments of need
(Willemain, 1980).
A link to standards under casemix reimbursement would be to
establish minimum standards for every facility based on its casemix
(Willemain, 1980). Given the current lack of knowledge about
positive relationships between input use and quality of care, this type
of standard-setting would be difficult to implement.
Non-profit nursing hones make fewer distinctions among patient
condictions than for-profit nursing hames in the provision of services.
This seems logical, given the evidence that there is greater slack in
non-profits (Koetting, 1980). This trend toward a lack of
discrimination may carry over to other types of facilities and may make
casemix an ineffective reimbursement mechanism for non-profit
facilities. Reimbursement based on casemix pramises to pay for actual
resources consumed, but requires extensive research to establish the
base costs. This research is expensive and lengthy, and requires the
full cooperation of physicians and care-givers (Smejda, 1977).
One alternative method of case mix reimbursement uses a sample of
patients to establish the casemix within any facility. The sample could
be stratified to include patients which providers identify as "heavy
need." This would reduce some of the risk averseness of providers to
sampling. This alternative would substantially reduce the cost of
establishing an appropriate rate (Willemain, 1980).
The sixth type of reimbursement is tied to the specific client and
the resources that client utilizes. Sarretines this method of
reimbursement is referred to as a specific charge system. It is
considered expensive to administer compared to other methods of
reimbursement. However it is hard to criticize a method of
reimbursement which pays for exactly what a person uses. When the
uncertainty in patient assessment is low, individually computed rates
are an attractive method for insuring a close match between cost of
needed services and reimbursement rate. However, the current
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state-of-the art in assessment does not allow a low uncertainity. When
uncertainty of assessment is high, individual rates perform poorly in
matching cost of needed services to the reimbursement rate (Willemain,
1980).
One variant of this method is to pay based on the initial condition
of an individual rather than the specific resource use of individuals
(Kane and Kane, 1978).
Though she could see his bald head through the window in his
door, Rhea decided she was not ready for another face-to-face
tete-a-tete with Pretend. She decided to buzz him on the phone
intercom. "Pretend Admin, this is Rhea Alty calling," Rhea could
see that Pretend was not finding her humorous. She continued,
"Pretend Admin, it seems to me that several of these methods of
reimbursement could be found coexisting, such as a per diem by
level of care in a specific facility."
"You're right again, Rhea Alty, I hadn't thought about that.
But the different methods may exist individually, for example, all
facilities might get the same per diem. I guess my types of
reimbursement are not mutually exclusive," Pretend Admin admitted.
"What bias to your examples does that introduce?" Rhea Alty
asked.
"I'm not sure," said Pretend Admin, "I really don't believe it
changes things very much, but I'm not sure."
"By the way," Pretend Admin asked, "what relationships do you
see between the method of reimbursement and the other control
mechanisms?"
"To tell you the truth, Pretend Admin, I think that the
relationship between the method of pricing and the method of
reimbursement that you have already mentioned is the only
relationship I can think of," said Rhea Alty. "And more
importantly, if we hurry on to the last rate-setting axis, payment
perspective, you'll be able to make your coffee break on time."
4. Payment Perspective
The fourth axis of rate setting is the payment perspective (see
Graph 3d). There are two types of payment perspective: retrospective
and prospective. The first type is retrospective payment. This is
payment in which an actual rate is set only after the costs have been
incurred by a provider. One criticism of this system is that it is
attuned primarily to accrual accounting costs while ignoring economic
costs. It disregards vital elements of financial requirements such as
working captial and may provide too little funding for plant capital
where mortgage payments exceed depreciation payments (Hitt, 1977).
As a consequence, a state agency may end up paying for interest
payments which would appear to be excessive except that they are
necessary for a vendor who is forced to borrow money to meet his working
capital needs. Furthernore, this type of payment perspective is often
associated with excessive costs since there is no incentive for cost
containment. Retrospective payment may be inherently inflationary,
because it rewards inefficiency (Vladeck, 1980).
Strangely, the only constraint found in retrospective payment is
that of meeting working capital needs and since one can borrow to meet
such needs, albeit at currently high interest rates, there is no
incentive to constrain costs. Only when the amount borrowed for working
capital reaches the limit that lenders are willing to lend against
accounts receivable, does retrospective payment serve to constrain
costs. Larger vendors have larger accounts receivable against which to
borrow. It is hard to know whether the result is the constraint of
unnecessary and excessive costs, or reduction in quantity or quality of
essential services. Retrospective payment may, however, provide the
fiscal motivation for increasing provider participation and service
quantity by assuring that all reasonable costs will be reimbursed.
Retrospective payment may also foster the financial conditions under
which cost-increasing quality efforts can occur (Richardson, 1981).
The second payment perspective is prospective payment through which
providers are informed of their future rate. It is often argued that
this method of payment allows providers to know what they can afford to
spend before they spend it and helps secure credit. Sometimes a
prospective payment is made that gives providers a flat fee in
proportion to their obligations, but independent of particular resources
used or their costs. Providers would be motivated to economize on costs
and on the use of particular resources which have implications for
quality of care (Mead, 1977; Vladeck, 1980).
Prospective payments oblige providers to live within the possible
revenues generated. The provider must trim expenditures if payments are
limited, possibly achieving this by reducing services. Any such
trinming process is difficult and complicated, but is preferable to
coping with cuts after dollars are spent. A prospective payment period
would, it is alleged, permit better management of necessary
inadequacies. With rate decisions being made beforehand, providers
would be in a better position to challenge denial decisions on specific
cost items by publicizing how services would be affected (Hitt, 1977).
Prospective payment can accomplish its cost control ends simply by
excluding high cost providers regardless of quality. While the method
offers substantial potential for economizing, this potential may remain
unrealized. Providers may not allow a surplus to exist, because this
would reduce the cost base for future years. Prospective payment may
have a negative impact on quality, because it focuses pressure on cost
control (Richardson, 1981).
Prospective reimbursement has had mixed success. In New Jersey and
Rhode Island, where the analysis used a hospital-by-hospital budget
review, prospective reimbursement had an insignificant effect on
costs and quality of care. In Western Pennsylvania, where the analysis
used a combination of budget reviews and a formula, there was a cost
impact on services under the influence of administrators, but not on
those services under the influence of physicians (pathology, radiology,
surgery). There was no deterioration in care. It is possible, however,
that there was a self-selection bias with participation by those
hospitals who were most able to decrease costs. In New York, the
analysis used only a formula without analysis of budgets or comparisons
across programs. In New York costs were decreased, but possibly at the
expense of hospital solvency (Hellinger, 1980). The New York hospitals
were as likely to reduce costs by reducing services to patients as to
cut waste or eliminate unnecessary expenditures (Vladeck, 1980).
"Pretend Admin," Rhea Alty called out, "you forgot about the
relationships that the payment perspective has with other
mechanisms."
"I was hoping you wouldn't notice, Rhea Alty; you see, I think
I'm having symptoms of caffeine withdrawal,," said Pretend Admin,
knowing his protestations were falling on deaf ears.
The relationship between the method of payment and quality of
service does not appear to have been supported. Retrospective payment
may reduce competition by driving out small vendors. Payment
perspective is also linked to contracting because of their joint
effects. It is argued that reimbursement mechanisms which pay hospitals
prospectively in lump sums, rather than retrospectively for
expenditures, would have the effect of setting prices exogenously
thereby simulating a market and giving providers a strong incentive to
economize (Mead, 1977). Further, contracting mechanisms which are based
on previous expenditures or are performance related are more likely to
require a retrospective determination of costs.
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"Pretend Admin, can you suggest any summary of all these axes
of rate-setting?" Rhea Alty asked.
"Augh!!" screamad Mr. Pretend Admin, not realizing that his
office door was open. When Rhea Alty poked her head in to make
sure her boss wasn' t having a stroke she heard him mumbling.
"Sometimes I wish I was a bear of very little brain, then I' d
know the only correct choice was honey."
"Sounds like its time for another coffee break, boss," Rhea
Alty called in, "what were you mumbling about bears and honey?"
"Eeyores can't understand," Mr. Pretend Admin stated as he
walked past and headed downstairs for his half-hour interlude with
the boys for coffee. So it was left to Rhea Alty to attempt the
summnary.
Rates and standards are intertwined. One model of rate-setting is
to let providers determine their cost to deliver a unit-of-service.
This method assumes that the components (inputs) of a unit of service
have been long established and accepted. It also assumes copetition
amng providers. A second model is to use a system of "class rates"
where the state agency defines the components (inputs) and costs of a
particular delivery modality. To do this, the input standards would
have to be sufficiently specific so that the fiscal impacts would be
clear (Massachusetts Task Force on Social Services Rate-Setting, 1978).
F. CONTRACTING PROCESS
The second type of control mechanism is the contracting process
where the axis reflects an increasing variability in the contract price
(see Graph 3e). There are two types of contracts: cost-oriented and
performance- oriented.
1. Cost-Oriented Contracting Processes
There are six types of cost-oriented contracting processes: fixed
price, unit price, fixed price redeterminable, cost plus fixed
percentage of cost, cost sharing, and cost reimbursenent. The first
type of cost-oriented contracting process is the fixed price contract.
It involves a fixed price, lump sum payment with the prices set
beforehand by the State. It is the easiest contract to administer and
is appropriate when costs can be estimated with reasonable accurancy.
It places most of the risks on the provider (Wedel, 1978) and is
potentially the least expensive to a state agency. Since the payment
remains the same, regardless of the conditions the provider encounters,
the risks for the provider can be considerable (Fisk, Kiesling and
Muller, 1978).
In the version of this contracting process adopted by the
Massachusetts Rate Setting Cormission, a flat rate was established for
each kind of service. Providers that can perform the service for less
than the flat rate will keep the difference, while those that spend more
will have to absorb the loss (Providence Sunday Journal, 1981).
However, this plan may favor larger providers if there are economies of
scale. Given economies of scale, larger providers, who can spread
administrative and indirect costs over a larger direct service base,
would be more likely to retain funds from this plan. Samller providers
would be more likely to operate in the red. A flat rate offers no
incentives to provide the effort necessary to achieve high quality, to
the extent that high quality requires extra expenditures; as in nursing
hames in Illinois. (Koetting, 1980).
This contracting process requires that the state agency have a very
clear idea of what it needs. It is an attempt to bring market forces
into the contracting process. The needed items must be sufficiently
standardized to permit many firms to compete. Profit comes from holding
costs as far below the estimate as possible (Dupre and Gustafson, 1974).
The second type of cost-oriented contracting process is a unit
price contract. This contract is based on a fixed price for each unit
of service. A contract that is based on the units performed, carries
with it the drawback that quality may be lower because it is profitable
to perform each unit of service quickly, or, alternatively, to maximize
the number of service units performed (Fisk, Kiesling and Muller, 1978).
The third type of cost-oriented contracting process is the fixed
price redeterminable contract. This type of contract has clauses for
moving prices up or down. It is appropriate when cost factors are
likely to vary during the contract period and the state agencies have
sore flexibility in their funding arrangements (Wedel, 1978).
The fourth type of cost-oriented contracting process is based on
fixed cost, plus a fixed percentage. In this type of contract the
importance of establishing a target cost for the contract is vital. The
target cost is the expected cost of performing the contract as
negotiated between the provider and the state agency.
These negotiated contracts are appropriate where the additional
resources from the percentage over target costs can be justified as
profit or for program expansion (Wedel, 1978). It gives the provider
significant flexibility where the service that is needed is uncertain or
complex. These contracts are the result of a bargaining process in
which the providers have an advantage. The providers attempt to
negotiate high target costs and have an advantage over the state agency
because provider personnel are likely to be more knowledgeable about
cost determinants. The contractor has little risk and costs are likely
to be high. Competition concentrates on aspects other than costs such
as quality, timeliness, etc. (Dupre and Gustafson, 1974).
The fifth type of cost-oriented contracting process is cost
sharing. In cost sharing the provider receives a predetermined portion
of costs for service delivery. Cost sharing is a time-tested way of
registering individual preferences (Seidman, 1980), because it seeks to
ration services through a traditional demand side variable-net price.
But it is unclear whether the demand that is deflected is essential or
superfluous (Schweitzer, 1978).
Cost sharing is most applicable when resources are scarce (Wedel,
1978). It can take the form of a flat fee to be paid for each service
by a purchaser or of a fixed percentage to be paid for each service.
Evidence suggests that cost sharing does depress the costs and the
demand for services (Mead, 1977). Cost sharing in insurance plans
appears to reduce new demands (resulting fram the insurance) for
ambulatory services if the deductible is greater than the average amount
spent for care (Newhouse and Phelps, 1974). Much of the difference in
utilization which occurs with cost sharing in insurance plans may be due
to self-selection, with healthier people choosing plans with higher
deductibles (Kaplan and Lave, 1971). However, cost sharing at least
makes physicians and care-givers aware of the impacts of their decisions
(Seidman, 1980).
The sixth type of cost-oriented contracting process is cost
reimbursement. In cost reimbursement allowable costs are reimbursed to
the extent described in the contract (Wedel, 1978). Payments may
increase if care of the sicker or needier client necessitates higher
costs. We rely on the high standards of the provider to prevent
exploitation, but this approach has accelerated the cost increases for
care (Kane and Kane, 1979). A straight cost-related system removes all
disincentives to providing high quality care insofar as high quality
care is a function of expenditures, as in nursing homes in Illinois
(Koetting, 1980).
A reimbursement system which pays actual costs up to a cap is
indifferent below the cap to whether costs are increasing because of
slack, additional quality, or special aspects of the program (Koetting,
1980; Vladeck, 1980), and above the cap penalizes a facility with high
quality or special program aspects, as in nursing homes in Illinois
(Koetting, 1980).
Cost reimbursement may produce perverse attitudes between payers
and payees. Payers may regard providers as beneficiaries of a subsidy
rather than as independent sellers entitled to full payment. Providers
react to this dependency status by alternately showing subservient and
demanding attitudes. Indulgence by payers is assumed by providers, so
that when payers act restrictively, severe problems surface. It is
unlikely that simply increasing payments would resolve those problems in
health care (Hitt, 1977). Cost reimbursement was gladly accepted when
hospitals were running deficits and could not collect even their costs
from many patients. Cost reimbursement is unattractive now as hospitals
realize they can generate surpluses and resent being told that they
cannot keep surpluses (Samers, 1969; Vladeck, 1980).
In cost reimbursement contracts, when a state agency buys a whole
program the answer to inadequate staffing or underfunding is solved by a
provider usually by taking take in fewer clients (Massachusetts Task
Force on Social Service Rate-Setting, 1978). This has led to high
vancancy rates. Vendors sometimes prefer cost reimbursement contracts
because it frees them from dependency on referral sources.
As one moves from a fixed cost to an entirely reimbursed cost
contract, the importance of the fiscal monitoring, i.e., auditing,
linkage becames critical. It is important to insure that the state is
paying for costs that are associated with its contract and only with its
particular contract, and not with all contracts in general that a
provider may have.
2. Performance-Oriented Contracting Processes
There are two types of performance-oriented contracting processes:
cost plus incentive and negotiated performance. Performance oriented
contracts place a premium on outcomtes, outputs, or processes such as
quality. These contracts are appropriate where objectives are agreed
upon and the criteria to measure performance can be clearly specified.
The rate of actual funding is dependent on the level of provider output
(Wedel, 1978). Hospitals do not attempt to realize large profits
(surpluses) when there is an incentive to realize such profits. Rather,
they spend up to the limit of each year' s rates, because they know that
their future rates will be based on current costs (Messier, 1978).
The first type of performance contract is the cost-plus incentive.
In this type of contract, target costs and performance objectives are
established. The provider receives funds for the costs of services at a
predetermined minimum level of output. If higher output or outcome is
delivered, additional funds are received by the provider up to a maximum
(Wedel, 1978). The provider has three incentives: to hold actual costs
below target costs, to keep target costs as high as possible (Dupre and
Gustafson, 1974), and to score bonuses for valued outputs.
Incentive systems which return to providers part of the savings due
to holding costs down should restrain cost increases, as demonstrated by
the 1970 Medicaid experiments (Mead, 1977). However, monetary rewards
will probably find their way into additional investments and higher
salaries, thus raising costs for the next rate cycle in hospitals
(Somers, 1969).
The second type of performance contract is based on negotiated
performance. Payment is based on an expected level of performance which
is negotiated with providers. As the expected performance is achieved,
an incentive payment is received by the provider. If the expected level
of performance is not achieved, a significant penalty may be charged
(Wedel, 1978) Hospitals have many ways to reduce costs without improving
efficiency by relatively invisible reductions in quality in order to
avoid a penalty (Somers, 1969). The use of incentives as motivators
runs into problems when workers are unable to control all of the factors
which affect the level of performance (Yorks, 1976). Under incentive
payment systems, workers may view the incentive system as a control
system through which management makes sure it only pays for what it
gets, rather than an effort to allow workers to maximize their earnings
(Yorks, 1976).
"Now wait, Pretend Admin, I was willing to accept evidence
about hospitals and nursing homes, but now you're using evidence
about motivating individuals," Rhea Alty declared.
"Rhea Alty, you may have something. I've been collecting
evidence wherever I could find it. I think if an individual's
performance is being evaluated, then specific behaviors have
probably been specified. The private sector does nave the
advantage that behavior can be clearly specified. Consequently, I
would expect that the effects of performance contracting are more
pronounced in the private sector," Pretend Admin stated.
"While we're on the topic, what differences exist between
health care institutions and other human service residential care
programs that might be important?" Rhea asked.
"I think that performance is clearer in health care, Rhea
Alty, so it may be easier for other types of human service
residences to cut costs and/or quality without the effects being
evident," Pretend Admin suggested.
In nineteenth century England, contracts with schools were based on
student attainment and attendance, which resulted in low pay for
teachers and teaching which was effectively limited to the subject areas
tested (Gramlich and Koshel, 1975).
In the performance contracting experiments carried out in the early
1970s in the United States, the contracts created an unintended
incentive to concentrate on those children most likely to meet the
average gains necessary for payment. In the three-year program in Gary,
Indiana, it appears that improvement was greater among those students in
the middle range where the improvement was expected based on this
unintended incentive. In the one-year Office of Equal Opportunity (OEO)
programs, however, this unintended incentive appeared to have little
effect on the pattern of gains. Possibly, the OBO contractors might
have taken greater advantage of this incentive if they had had more
power to group students by potential for gain and profitability, and
more time to operate. In both the OEO and the Gary, Indiana programs,
those academic subjects which were not being tested suffered as part of
the incentive contract. In the OEO experiment, students in the program
did test slightly higher in the subjects stressed than they would have
been expected to otherwise, but pupil attendance was lower than normal
(Gramlich and Koshel, 1975).
One version of negotiated performance contracting is outcome
reimbursement. In this type of contracting process, reimbursement is
based on the initial condition of an individual. Knowing the expected
course of the client's condition over time, improvements would be
rewarded and deterioration punished by retrospective adjustments.
Outcomes of concern would include overall physical and functional status,
and psychological and social well-being in nursing homes (Kane and Kane,
1978). This type of reimbursement might tend to decrease innovation, as
nursing home providers might feel more confident of escaping punishment
for deterioration if they have followed standard patterns of care
(Willemain, 1979). Possible modifications of this type of performance
contracting would include ignoring minor changes in status, and limiting
the liability for deterioration and the reward for improvement.
Physical and functional status might be weighted heavier than other
dimensions. These modifications should help insure that clients whose
prognoses are poorest will still received needed services. However, the
increased risks in outcome reimbursement would probably require that
expenditures be increased as a compensating factor (Willemain, 1979).
As contracting processes increase the risk for all participants
(rightward movement on Graph 3e), monitoring becomes a more important
part of the reimbursement process. This would cause a rightward
movement in the what and how of monitoring. As standards become more
closely related to performance, then it is also possible for the state
agency to increase the risks for vendors by moving to performance
contracting or to more fixed price contracting. It is also more likely
that as contracting processes increase the risks for both vendors and
the state agency, standards which emphasize performance will be called
for by vendors and the state, at least partly to reduce the
opportunities for corruption.
As the risks within cost-oriented contracting are shifted from
providers to the state (i.e., as one moves fram left to right on the
axis), providers would be less concerned about the clients they accept.
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As the risks for providers increase (mvement to the right in
performance contracting), providers would want more control over the
clients they accept.
"I'll see you in a half hour," said Pretend Admin as he
breezed past Rhea Alty.
"But standards won't take long!" Rhea called after him.
G. STANDARD SETTING
The third control mechanism for influencing provider behavior is
setting standards for the service to be delivered. The range of
variation in standard setting runs from getting vendors to agree to a
nominal set of contract terms to the specification of the desired
outcome (see Graph 3f). Clear standards illuminate what is expected of
providers. This is as important a concern of providers as it is of
state contract managers (Rhode Island Task Force on Contracting Out,
1976). The choice of instrument must match the problem to be regulated.
What works for reducing fire hazards won' t work for improving the
quality of nursing services (Vladeck, 1980).
The first type of standard setting mechanism is "terms of the
contract." This includes such items as agreement to let state and
federal agencies perform audits, non-discrimination in the hiring of
staff and in the provision of client services, and bonding, as required.
The agreement of a provider to these terms sometimes allows the provider
to join a list of "certified" providers.
The second type of standard setting is input standards for fire and
safety, as well as other facility standards such as the physical layout
of a residence. Standards of this type, which constrain providers and
have an arguable relationship to quality, generate ill-will with
providers who may not be willing to go through the maze of details
regarding such things as the layout of rooms (Buckle and Buckle, 1977).
This reduces the potential size of the provider market, increases the
cost of the service, and has the effect of limiting entry to the
provider market. This type of standard setting sometimes leads to
"licensure" of a provider. The life safety code (licensing) requires
facilities to make same unnecessary and costly changes that could be
better spent on patient care (Long Term Care Task Force, DHEW, 1978).
The third type of standard setting is input standards related to
institutional quality, such as the number and types of personnel,
staffing ratios, record-keeping, etc. This type of standard setting is
sometimes referred to as "accreditation". Despite widespread adoption
as a screening mechanism, one sunrary of the literature in health care
found that this type of input-oriented regulation appeared to make
little difference in performance as evidenced by the performance of
approved and non-approved providers (O'Donoghue, 1974). However, it is
unclear what effect the presence of accredited providers had in possibly
improving the performance of non-accredited providers.
It is very difficult, if not impossible, to relate input units and
input costs to output units, and to performance. Larger expenditures do
not always lead to proportionately higher quality. While overall
resource expenditure may be a bigger factor, the number of employees and
the organizational setting in which they work results in a variety of
quality of care which can be purchased at the same price in nursing
homes (Koetting, 1980). The input standards do not appear to be related
to other measures of care in nursing homes unless they represent glaring
inadequacies (Linn, 1974). Input standards, such as those found in
accreditation requirements, are necessary but not sufficient conditions
for satisfactory care. The chief use of these standards may be to
determine the boundaries and components of a service. While input
standards may give indications of potential for performance, they reveal
nothing of actual performance (Wiillemain, 1974).
The accreditation process assesses a facility' s capacity to rendor
good care, not the facility' s performance. It examines structural and
administrative aspects of a facility, because these aspects are highly
visible. The additional inputs which accreditation requires fit well
with the service orientation of providers.
Input standards are not mutually exclusive, but rather tend to
cumulative. If a program has accreditation standards, then it is also
likely to have licensure and certification standards.
The fourth type of standard setting is process standards and
measures of the "quality" of the service being delivered. Process
measures would include such items as the number and type of verbal
interactions between staff and clients. Problems with this type of
standard setting include the weak link between the elements of process
quality, outputs and outcomes, and the general difficulty of
establishing a definition of the critical elements of processes that are
important components of quality. A study of the use of input and
process measures in nursing hones indicated that a process measure using
a peer review of quality was most closely related to assessments of the
physical plant, staffing ratios and quality of meals (input variables)
(Linn, 1974). Process standards relate to the dynamics of a service and
are more meaningful than input standards, but are also more expensive to
measure (Willemain, 1974). Process standards can degenerate into
cookbooks for best care practices (Jacobs, Christoffel and Dixon, 1976).
The fifth type of standard setting is the specification of the
performance of the provider. The major drawback to this type of
standard-setting is the determination of what constitutes the output.
The use of output performance standards may create incentives for
short-term gains without proper consideration of long-term consequences,
as private industry knows only too well (O'Hara and Leschem, 1977). For
example, short-term profit maximization may blind an organization to
long-term problems, such as client disatisfaction, facility
deterioration, etc.
The sixth type of standard setting is the specification of the
desired outcome, that is, the change in client condition, resulting from
outputs. There is some question about the validity of this type of
standard from the provider' s viewpoint, because a provider may follow
the best prescribed protocols for service delivery and not be effective.
The ineffectiveness could result from environmental conditions beyond
the control of the provider, or because the logic of the protocols is
flawed, or the protocols are incomplete, as well as from an ineffective
provider' s program. This type of standard-setting may induce
conservative strategies for service delivery, thereby reducing
innovation in services (Willemain, 1979).
"Now these last two sound like they will answer all of my
questions, in fact, they sound too good to be true," stated Mr.
Pretend Admin, deciding he'd bounce it off Rhea Alty.
"Well," Rhea Alty said, while still formulating her answer in
her head, "I like them but the vendors would kick up a fuss."
"But why?" wondered Mr. Pretend Admin out loud.
"You see," Rhea Alty explained, "with input standards, and
maybe even process standards, you know what you have to do to pass
if you're a vendor. Everything is prescribed for you and as long
as you play by those rules nobody can call you a bad vendor."
"Hmn," thought Admin, "are providers that risk-averse? Can
Rhea Alty be right about that?"
As a state agency moves from input standards to output and outcome
standards, the standards become more difficult for a state agency to
specify. Hence, the absence of accepted measures. The current status
of such standards is not such as to allow their use for regulatory
purposes. The combination of adequately defined measures and the
pressure of the legal system for standards which describe activities
that are measurable and capable of being uniformly interpreted has lead
to the emphasis on input and process standards (Vladeck, 1980). As a
consequence, the use of monitoring information for provider compliance
and change would decrease the use of standards other than input
standards. Further, it would increase the detail of input standards.
The first three types of standard setting really are variations of
the establishment of input standards for a service. They relate, first
of all, to the method of pricing when input standards are required so
that the method of pricing must have a corresponding means of including
these costs as part of the established rate. They also relate to the
exogenous variable, the level of competition. Input standards have
costs, because as one increases the set of inputs required by a vendor,
one also raises costs and reduces the potential and actual pool of
providers. Providers are faced with higher costs and they must have
sufficient working capital and/or start-up captial to meet the costs of
input standards that are required before they can start a service.
Input standards may serve to separate out a class of providers, whether
it is through licensing, accreditation or certification; once a class of
providers has been separated out, they are given additional
power by virtue of being part of a smaller market. Their position
vis-a-vis the state is one of greater power as well. Often providers
will attempt to have this determination of input standards made in such
a fashion as to limit entry. This is true, for instance, in the
trucking industry and many other industries, because this allows the
provider market to have the government do the work for the providers
of limiting entry to the market (Wilson, 1974). Similarly, as inputs
become more detailed, the regionalization potential of providers may be
reduced because the inputs are specific to one state purchasing agency.
The relationship is not a straightline one. At either end of the
standard-setting process there is sufficient latitude in the
specification of the service so that competition and regionalization
potential are not affected. However, as accreditation standards become
more detailed, competition and regionalization potential are decreased.
Standard setting for processes, outputs, or outcome must have a
similar method of pricing. If the method of pricing is based on changes
or absolute levels of quality or outcome, then the criteria for quality
or outcames have to be set by standards. There is also a close
relationship between standards and the contracting process, if that
process includes same measure of performance. It is also important to
remember that, overall, standards ought to set the stage for monitoring,
i.e. monitoring should be a natural follow-through based on the
standards for performance that have been established. Monitoring should
simply be a verification of the extent to which the standards have been
successfully implemented.
"Rhea," said Pretend Admin, "I am thankful for your help, but
many of these relationships seem obvious."
"That's why you hired me," crowed Rhea Alty, "If you checked
around you would find the relationships more honored in the
literature and in common-sense discussions than in practice." But
Pretend Admin had left long ago to join his old cronies for a cup
of coffee. "No one listens to me around here, especially when I
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make my best conmients," Rhea Alty said to the empty chair of
Pretend Admin.
H. MDNITORING
The fourth control mechanism for controlling vendor behavior is
monitoring, which is the activity of determining and describing what is
or is not occuring in a provider agency. Monitoring data should reflect
its intended use. Critical elements in the decision of how and what to
monitor are the time available for completing the monitoring, the cost
of monitoring, and the number and types of staff resources available.
Monitoring is difficult because of the large number of small agencies,
each of which has a different approach to record-keeping. This creates
a strain on the resources, costs and quality of monitoring (Buckle and
Buckle, 1977). The axes of monitoring are particularly closely related:
what is monitored, how it is monitored, who monitors, and the uses of
the monitoring information (see Graphs 3g - 3k). Following traditional
research steps, the what, how, and who of monitoring should be
established after the determination of how the information is going to
be used. The options on each of these axes may be cumulative. For
example, if the quantity of expected services is monitored, then it is
likely that fiscal procedures are monitored as well.
1. What to Monitor
The first axis of monitoring is the delineation of what is to be
monitored. There are seven items that could be the object of
monitoring: terms of the contract, fiscal procedures, services are
delivered, quantity of expected services is delivered, all inputs
expected are delivered, quality expected is delivered, and cost
efficiency or cost effectiveness. The first item of monitoring is terms
of the contract, including such items as personnel policy and
procedures, affirmative action policies.
The second item that could be monitored is the fiscal integrity of
the provider, such as its procedures for billing, budgeting, allocation
of expenses, preparation of financial reports and internal auditing.
The third item that could be monitored is that services of some
sort are delivered. This is simply a "yes" or "no" determination. The
fourth item that could be monitored is the quantity of services that are
delivered (e.g., 3,000 client bed-days). Again, this is a simple
determination from the records of the agency that the provision for the
expected number of units of services has been met.
The fifth item that could be monitored is that all of the expected
inputs (e.g., one physical therapist three times a week for three hours
each visit) are delivered. The sixth item that could be monitored is
that the expected quality of the service is delivered. The seventh item
that could be monitored is that the expected performance is delivered.
This determination might include links with fiscal aspects of the
service delivery in the determination of such things as cost efficiency
and cost effectiveness.
"Do you see how quickly the monitoring mechanism is
progressing, Pretend Admin?" Rhea Alty asked.
"So far, so far," Pretend Admin responded, "but there are
still four more monitoring axes and we haven' t discussed the
relationships that this monitoring axis has with other axes."
When contracts establish performance or the set or resources to be
delivered, then obviously those factors ought to become part of the
monitoring process. The same is true for the method of pricing. For
example, the method of pricing may be delivering a set of inputs and
that would have to be verified through monitoring. Clearly, as
standards move from left to right on the standard setting axis,
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monitoring-what would adjust accordingly.
2. How to Monitor
The second axis is how the monitoring is done. Monitoring can be
done through five means: desk audit, field audit, qualitative
assessments, constructed measures, and testing. As we move along this
axis, the state agency resources utilized for monitoring must increase.
The first method of monitoring is by desk audit, in which the state
agency reviews any materials sent to it in its own offices. The second
method of monitoring is by field audit, where the state agency reviews
materials on file in the vendor's- offices. The third method of
monitoring is by qualitative assessment. This might include client
feedback, client satisfaction surveys, peer reviews, etc. Client
dissatisfaction may indicate the need for corrective action, but the
contary may not be true (Willemain, 1979). The instructions for
completion of the monitoring instrument are minimal and serve primarily
as guidelines. Responses may be restricted to a choice of "yes" or "no"
(present or not present). A study of implicit and explicit judgements
of process and quality found that implicit judgements of process were
related to care in terms of the conventional wisdoms, and not in terms
of the processes likely to improve a patient' s status (Brook and Appel,
1973). This suggests that since qualitative assessments are based on
implicit judgments, the usefulness of the findings that these
assessments generate is limited.
The fourth method of monitoring is by constructed measures. This
would include reports from vendors, semi-structured interviews or
structured interviews, etc. Constructed measures use predetermined
indicators of each gradation in the measure, with explicit criteria for
differentiating between the gradations.
The fifth method of monitoring is by testing. This requires a
determination of expected outcomes and the construction of an instrument
to test for the presence of these outcomes. Specific events and changes
are addressed (Wedel, 1978; Waller, et al., 1976).
The determination of how monitoring will occur is closely related
to what is monitored and who monitors. For example, to verify that
services are delivered there is no need for an elaborate testing
mechanism; rather, a field audit would be sufficient. Consequently, as
monitoring-what increases, monitoring-how would increase, thereby
increasing monitoring-who.
3. Who Monitors
The third axis of monitoring is the determination of what actor
will do the monitoring. The first actor would be the provider
performing self-reports. The second actor would be the client, through
client feedback or client satisfaction surveys. The third actor would
be community monitors, either case managers or visitors, whose potential
reporting of problems is apparently sufficient to improve quality. This
position has been empirically supported by Barney (1974) and Gottesman
and Bourestrcn (1974). Barney's review of other studies found that
licensing and regulation of nursing hones did not appear to be an
effective tool for ensuring the quality of institutional life. However,
greater community presence in a nursing hone broke the traditional
isolation of nursing homes and fostered greater accountability.
Gottesman' s and Bourtestrom' s review of other studies, as well as their
own research, indicated that patients who have more visitors get better
care.
The fourth actor would be a fiscal audit team. The fifth actor
would be a performance audit team. The sixth actor would be a joint
fiscal/performance audit team. The seventh actor would be a third
party. As the state agency moves from self reports by vendors to third
party reports, the potential objectivity and expense of monitoring
increases.
The relationship between who monitors and what is to be monitored,
and how that monitoring is to be done is an obvious but critical link,
both in the establishment of objectivity and in the establishment of
cost. There is also a relationship to the use of the information. As
the use of the information becomes more severe, that is, it is used to
terminate providers, then the data must be more objective and in many
cases this means more expensive, and the determination of who monitors
moves towards a third party monitor. Monitoring-who also limits how
monitoring can be done. Where persuasion gives way to quasi-judicial
regulation and legal redress is a viable next step, then activities must
be more formalized and information must be more specific and consistent,
so as to survive legal evidentiary requirements (Crane, 1976).
"At last, the what, how and who are done, that should be it
for a while," decided Pretent Admin.
"Not quite, Pretend Admin!" Rhea Alty called out. "You're
forgetting the most important part of monitoring - the use of
monitoring information."
"But I just finished talking about that," said Pretend Admin
resignedly.
"You've only just begun," declared Rhea Alty.
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4. The Uses of Monitoring Information for Linkage
The fourth axis of monitoring is the use of monitoring information
to link parts of the vendor control system. The axis reflects an
increasing internalization of the focus of the change.
First, monitoring information may be used for compliance and
control purposes when providers are cited for major problem areas.
Second, monitoring information may also have a significant impact
on planning where it could be used to guide the choice of vendors and
budget projections. The information may also be used to help managers
measure their own program. This use of information appears more likely
to occur when projects have been well accepted or have failed to
function (Waller, et al., 1976).
Lastly, since monitoring is based on a set of standards, monitoring
information may be used to revise these standards. The information
would be used to evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness of existing
standards and criteria that apply to processes, programs or facilities.
The need for additional or more comprehensive standards could be
determined.
As the characteristics of monitoring information are changed to
become more appropriate for internal changes in the state agency control
system, the information may becom less apprpriate for severe vendor
changes, such as termination.
5. Uses of Monitoring Information for Changing Vendor Behavior
The fifth axis of monitoring is the use of monitoring information
to change vendor behavior. The axis reflects an increasing severity of
actions against providers as one moves from left to right. Sanctions
against facilities for failing to meet standards remains a problem.
Removal or diversion of clients is possible only where supply exceeds
demand; reductions of future reimbursement only further reduce the
possibility of improvements (Willemain, 1980).
The first use of course is to do nothing with the information.
Several problems could inhibit the use of monitoring information.
First, no criteria may exist for responding to the monitoring
information. Second, there may be insufficient resources to respond to
the information. Third, the programs, objectives, and responsibilities
of the various state agencies may be too diverse to allow a particular
agency to take responsibility for responding to the monitoring
information. Fourth, the information may not be in a form which is
usable by decision-makers. Fifth, the information may not arrive in
time to allow the agencies to act on it. Sixth, often projects are
funded without explicit statements of the planned results so that the
monitoring information has no base for comparison (Waller, et al.,
1976).
The second use of monitoring information is to negotiate changes
with providers by offering technical assistance. In order for this to
work, the conditions indicating when a need for technical assistance
exists must be clearly specified beforehand (Waller, Kemp, Scanlon,
Tolson, Wholey, 1976). Unfortunately, many states have given technical
assistance a bad reputation because state agency managers have preferred
to "consult with" providers who should have been recipients of more
drastic measures (Butler, 1980). Surveyors regulating nursing haes in
some states perceived themselves as consultants, not policemen (Vladeck,
1980).
The third use of monitoring information is to negotiate changes in
the rate with the provider. This might involve changes in the number,
types and costs of the units of service as part of the rate change. One
method of implementing this contract change negotiation is to
provide for sanctions linking performance to reimbursement (Schaffer,
1979).
The fourth use of monitoring information is to preclude or increase
client placenent with a provider, thereby, if allowed by the contracting
mechanism, cutting off or increasing the flow of funds to a provider.
The fifth use of monitoring information is to provide for either
the termination or the renewal of a contract based on performance.
However, the specific criteria for motivating such a decision are rarely
specified in advance. This limits the possible use of monitoring
information (Waller, Kemp, Scanlon, Tolson and Wholey, 1976).
The most important relationships are the effect of the potential
use on who performs the monitoring and on the standards.
"That wasn't so bad," decided Pretend Admin.
"There's only one mechanism left-client placerent," informed
Rhea Alty.
"And then we're done?" asked Pretend Admin.
"Not quite, Pretend Admin, we still have the exogenous
variables to do," said Rhea Alty.
I. CLIENT PLACEMENT
The fifth mechanism of vendor control is client placement. The axis
of client placement is the extent to which clients have a choice of
providers (see Graph 31). The first type of client placement is market
choice in which clients choose their own providers. This assumes that
traditional market conditions are met, namely, that there are numerous
competitive providers and sufficient information about these providers
to allow the client to make an informed choice.
A variant of this type of client placement is the use of vouchers,
which may restrict choices among providers to those certified or
licensed for participation. If complete equality of care is the intent,
the distribution of vouchers should be the sole determinant of the
purchase of services. If, however, only a minimum quantity for each
person needs to be guaranteed and not complete equality, then the
purchase of services with vouchers for minimum services and money for
additional services will allow a diversity of preferences to be
expressed (Thurow, 1972).
Vouchers were seen as a way to increase the diversity and
responsiveness of education in a competitive environment (Areen and
Jencks, 1972; Arons, 1972). Despite making vouchers for more
disadvantaged youth worth monetarily more, it is likely that the better
private schools would limit the number and proportion of disadvantaged
youth that would be admitted (Ginzberg, 1972). There must exist a
sufficient provider market in which the client can use such vouchers.
The notion that educational vouchers would be given to parents who,
provided with information, could make an effective choice is weak
because the information about the performance of schools will be subject
to disagreements about goals and it is unlikely that many parents would
have the time, energy, and background to make informed judgments
(Ginzberg, 1972).
Vouchers are not immune to "distortions to measures" caused by
standards for services. In housing voucher experiments, where minimn
standards for dwellings where imposed as entrance requirements, the
standards had only a slight impact on housing consumption. Choice and
changes in housing were altered to the least extent necessary to qualify
for housing vouchers. Total housing outlays (consumption) were not
significantly increased.
The second type of client placement is determination by a case
manager or social worker. Consumer sovereignty may not exist because of
poor information or because the people are deemed poor decision-makers.
This creates a need for a disinterested party to prevent exploitation
(Thurow, 1972). This choice may be based on criteria such as the
quality, cost, or availability of service. For this option to be most
effective, information fram the monitoring system about the criteria
must be available to allow the intermediary to use leverage on the
market.
The third type of client placement occurs when there is a local
monopoly by a sole provider who is supposed to serve all qualified
clients. This may occur when a provider has a guaranteed area through
the bidding process, or when other factors limit the number of
providers. There is evidence from a study of home health agencies in
Massachusetts that providers are able to manipulate what type of client
they service through their choice of a particular service delivery nodel
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In this type of client placement, providers usually "cream"
clients with the least problems or with the easiest service require-
ments.
Nursing homes pursue an active policy toward rejecting and
accepting different payment classes of clients (Marshall, Greenlees and
Yett, 1974). In choosing clients, they will be concerned about the
costs of treating individual patients and may discriminate against the
most severely impaired (Scanlon, 1980). Providers also attempt to keep
the census down to reduce their variable costs (Sellinger, 1979).
Overall high occupancy will lead nursing home facilities, especially
better facilities, to be more selective in admissions, which may mean
that lower reimbursed patients will be relegated to poorer facilities.
(Koetting, 1980).
As the level of competition or the regionalization potential
increases, clients have more choices and market forces can operate. For
the market forces to operate efficiently, the monitoring system must
generate information about providers which can be used by clients in the
choice.
"At last, we're done with the endogenous variables," stated
Pretend Admin. Rhea Alty sat by glumly, mourning the passing away
of such a dear sounding friend.
J. EXOGENOUS VARIABLES
In order to estimate the impact on the provider market of the
state's control mechanisms, an understanding must be gained of likely
provider behavior. Predicting this provider behavior is difficult for
several reasons. First, human service organizations traditionally have
lacked feedback linkages from clients. Consequently, goals and
performance criteria are determined on the basis of professional rather
consumer value judgements (Baker, 1974). Human service organizations
lack reliable and valid measures of effectiveness because there are no
clear operative definitions of desired outcomes, there is inadequate
knowledge of cause and effect relationships, or because they rarely
control enough attributes of their clients in order to measure the
specific consequences of their intervention procedures. As a
consequence, the definitions of goals that are used in human service
organizations tend to be comitrents to certain values, norms and
ideologies, rather than specific performance outcomes (Hasenfeld and
English, 1974) .
Further, it appears that non-profit organizations, particularly in
the health sector, are motivated by prestige, not profit. As a
consequence, any increase in demand results in a profit (surplus) in the
short run and in the long run services will increase in quantity (which
would be expected in profit motivated organizations) and in quality and
camplexity. This, in turn, increases the costs of service. If the non-
profit organization' s clients do not have to pay for the service, then
services will not be priced out of the market and the upward spiral of
costs will continue (Berry, 1974). Competition in the non-profit sector
may then serve to increase costs instead of constraining them.
Non-profit nursing homes attemrpt to maximize their size without
incurring a budget deficit and without reducing the quality of services
in the facility (Scanlon, 1980).
Indeed, among the reasons that regulation has displaced the market
as the controlling force are: the client is not a consumer, government
is the primary consumer, there are barriers to entry to the market, and
the market may be controlled by a few providers. Since the clients do
not pay for the service, demand may be insatiable, providers have few
restraints on price increases, and concern for quality may beccme
secondary. Consequently, price changes may have no relationship to
changes in quality (Richardson, 1981).
A study of human services contracting in Massachusetts found that
the state was subsidizing providers service objectives rather than
achieving its own objectives. In part this problem could be traced to
the lack of usable objectives (Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation,
1980).
In predicting provider behavior, at least two variables may
significantly affect the responsiveness of providers to the state' s
control mechanisms: the level of competition in the provider market and
the degree of regionalization of the provider market.
1. Level of Competition
The first exogenous variable, level of competition, ranges from
sole source to multiple source (see Graph 3m). The first level of
competition is sole-source contracting. This may be the result of the
high level of expertise and resources needed to perform a particular
service, or because bidding has given a provider a guaranteed
service area. One immediate problem with this type of sole-source
contracting is what is termed the "capture" problem, i.e., the
sponsoring agency becomes overly dependent on the sole-source provider
and as a consequence, the sole source provider is in a relatively good
position to dictate its terms for cost and quality (Wedel, 1978). The
state agency is caught in a bind because the uniqueness of the service,
or the frequency with which it is needed, may dictate that either a sole
source or limited sources ought to be used for contracting.
The state must make a decision as to whether or not it is willing
to pay for a multiplicity of small programs as a method of gaining
independence from a sole contractor (Fisk, Kiesling and Muller, 1978).
A large number of suppliers may result in greater competition and,
presumably, lower service costs. But several other factors are just as
important. First, there is no guarantee of competition. Second, one
efficient firm and a knowledgeable public official could reach an
agreement at a price no higher than if multiple competitive suppliers
were present. The problem is in writing the contract and in insuring
that there are sufficient opportunities for renegotiation (Fisk,
Kiesling and Muller, 1978). Otherwise, providers will overestimate the
costs of service to cover their risks.
When competition is sole source because vendors are chosen by a
bidding process, vendors may tend to be large organizations if there are
economies of scale. Since administrative expenses are either fixed, or
increase in steps, there are at least same economies of scale (Koetting,
1980). It may be possible for larger vendors to provide the same
service at a lower price. When competition is limited by a local
monopoly, it is interesting to note that perhaps one of the best
which can compete grows smaller and smaller (Dupre and Gustafson, 1974).
State agencies must recognize that in oligopolistic markets vendors tend
toward a conservative competition which may not consider a variety of
quality in services offered (Buckle and Buckle, 1977). There may not
only be reduced choices for service, but little difference in the cost
and quality among the providers (Harris, 1981). The immediate impact of
limits is usually to raise costs as this involves entry to the market.
Among the reasons there were a few large vendors in each area in
one state were: the impacts of financial constraints in setting up and
running expensive programs; the lack of expertise available in the
community; the limited ability of state agencies to monitor vendors
given restricted funds for this purpose (consequently, state agencies
use vendors they assume are satisfactory); the potential for economies
of scale; the administrative ease of dealing with only a few vendors,
and the hardship of slow state payments. This led to a provider-
dominated purchase system. State agencies felt there was little they
could do and had no alternative vendors to turn to if they were
dissatisfied with a provider's service. One consequence of this
situation is that providers feel safe in rejecting clients who they
think will require too much work (Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation,
1980).
The third level of competition is where there are many providers.
If clients are primarily from one state, providers may be subject to the
regulatory objectives of that particular state. The evidence from
health care indicates that quality (as measured by input use)
competition among providers may increase costs, because cost does not
serve its usual role as a constraint. The competitiveness which results
which can compete grows smaller and smaller (Dupre and Gustafson, 1974).
State agencies must recognize that in oligopolistic markets vendors tend
toward a conservative competition which may not consider a variety of
quality in services offered (Buckle and Buckle, 1977). There may not
only be reduced choices for service, but little difference in the cost
and quality among the providers (Harris, 1981). The inmediate impact of
limits is usually to raise costs as this involves entry to the market.
Among the reasons there were a few large vendors in each area in
one state were: the impacts of financial constraints in setting up and
running expensive programs; the lack of expertise available in the
connunity; the limited ability of state agencies to monitor vendors
given restricted funds for this purpose (consequently, state agencies
use vendors they assume are satisfactory); the potential for economies
of scale; the administrative ease of dealing with only a few vendors,
and the hardship of slow state payments. This led to a provider-
daminated purchase system. State agencies felt there was little they
could do and had no alternative vendors to turn to if they were
dissatisfied with a provider's service. One consequence of this
situation is that providers feel safe in rejecting clients who they
think will require too much work (Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation,
1980).
The third level of competition is where there are many providers.
If clients are primarily from one state, providers may be subject to the
regulatory objectives of that particular state. The evidence from
health care indicates that quality (as measured by input use)
competition among providers may increase costs, because cost does not
serve its usual role as a constraint. The competitiveness which results
revolves around increased use of inputs (particularly technological
inputs) with an increasing cost per bed.
Hospitals compete with each other in the adoption of technical
innovations. In a competitive environment they tend to adopt new
technologies sooner and to acquire more expensive equipment than other
hospitals in less campetitive environments (Rapoport, 1976).
Competition could also drive down the cost of services by inducing
providers to use fewer, lower priced, or lower quality inputs in a
manner similar to the private sector.
"Rhea Alty," sighed Pretend Admin, "this seems awfully dry."
"I know," sighed Rhea back. "Perhaps a discussion of the
relationships might help."
"Very well," said Pretend Admin, "but I don't have to like
it."
Standards have an impact on the provider market to the extent that
standards, particularly input standards, may limit entry by singling out
a class of providers through licensing, accreditation, or certification
or by increasing costs to such an extent that only large vendors or
those with a substantial amount of working capital can stay in the
market. Similarly, flexibility in rate negotiation can increase
competition, and as competition moves from many providers to one
provider it is necessary for negotiation to increase to maintain the
state's position.
Client placement also links with the provider market, i.e. the size
of the provider market and the level of competition in the market has an
important determining value on how clients are placed. Conversely, how
clients are placed will increase or decrease the level of competition.
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2. Regionalization Potential
The second important exogenous variable is the degree of
regionalization of the provider market where the range is from a single-
service, single-state provider market to a multiple-service, multiple-
state provider market (see Graph 3n). In this range the single-service
single-state provider market is the most vulnerable to influence by the
state agency. If there is a single buyer of services, it may be to the
buyer' s advantage to have excess capacity among providers to provide a
motivation for competition even if the excess capacity increases costs
(Vladeck, 1980). As the provider market begins to offer additional
services (single-state, multiple-service) it increases the degree to
which it can change its case mix to capture better reimbursement rates
or preferred types of clients.
A study of nursing homes found that they adapted their patient mix
or adjusted the way they served patients in response to different levels
of reimbursement (Marshall, Greenlees and Yett, 1974). Nursing homes in
this study persisted in providing more services to clients in certain
payment classes even when there were no differences in debility.
Alternatively, the provider market could expand to become a single-
service, multiple-state provider market. It is possible for the
providers in this market to select not only the possible reimbursement
level but the regulatory environment. For example, if a market includes
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, providers would have the
option of modifying the extent to which they want to take Massachusetts
residents versus Rhode Island residents versus Connecticut residents
based on where they thought the best reimbursement could be obtained and
the least regulation would be required. As the provider market becomes
a multiple-service, multiple-state provider market, providers are less
vulnerable to the influence of one particular agency in one particular
state, since the providers can always opt to select the type of client
they take in or the client' s state origin.
Multiple-service and multiple-state providers may maximize
reimbursement or perform their goals as they perceive them, and not
deliver the service the state wants, because the providers have the
flexibility to choose who and how they serve.
The amount of "inter-state comrnerce" in non-health care human
services appears, however, to be declining. Pressure from the public
and the state legislatures for greater accountability has resulted in
the restriction of client placement to in-state facilities. There are
however, a few "chains" in the Northeast, for example, Marathon House
and DARE, which operate facilities in several states.
The important link for regionalization of the provider market is to
standards. In particular, as input standards increase and become more
specific, it is more difficult for providers to cross service and state
lines.
K. Dynamic Relationships
"Now, Pretend Admin, you must use all of this information
we've been gathering to convert a static picture of the
relationships into a dynamic picture," stated Rhea Alty.
"What?" questioned Pretend Admin.
"You have to convert a snapshot into a motion picture,"
answered Rhea Alty.
"Oh! You mean my signed digraphs," responded Pretend Admin.
"I'd better explain how to interpret them first."
"You're catching on," Rhea Alty sniped.
The relationships between the axes in Graphs 3a - 3n are
illustrated in Graphs 3o - 3s. The arrows and signs indicate the
direction and type of relationship. The arrows indicate what happens to
the position on the continuum at the head of the arrow as one moves from
left to right on the continuum on the tail of the arrow. A positive
sign (+) indicates that the position on the head of the arrow also moves
from left to right, while a negative sign (-) indicates that the
position moves fram right to left. In the text, an "increase" on a
continuum indicates a left-to-right movement, while a "decrease"
indicates a right-to-left movement. The graphs include rovements which
cannot be fully discussed until a later axis is analyzed. No one-to-one
correspondence between positions on the continuums is intended. Rather,
the general direction of change is indicated.
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"Is that it for today?" asked Pretend Admin.
"To tell you the truth, Pretend Admin, I still feel
uncomfortable," admitted Rhea Alty. "Why don't we see what other
states do?"
"After my coffee break, of course, Rhea Alty," agreed Pretend
Admin.
"Of course," agreed Rhea Alty.
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L. Purchase-Of-Service Contracting In States Other Than Those
In The Case Studies
A review of literature on the purchase of residential services in
other states was conducted to campare the preferred relationships in the
signed digraphs with actual relationships used by states. The purpose
of reviewing this literature was not to validate the proposed
relationships, because these relationships are the preferred
associations. In reality, residential social service programs will not
exhibit the range of variation found in the axes. Further, if all the
relationships existed in current practices, then this dissertation would
not be needed. The purpose of the review of other states is to
illustrate when current practices have limited variation, and when they
do not follow preferred relationships. This study was designed to
further the study of the interrelationships among control mechanisms in
a variety actual of provider market situations (variation in the
exogenous variables). Literature about the states of Georgia, Utah,
Idaho, Wisconsin, Colorado, and Maine was reviewed (see Tables 3t and
3u) .
The review was based on materials sent by state agencies in
response to requests and reviews undertaken by other state agencies.
Most of the material reviewed was for mental health or mental retarda-
tion group homes.
Two particularly interesting studies came from the states of Utah
and Georgia where the state social services department attempted to
directly equate input costs to units of service. In Utah, a method of
paying for services termed "Problem, Objective, Method, Evaluation"
(P 0 M E) was adopted. For each service, the activities required to
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perform that service were identified and money was appropriated to
support these direct activities. Utah was attempting to relate total
costs to different levels of "effort" (output units) and, ultimately,
relate input costs to output units (O'Hara and Leschem, 1977).
Following the nomenclature previously adopted the method of
reimbursenent was level of care, the method of rate negotiation was
unilateral determination by the state agency, and the method of pricing
was based on delivery of specified inputs. If the developnent of a
relationship between input costs and output units is successful, it is
possible to change the method of pricing to one based on relative
efficiency.
The state of Georgia established costs for services based on
"relative value points." These points are determined based on the time
and cost of each type of activity in a service (O' Hara and Leschem,
1977). Reimbursement, rate negotiation, and pricing were determined in
the same manner as in the Utah study. Contracting was based on a unit
price. In both Georgia and Utah, the links among the methods of rate
negotiation, reimbursemrent and pricing in rate-setting were recognized
in order to improve the means of paying for services.
In Idaho, the Department of Health and Welfare contracts primarily
with sole-source providers. Because of the low population density,
there were few providers of services. The rate for services was based
on a comparison of costs for similar services, state agency budget
limitations, and the quality of the service (Rhode Island Task Force on
Contracting Out, 1976). Rate negotiation was based on the prior rate
and the state agency' s projected budget. Pricing was based on the level
of quality with the possible use of relative efficiency. This use of
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comparisons is interesting, considering that the level of competition is
chiefly sole source. The method of reimbursement was by facility.
Standards used in Idaho included certification and licensure.
Certification was accomplished by including a simple statement in the
contract which the provider signed. Providers were required to maintain
fiscal records to substantiate payments. Licensure of providers
encompassed the customary fire/safety input standards.
Monitored areas included terms of the contract, fiscal procedures,
and cost effectiveness, and was done by fiscal and performance audit
teams using qualitative assessments and field audits.
In Wisconsin, the terms of the contract were negotiated with a
provider and included: the service to be delivered, resources to be
used, the costs of these resources, the unit-of-service cost and,
in some cases, standards. Providers were required to submit monthly
reports detailing the number of clients served, the number of units of
service delivered, the dollars expended, and the unit-of-service cost.
Additionally, the state agency determined allowable expenses for cost
reimbursement (Rhode Island Task Force on Contracting Out, 1976).
Monitoring focused on terms of the contract, fiscal procedures and the
quantity of expected services. Monitoring relied on self-reports and
was evaluated by a desk audit.
In Colorado, program evaluation used an "enviornmental" checklist
to assess group facilities (Yaron, 1979). The checklist was based in
part on input standards for residential institutions, and assessed the
quality of the service being delivered using constructed measures. The
checklist was administered by a performance audit team. The information
developed by the monitoring system was used to determine the need for
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MECHANISM UTAH-
Table 3t: Mechanisms in Utah,
STATE
GEORGIA
Georgia and Idaho
IDAHO
Negotiation Unilaterally Set Unilaterally Set Prior Rate
by State Agency by State Agency
Pricing Delivering Inputs Delivering Inputs Level of Quality
Reimbursenent Level of Care Level of Care Facility
Contract Process Unit price
Standards Certification,
Licensure
Monitoring- Terms of the
What Contract, Fiscal
Procedures, Cost
Effectiveness
Monitoring- Fiscal Audit,
How Qualitative
Assessrents
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(Table 3t, cont'd)
MECHANISM
STATE
GEORGIAUTAH IDAHO
Monitoring- Fiscal Audit Team,
Who Performance
Audit Team
Other Primarily Sole
Source
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Table 3u: Mechanism in Wisconsin, Colorado and Maine
STATE
MECHANISM WISCONSIN COLORADO MAINE
Negotiation
Pricing
Reimbursement
Contract Process Cost Reimbursement
Standards Input Standards Input Standards
Monitoring- Terms of the Quality Terms of the
What Contract, Fiscal Contract, Fiscal
Procedures, Quantity Procedures, Quality
of Expected Services
Monitoring- Desk Audit Constructed Desk Audit,
How Measures Field Audit,
Constructed
Measures
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(Table 3u, cont'd)
MECHANISM WISCONSIN
STATE
COLORADO
Monitoring- Self-Reports Performance Joint Fiscal/
Who Audit Team Performance
Audit Team
Other Information Information
Used for Used for
Technical Technical
Assistance Assistance
and Planning
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MAINE
technical assistance, and for planning program expansion of providers.
In Maine, the program review methodology adopted by the state
assessed compliance with the terms of the contract and input standards
as well as the utilization rate (including a camparison of budgeted
versus actual services rendered), expenditure rates, cost per unit of
service, the number of successful closings, and staff satisfaction.
These assessments were made based on desk and field audits by a joint
fiscal/performance audit team. A fixed, standard review schedule was
used for the field audit. An attempt was made to assess cost
effectiveness. Where needed, technical assistance was arranged (Maine
Department of Human Services, 1977).
The mix of control mechanisms found in this literature fits very
well with the trends indicated by the signed digraphs. The exceptions
to this are noted below. In Idaho, the rate negotiation by prior rate
and the sole source level of competition appear to be in opposition to
the direction indicated by the signed digraph. The sole source level of
copetition would appear to indicate a less negotiated process than the
use of prior rates. However, the matching of negotiation based on the
prior rate and pricing by quality and relative efficiency is indicated
by the graphs. Pricing by relative efficiency and level of quality
should generate higher level standards than input standards, and
reimbursement by facility should have resulted in a lower level mthod
of pricing. The input standards would appear to be mismatched with the
monitoring-what that includes cost effectiveness. In Utah, Georgia,
Wisconsin, Colorado, and Maine the choices of control mechanisms
generally follow the trends of the signed digraphs.
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"I don't know about you, Pretend Admin, but I'm rather
surprised that such a small survey had such a large variation on
the axes. I was quite pleasantly surprised," said Rhea Alty.
"So was I. My axes performed admirably," declared Pretend
Admin boastfully.
In order to assess the validity and the sign of the relationships
found in this literature, the states have been put on graphs indicating
the intended relationships wherever at least two states (two points
establish a line) illustrate the relationship. The x-axis indicates the
independent mechanism (tail of the arrow), and the y-axis indicates the
dependent mechanism (head of the arrow). See graphs 3v-3aa.
Where options on an axis have not been mutually exclusive, as with
monitoring mechanisms, the option farthest to the right was used. This
was necessary because options on this type of axis are often cumulative.
If a mechanism is cumulative, it implies that the options to the left of
any other option are present as well. In other words, the presence of
accreditation standards at the middle of the continuum implies that
licensure and certification standards are also present.
All double ended arrows have the same sign at both ends in this
analysis, so only one graph is used to display the relationship. When
two, three or four options for a mechanism exist, the spacing between
options was adjusted to improve readability. Cost-oriented contracting
and performance-oriented contracting were placed on the same axis when
they affected other mechanisms or the provider market in the same way,
were affected in the same manner by those variables. The same is true
for input standards and process, output and outcome standards.
For Colorado and Maine, the literature did not specify the type of
input standards, so a middle level option (licensure) was used.
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Graph 3w. Pricing and Rate Negotiation
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Of the six relationships possible to depict on a graph, three
followed the directional patterns indicated by the preferred
relationships, and one exhibited an opposite directionality. The other
two presented no positive or negative pattern. The relationships
between monitoring-what and monitoring-how, pricing and rate
negotiation, and monitoring-how and mionitoring-who existed in the
direction indicated by the signed digraphs. The reimbursement and
pricing relationship was the opposite of the preferred one. For the
relationships between monitoring information use-vendor changes and
nonitoring-who, and standards and nonitoring-what, there was no
variation in the independent mechanism, so no positive or negative
relationship could be suggested.
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M. Effective Combinations
"Pretend Admin," Rhea said, "I know I'm pushing my luck, but
if you could give exemplary combinations under different conditions
it would be most helpful to me."
"You aren't suggesting I do that now, are you Rhea Alty?"
Pretend Admin asked. "After all, it is only an hour until quitting
time and I was planning to attend a meeting with the Commissioner
on my way hame."
"I wouldn' t think of interfering with your Space Invaders game
with the Cormissioner, " said Rhea Alty. "Tomorrow will be soon
enough."
Table 3bb exemplifies how some of the mechanisms can be combined in
the least cost/most effective manner. The least cost consideration
includes the cost of the mechanism and the fiscal im-pacts on the
providers. The level of competition and the degree of regionalization in
which the combination if likely to be effective are also determined.
It should be noted that the dynamics of the mechanisms may
determine the level of competition and the potential for
regionalization. For example, no matter how many vendors enter the
bidding process, one there is client placement by guaranteed area the
level of competition becomes sole source.
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Table 3bb: EFFECTIVE CCMBINATIONS OF MECHANISMS
CONSTRAINING MECHANISM/CONDITION
FEW MONIT1ORING RESOURCES
MONITORING REQUIRfMENTS
Maximize Control at Low Cost
MONITORING RESOURCES USED
Contract Terms, Fiscal, and Quantity
of Services based on a Desk Audit of
Materials from Provider Reports
(Self-Reporting)
(Few Resources)
NEGOTIATION BY BIDDING, CLIELNT
PIACEMENT BY GUARANTEED AREA
Ensure that Type of Service
Delivered Reflects State
Agency Objectives for Type
and Cost of Services:
Concern over Service Quality
Will Induce Use of More Inputs
Than Necessary; Which Should
lead to Contracting Mechanisms
Which Constrain This Incentive
Quality Expected Based on Qualita-
tive Assessments and Constructed
Measures Dong by a Performance Audit
Team
(Moderate Resources)
PRICING BY REIATIVE EFFICIENCY Cost/Output Comparisons Fiscal/Performance Comparisons
Based on Constructed Measures and
Distortions to Measures Will Testing Done by Joint Fiscal/Per-
Iead to Minimization of Use formance Teams and Third Parties
of Inputs Which Are Not Irme-
diately Seen as Increasing (Considerable Resources)
Reimbursement: Pattern Of
of Service Delivery Will
Change to Reflect What Is
Measured.
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(Table 3bb, cont'd)
ASSOCIATED MECHANISMS
RESULTING LEVEL
OF CmPETITION
RESULTING
REGIONALIZATION
POTENTIAL
FHM MONITORING RESOURCES Ceritifcation Standards, Multiple Sources Multiple States/
Pricing by Delivering Services
Capability, Negotiation
Based on Prior Rate and
State Agency's Projected
Budget, Unit Price Con-
tracting Client Placement
by a Market Mechanism
NEGOTIATION BY BIDDING, CLIENT Level of Quality Pricing, Sole Source One State Only
PLACEMENT BY GUARANTEED AREA Cost Sharing or Cost Plus or Limited Providers
Incentive Contracting, Sources
Process Standards
Larger Vendors
Likely
PRICING BY RELATIVE EFFICIENCY Restrospective Payment, Multiple Sources Multiple States/
Negotiated Performance Services
Contracting, Output Stan-
dards (Reimbursem-ent
Should NOT Be Too Closely
Tied to a Specific Person).
Reimbursement by Type of
Case or Level of Care,
Client Placement by a
Market Mechanism, Negotia-
tion Based on Formal Prin-
ciples of Reinbursement
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"Well, Mr. Pretend Admin, I guess that's the end of my
assignment here. It certainly has been real, working with
you. If we leave now, you should clear the parking lot by
quitting time. Say hello to the comnissioner for me, if he's
still waiting."
"Thank you, Ms. Rhea Alty, thank you very much indeed.
Your services have been more than human. "
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
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A. Research Focus
The focus of the research was on the use of management control
mechanisms for shaping the behavior of group hones. A group home is a
residential facility for five to twenty residents which includes 24-hour
supervision in an environment which is as nearly "home-like" as
possible. Group hames are a particularly generic service across the
social services spectrum - for abused/neglected children, runaways,
juvenile delinquents, corrections, mental health, nental retardation,
substance abuse, and the elderly. Group hones are also cross-cutting on
the federal level (HUD, Labor and several divisions of HEW). They were
chosen because they have received considerable adverse publicity in
Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and New York City regarding poor use of
management control mechanisms. It is a priority area for change, and
this has been recognized by recent efforts in Connecticut,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York City, and Rhode Island to improve
and coordinate the use of management control mechanisms, and to use the
feedback from these strategies to provide technical assistance to
vendors.
The emphasis on residential facilities lends a bias to the study.
Since camnity residential facilities are not far removed from the
facilities that are regulated - nursing hones, hospitals - it was
expected that the control system would be more evolved and formalized
than in other types of conmunity services.
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B. Research Questions
The field research was designed to answer questions about the
current and potential use of control mechanisms for shaping behavior.
There were two basic questions:
1. How are the management control mechanisms used, and what
effects does this use appear to have?
2. How can a state agency anticipate provider behavior,
especially in response to management control mechanisms?
Current use and effects were determined through interviews. The
anticipation of future behavior required an analysis of use and effects
within the context of an explanatory theory.
The interviews sought answers to the questions:
1. What is the current nature of the purchase-of-service control
system?
2. What do the effects of the control system appear to be from
the point of view of providers and state agencies?
3. What are the apparent objectives of the control system?
4. How did providers respond to the control mechanisms?
5. What is the provider market and what influence does the
provider market have on the choice and use of different
control mechanisms?
6. How do providers beat the control system (minimize its
effects)?
7. How actively is the legislature involved on behalf of
providers? (See section on Pre-Testing.)
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C. Case Studies
The survey research involved two case studies: one in a state with
a small number of providers and the other in a state with a large number
of providers.
The two states chosen for the case studies were both Eastern,
densely populated, industrial states. However, the first case study
state was one-fifth the size of the second case study state in terms of
both population and physical size. State 1' s budget is devoted
primarily to human services and the state has a reputation for being
very liberal, but is fiscally conservative (no deficits are allowed in
the state budget). State 2's budget is also substantially spent on
human services, and it has a long standing liberal reputation for human
services; it has been a national leader in deinstitutionalization and
the development of new service delivery models. Its ccanitment to
commnnity services has been reinforced by several court orders to speed
up the development of coununity residential services.
These two states were chosen because purchase of services is used
extensively in both states, yet they differ markedly in terms of their
provider market (level of competition and regionalization potential).
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D. Survey Research
1. Pre-Testing
Three levels of pre-testing occurred during the months of June and
July in 1981. In the first level, an initial interview format was
discussed with three dissertation advisers and with two colleagues who
had substantial experience in survey research. The result of this level
of pre-testing was a reduction in the time to complete the questionnaire
and the use of more and simpler questions with regard to provider
reaction to regulation.
The second level of pre-testing utilized five top state management
officials. After reviewing the proposed format, interviews with the
officials were conducted which lasted approximately two hours each. The
result of these interviews was to reduce the number of questions and to
reword several of the questions. These state agency officials were
drawn from two states resembling the case study states.
The third level of pre-testing was conducted in two two-hour
meetings with a large multiple service provider and a high level state
agency official who set policy for contracting in State 1. The changes
that resulted from these meetings included a reduction in the number of
questions and an increase in the follow-up questions for those areas
remaining in the interview format.
During the course of pre-testing, several conditions were suggested
by interviewees as varying with the provider market. The conditions
which were mentioned most often were: the amount of resources committed
to monitoring, the number and complexity of relationships among state
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agency actors involved in the control system, the providers' ability to
have the legislature intervene with state agencies, and the apparent
objectives of the control system.
2. Interviews
The people interviewed in the second and third rounds of
pre-testing were also questioned about state agency personnel and
provider staff who had a good command of the purchase of service system
in the case study states. Most of these recaiended people were later
interviewed in the survey.
In State 1, eight state agency staff in three state agencies were
interviewed. In State 2, fourteen state agency staff in seven state
agencies (four line agencies and three staff agencies) were interviewed.
Providers were chosen based on the recomrendations of state agency
staff and other providers for their knowledge of the effects of
contracting on their agencies. The provider staff interviewed were
primarily executive directors or directors for management services.
In State 1, six providers were interviewed including three
providers who had single-service programs and three providers who had
multiple-service programs. In State 2 nine providers and the
contracting expert for the human services providers' association were
interviewed. This included one provider who had a single-service
program, five providers who had a multiple-service program wholly within
State 2 and three providers who had multiple-service and multiple-state
programs.
The interviews were semi-structured using the interview format
which follows this section. As each interview was conducted, the
interviewee was asked to suggest names of other state agency staff and
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providers who were knowledgeable about the purchase of service system.
The state agency staff who were interviewed were predominantly in the
upper-middle management of the state agencies, with the exception of
monitoring staff , who tended to be in low to middle management
positions. The decision of who to interview was made on the basis of
which staff appeared to have the best coniand of the purchase of service
system based on the suggestions of previous interviewees.
In both states, interviewing ceased when it appeared that the
information being gathered was for the most part repetitive. In State 1
all interviews were conducted as scheduled. In State 2 interviews with
the originally scheduled interviewees were not conducted in three cases.
In two of these cases, a lower-level staff person with in-depth
knowledge of contracting was interviewed. This did not affect the
results. In the third case, the director of a small provider
association refused to be interviewed because he/she felt their concern
about providers not being able to meet new standards might be
conunicated by the interviewer to state agencies. A promise of
confidentiality resulted in the director's agreement not to interfere in
the interviews with nembers of the association.
In all cases, official copies of the control mechanisms being
discussed were obtained and campared to the descriptions given by state
agency staff and providers. There appeared to be very little difference
among these descriptions of the mechanisms being used in both states.
State 1 interviews were conducted during the months of August,
September and October, 1981. State 2 interviews were conducted during
the months of November and December, 1981. The length of the interview
was designed to be about two hours. The average length of the
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interviews conducted was two to two and one-half hours. The time range
of the interviews was from one hour to three and one-half hours. In
each state, the majority of state agency staff were interviewed first
and then the provider staff were interviewed.
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3. Survey Instrument
Introduction
People whose names had been selected for interviews were contacted
by telephone and told:
"I am Levi Sorrell and I am writing a dissertation at M I T about
purchase of service contracting. Your name was suggested to me as
someone with whom I should talk. (If asked name of referral source,
then specify name.) I would like to set up an appointment with you to
discuss (rate-setting/standard-setting/mnitoring and the use of
monitoring information/client placement/how contracting affects
providers like you; (depending on what the person was recommended for)).
If a provider:
"The discussion will center around the specific mechanisms that are
used, such as rate-setting, standard-setting, monitoring and client
placement, and the effects of these mechanisms on your agency and the
service you provide."
If a state agency:
"The discussion will center around the use of
(rate-setting/standard-setting/monitoring and the use of monitoring) by
your agency."
For all interviewees:
"The interview will last about two hours. Your name will not be
associated with any information you provide, nor will your name appear
in the dissertation. Do you have any questions about the interview?"
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State Agencies
1. General
a) Who are the key actors in the purchase of services for (name
of service) in
(1) rate-setting?
(2) contracting?
(3) standard-setting?
(4) monitoring? use of monitoring information?
(5) client placement?
b) What activities does your unit perform in purchase-of-service
contracting?
2. Specific Control Mechanisms
a) Could you identify and describe the characteristics of each of
the mechanisms your unit administers as part of its
activities?
b) What are the effects of (name of mechanism) on providers?
(1) Mechanism 1
(a) How did providers respond?
(b) How did it change the service providers delivered?
(c) How useful has (name of mechanism) been in allowing
you to distinguish between providers?
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(d) Were providers involved in the development of this
mechanism?
(e) Would other options for this type of mechanism have
required more resources or more coordination with
other units? Was this an important consideration in
the choice of this mechanism? (Specify other options
fram axes if needed.)
(2) Mechanism 2, as above
(3) Mechanism 3, as above
3. How would you describe the provider market for residential
services?
a) Is the capacity of providers larger or smaller than the demand
for services?
b) How does this affect your use of the (name of mechanism)?
c) Does this state agency purchase services from providers
outside of the state?
If the provider market is multiple-state:
d) How does the presence of a multiple-state provider market
affect your use of (name of mechanism)?
4. How does the legislature become involved in the operations of this
state agency? Under what conditions? (Follow-up on intensity of
involvement.)
5. Can you suggest staff in this and other state agencies, and
providers with whom I should talk?
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Providers
1. General and Historical
a) Tell me about the services you deliver.
b) How long have you been delivering these services and how have
the services changed over time?
c) What state agencies purchase residential services from you?
2. For each state agency, please describe the method of rate-setting,
contracting, standard-setting, monitoring and client placement that
is used. (Prcpt as needed by reading alternatives from the axes.)
a) State Agency 1:
(1) Rate-setting
(a) Description
(b) What have the effects been on your agency of this
method of rate setting? (Characteristics, cost,
quality, quantity.)
(c) Have you found any means of minimizing these
effects? (Start off: "You have obviously been able
to survive.")
(2) Contracting
(a) Description
(b) What have the effects been on your agency of this
method of rate-setting? (Characteristics, cost,
quality, quantity.)
(c) Have you found any means of minimizing these
effects?
(3) Standard-setting
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(a) Description
(b) What have the effects been on your agency of this
method of standard-setting? (Characteristics, cost,
quality, quantity.)
(c) Have you found any means of minimizing these
effects?
(4) Monitoring
(a) Description
(b) What have the effects been on your agency of this
method of monitoring? (Characteristics, cost,
quality, quantity.)
(c) Have you found any means of minimizing these
effects?
(5) Client Placement
(a) Description
(b) What have the effects been on your agency of this
method of client placement? (Characteristics, cost,
quality quantity.)
(c) Have you found any means of minimizing these
effects?
(6) Were you involved in the development of any of these
mechanisms? Were other providers?
b) State Agency 2: As above
c) State Agency 3: As above
3. How would you describe the provider market for residential services
for (state agency name)?
a) State Agency 1
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(1) Is the capacity of providers larger or smaller than the
demand for services? (If necessary, clarify the
differences between "demand" and "need".)
(2) How has this affected the services you deliver?
(3) Are you able to draw clients from outside this
conmunity? Outside this part of the state? Outside
this state?
(4) What evidence do you have of this?
b) State Agency 2: As above
c) State Agency 3: As above
4. Can you suggest same state agency staff and other providers with
whom I should talk?
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4. Coding Responses to Conditions
The set of agency actors involved in the control system was divided
into three categories: simple, intermediate, and ccmplex. A simple set
of agencies existed when all mechanisms were administered by one
division of a state agency. An intermediate set existed when one
mechanism was administered by a second state agency. The mechanism
usually administered in another agency was rate-setting. A ccnplex set
existed when at least two state agencies besides the funding agency were
involved in the control system. Usually, the mechanisms administered in
the other agencies were rate-setting and accreditation/ licensing.
The resources ccmmritted to monitoring were divided into three
categories: few, moderate, and considerable. The evidence of resources
comitted to monitoring was based on the importance attached to
monitoring by state agency staff, and the intensity of monitoring as
reported by providers. When state agency staff attached low importance
to monitoring and providers reported infrequent monitoring and
monitoring that did not result in changes, then the resources were
considered few. When state agency staff attached high importance to
monitoring, and providers reported frequent visits and
monitoring-generated changes, then the resources were considered
considerable. Otherwise, the resources conmitted to monitoring were
considered moderate.
The relationship of providers with the legislature was divided into
two categories: active and not active. Evidence of an active
relationship was admitted if state agency staff could cite numerous
examples of the intervention of the legislature on behalf of providers.
To distinguish between general political activities on behalf of
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constituents and political activities on behalf of service providers,
the examples had to be a case of intervention on behalf of all
providers, not just one specific provider. Otherwise, the relationship
was considered not active.
5. Survey Inadequacies
The survey instrument proved to be inadequate for gathering
information on four questions:
1) How does (the particular provider market) affect: your use of
(name of the mechanism) ?/the services you deliver?
For state agencies:
2) How useful has (name of mechanism) been in allowing you
to distinguish between providers?
3) Would other options for this type of mechanism have required
more resources or more coordination with other units? Was
this an important consideration in the choice of this
mechanism?
For providers:
4) Have you found any means of minimizing these effects?
Apparently, there is little variation in the use of mechanisms in
different provider markets. At least, little variation could be
generated by this question. State agency staff had not used the
provider market as a factor in choosing mechanisms. Providers did not
respond directly to the question. Rather, they responded with
information about the effects of state agency decisions to buy or not
buy beds and the shifting of services to state agencies that were
expanding, that is, those state agencies where demand exceeded supply.
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State agencies were unresponsive to the question about a
mechanism's ability to offer information that allows for distinction
among providers. The one notable exception was staff at the
rate-setting commission in State 2.
State agencies were also unresponsive to the question of resource
use and the coordination needed by different mechanism options.
Interviewees tended to talk about the resource use and coordination
needed by the mechanism actually used. Prompting did not elicit further
comment.
Providers responded to the question of minimizing a mechanism' s
effects by following one of two divergent paths. One path, which I call
tactics, stressed such things as end-of-the-year cost loading. The
other path, which I call strategies, stressed making accreditation and
licensing laws work for and not against providers. While both were
appropriate responses to the question, it was impossible to pool the
responses according to provider market or type of service. Interviewees
in State 1 stressed tactics, while interviewees in State 2 stressed
strategies.
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CHAPTER 5: SURVEY RESULTS
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A. Similarities Between the Case Study States
Providers and state agency staff in both states complained about
the lack of clear expectations for performance even though only input
standards were found. Providers and state agency staff equated higher
quality with more input standards, while at the same time recognizing
the difficulties cause by more and more explicit standards. This
finding links organizational motivation to personal motivation. The
evidence from performance appraisal and management by objectives
emphasizes that only where expectations are clear will results be
satisfactory. Even though providers recognized that input standards are
not sufficient to clarify expectations, they indicated that they did not
understand that process and output standards would be any better. The
use of performance standards would also lead to cost efficiency and
relative efficiency as criteria for evaluating providers. This would
make the state' s expectations clearer but providers' funding less
certain. Providers do not recognize that the clarification of
expectations could lead to both clarity and uncertainty.
In both states, state agencies relied on historical relationships
with vendors. This could be expected in State 1, where there were few
choices to begin with. But it was surprising to find this reliance in
State 2 as well. According to one state agency officiel, reliance on
known providers reduces the problem of trying to monitor the many
potential providers.
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B. Differences Between the Case Study States
While State 1 providers were predominantly single service with a
single residential facility, State 2's providers were predominantly
multiple service with multiple facilities. State 1 in general was a
very uncompetitive state, while in State 2 providers appeared to be
quite competitive for clients. In general, State 1 has low levels of
ccampetition and regionalization potential, while State 2 has high levels
of competition and regionalization potential. One of the consequences
of this, discovered during pretesting, is that in order to study the
services offered by providers in State 1 it was necessary to interview
considerably more state agencies in State 2, as providers in State 2
tended to have contracts for a variety of services with a variety of
state agencies. In ccparison to State 1, where the average provider
had one to three contracts with one or two state agencies, in State 2
the average provider had over 4 contracts for programs with a variety
of state agencies. State government funding in State 2 accounted for
over two-thirds of the average provider budget among human service
agencies contracting with the state. In State 1 there was a central
source for allocating clients among providers in each state agency. In
State 2 the decentralized decision-making processes for all services was
responsible for allocation of clients. The state was divided into
regions and sub-regions, each with its own budget. Consequently,
according to staff in State 2 there was often competition not only among
state agencies for the same slots, but a competition among the regions
and sub-regions for these slots. In addition, different regions and
sub-regions sometimes attached different requirements to their
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Table 5a: Differences Between the Case Study States
ITEM STATE 1
Level Of Competition
Regionalization
Potential
Number of Contracts
Case Allocation
Cammyunity Monitors
Limited Sources
(Low Level of
Campetition)
Primarily Single
Service, One State
Only (Low Potential
for Regionalization)
STATE 2
Limited Sources/Multi-
ple Sources (Low and
High Levels of
Competition)
Primarily Multiple
Services (High Poten-
tial for Regionaliza-
tion)
1-3
Centralized
Often Used
Decentralized
Seldom Used
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contracts, complicating the requirements for providers. In State 2,
unlike State 1, frequent conmmnity caseworker presence as a quality
assurance tool was not used. The only exception was in services for
juvenile delinquents which was administered by a very small state
agency. Rather, in State 2 much more effort was put into formal,
structured monitoring processes.
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C. STATE 1
1. General
In State 1, a separate agency does fiscal audits on-site at a
provider's facility. The state agency that funds the mental
retardation, mental health, and substance abuse facilities also contains
a licensing section. However, the director of the section stated that
licensing was only a mildly effective mechanism because the agency has
never denied a license. Moreover, as the small licensing staff finds it
difficult to verify the activities of vendors, the head of the staff
felt that it would be very easy to "beat" the licensure review.
Conmunication about vendors among the program divisions and the
licensing section is non-existent. In the words of this chief,
"Licensing is the illegitimate step-child of the department."
A five-year-old state study found that 80% of the providers could
and would increase their services if the state would provide clients and
funding. These providers also indicated a willingness to compete for
clients but only if the state would provide clear standards for
comparisons among providers. Among state agency staff and providers in
State 1, there was agreement that demand for residential services (group
hores) exceeded the supply. However, the true constraint is the limited
departmental budgets, not the restricted supply. In all programs, the
current vendors are those that have always been used by the departments.
The state is committed to keeping its residents at facilities within the
state, even though it is recognized by staff in state agencies that this
limitation reduces the number of providers and inhibits competition.
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2. Substance Abuse Facilities
The substance abuse program is run by a division of the agency that
also runs the mental health and mental retardation programs. The
division has separate sources of funds for drug abuse and alcohol abuse,
but the same staff monitors both programs. Rates are set by action of
a committee for each service. While there were no comparisons of costs
for different service levels, a class rate system (a single rate for
similar vendors) was used in alcohol abuse services.
Proposals from providers are used for ranking vendors, but there is
seldom much change in the amount each vendor receives, according to
state agency staff. The entire state program has always been built
around comunity services, with the same few providers continuing to be
chosen. This non-campetitive environment is probably due to a lack of
effort by the state to develop new community resources. One of the
providers expanded across state lines, then across program lines, and is
now one of the largest providers found in either case study state.
State agency staff stressed the small size of the state and
frequent contact with providers as their most effective monitoring tool.
The small size allows any problems to came to the quick attention of the
state. The standards used are embellishments of nationally promulgated
standards. Monitoring is done by both the substance abuse division and
a licensing section within the state agency. The monitoring staff
within the substance abuse division indicated that communication with
the licensing section was poor and that information did not flow back
and forth as well as it should. This opinion was echoed by the
licensing section. One state agency staff member indicated that the
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Table 5b: STATE 1 Substance Abuse
RATE
NEGOTIATION:
PRICING:
REIMBURSE4ENT:
PAYMENT
PERSPECTIVE:
CONTRACTING:
STANDARD-
SETTING:
Drugs: Prior Rate and Projected State Budget
Achohol: Prior Rate and Monitoring Report
(agencies get essentially the same rate
and sane increase in rate)
Drugs: Delivering Capability (at a specified
occcupancy)
Alcohol: Delivering Capability
Drugs: By Type of Case
Alcohol: By Facility
Drugs: Cap Set Prospectively, Rate Set
Retrospectively
Alcohol: Prospective
Drugs: Cost Reimbursement (up to a cap)
Alcohol: Cost-Sharing
Drugs:
Alcohol:
Certification, Licensure
Certification, Licensure
MONITORING-
WHAT:
MONITORING-
HOW:
MONIORING-
WHO:
MDNITORING
INFORMATION
USE-LINKAGES:
Both Services:
Both Services:
Both Services:
Both Services:
Both Services:
Both Services:
Both Services:
A. Terms of the Contract, Quantity
of Expected Services Delivered
B. Fiscal
A. Field Audit, Qualitative
Assessments
B. Field Audit
A. Performance Audit Team,
Connunity Monitors
B. Fiscal Audit Team
Compliance
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MONITORING
INFORMATION
USE-CHANGES IN
VENDOR BEHAVIOR: Both Services: A. Technical Assistance
Both Services: B. Rate Changes
CLIENT
PLACEMENT: Both Services: Case Manager
LEVEL OF
COMPETITION:
REGIONALIZATION
POTENTIAL:
Both Services: Limited Sources
Drugs: Mixed-Single Service, One State Only, and
Multiple Services, Multiple States
Alcohol: Single Service, One State Only
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monitoring process often gives waivers and rarely closes down a program.
Another staffer felt that is is impossible for providers to "game" the
rate-setting process to improve their rate. It was remarked that there
was more ccapetition in substance abuse than in mental retardation and
mental health services. However, reductions in funding will leave only
a few large vendors remaining.
Provider staff from drug abuse and alcohol abuse facilities
indicated that the standards used by the state were too weak, and in
fact, demanded less of the facilities than the internal standards of the
agencies. As a consequence, the standards and monitoring did little,
except to increase the paperwork of providers. Another consequence of
the increasing formalization of the contracting process was that
providers had to divert resources from direct services to hire more and
better skilled administrative staff.
One operator of a drug abuse rehabilitation facility stated that
the formalized standards were really just "common sense" ideas about
running an agency. He added that the minimum utilization rate
requirement never really resulted in penalties. Nonetheless, the
provider could never be sure it wouldn' t be, so he developed a tracking
system for his clients and established a network for recruiting clients-
both methods designed to keep utilization up.
3. Mental Health Facilities
Group homes for the emotionally disturbed are administered by a
division of the agency also administering the mental retardation and
substance abuse programs. The state is attempting to develop community
facilities quickly. Each group home has a specific geographic area from
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Table 5c: STATE 1 Mental Health
PATE
NEGOTIATION:
PRICING:
REIMBURSEMENT:
PAYMENT
PERSPECTIVE:
CONTPAC'ING:
STANDARD-
SEITING:
MONITORING-
WHAT:
Prior Rate and Projected State Budget (all group
hames receive same rate and have the same number of
beds)
Delivering Capability (at 90% occupancy with a per
diem reduction per bed not filled below 90%)
By Facility
Prospective
Cost Sharing (becomes cost reimbursenent if
provider' s share cannot be met)
Certification, Licensure, and Accreditation
A. Terms of Contract, Quantity of Services,
All Expected Inputs Delivered
B. Fiscal
MONITOPING-
HOW:
MONITORING-
WHO:
A. Program-Desk Audit
B. Fiscal-Field Audit
A. Self-Report, Conmnity Monitors
B. Fiscal Audit Team
MONITORING
INFORMATION
USE-LINKAGES:
MONITORING
INFOPMATION
USE-CHANGES IN
VENDOR BEHAVIOR:
CLIENT
PIACEMENT:
Compliance
A. Technical Assistance
B. Rate Changes
Provider Choice
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LEVEL OF
COMPETITION:
REGIONALIZATION
POTENTIAL:
Limited Sources
Single Service, One State Only
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which its clients are drawn. The facilities are associated with
either the corunity mental health centers, or one non-profit
organization that operates several facilities.
The state agency staff interviewed place more emphasis on staff
visits and the small size of the state ("everybody knows everybody
else' s business") as a means of monitoring than on a structured
monitoring process.
It recognizes that costs are higher than the state rate, but
expects providers to collect "rent" from clients. It was noted, however,
that the problem with group homes is that "... they are marginal
operations with money only for essentials." This leaves no money for
reserves and results in low-paid staff. It would be impossible to have
facilities compete for clients publicly because a town' s citizens don' t
want ".... 'crazy people' brought in from 'outside' ," according to a
provider.
Providers found the rate-setting system to be "...like being on
welfare..." because any money the provider brought in from outside
sources was subtracted from his rate. This provided a disincentive to
actively seek additional funds. However, recent cutbacks have caused at
least one provider to think about innovative organizational structures,
such as a holding company, that would allow the provider an opportunity
to operate profitable enterprises under the non-profit umbrella.
4. Mental Retardation Facilities
Group hones for the retarded are administered by the same state
agency which funds the mental health and substance abuse programs. The
rate for group homes is set by another state agency which administers
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the Medicaid program, because all group homes are partially funded with
Medicaid funds as Intermediate Care Facilities for the Mentally Retarded
(ICF-MR) .
The state is attempting to deinstitutionalize and develop more
group hames quickly. Each group home has a specific geographic area
from which its clients are likely to cone. Group homes are now
primarily run by an advocacy organization, but the state is considering
opening facilities staffed by workers from the state institutions as a
means of increasing the number of community facilities.
Remarks by state agency staff members touched upon monitoring,
costs, and politics to some extent. The role of monitoring was seen as
ensuring that providers know what " ... ought to be done." It was
perceived that monitoring was some what easier because of a decision to
seek providers who were ". . . service-oriented, not profit-oriented;"
though some apparently service-oriented people "... ripped off the
system."
Rate-setting was found difficult because "...every facility is
viewed as unique." Another difficulty was that many providers had
problems finding the financial backing to carry the cash flow while
waiting for state payments. One offical noted that if the state ran
group hoes ".. . to compete (with the advocacy group) ... the state homes
would be more expensive..." because they would be staffed by higher-paid
state employees. Apparently, the increased demand created by
deinstitutionalization has increased the unit costs of group homes.
According to one state official, the state "..... played a supplicant
role..." to the advocacy organization in trying to get it to expand the
group hore system. The advocacy group would inform the state agency of
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Table 5d: STATE 1 Mental Retardation
RATE
NEGOTIATION:
PRICING:
REIMBURSEMENT:
PAYMENT
PERSPECTIVE:
CONTPACTING:
STANDARD-
SETTING:
MONITORING-
WHAT:
MONITORING-
HOW:
MONITORING-
WHO:
Formal Principles of Reimbursement
Resources Consumed
Per Diem
Prospective (with retrospective adjustment)
Cost Reimbursement
Certification, Licensure, and Accreditation
A. All Expected Inputs Delivered
B. Fiscal
A. Desk Audit, Field-Audit, Qualitative Assessments
B. Desk/Field Audit
A. Joint Fiscal/Performance Contract Team
B. Fiscal Audit Team
MONITORING
INFORMATION
USE-LINKAGES:
MONITORING
INFORMATION
USE-CHANGES IN
VENDOR BEHAVIOR:
CLIENT
PLACEMENT:
Compliance, Revision of Standards
A. Technical Assistance
B. Rate Changes
Provider Choice
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LEVEL OF
COMPETITION:
REGIONALIZATION
POTENTIAL:
Limited Sources
Single Service, One State Only
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its desired budget and if it was not granted the group would then go to
the legislature.
Provider staff indicated that while accreditation standards
provided a general framework for operations, they were not an effective
deterrent to poor services, since most of the care provided is not
visible to the public or monitors. One staff member felt that a greater
presence by state staff would lead the residences to be
"self-monitoring" while another felt that good relationships had been
built with monitors.
Providers liked the cost reimbursement provision attached to the
per diem rate determination because they need not be concerned with
actual occupancy and because they are reimbursed for actual
expenditures.
In general, providers stated that they usually had more referrals
than they could handle.
5. Facilities for Abused and Neglected Children
Group hames for abused and neglected children are administered by a
state agency for children' s services. The state has switched from a
state-run, large institutional program to a cornunity-based program
split between residential facilities and foster care families. It has
been attempting to increase its use of foster care families and decrease
its use of residential facilities, but has not been successful in
recruiting a sufficient number of families. The state has not put much
effort into finding or developing new residential facilities, because
staff thought that it would be easier to recruit foster families than it
proved to be.
157
PATE
NEGOTIATION:
PRICING:
REIMBURSEMENT:
PAYMENT
PERSPECTIVE:
CONTPACTING:
STANDARD-
SETTING:
MONITORING-
WHAT:
Table 5e: STATE 1 Abused/Neglected Children
Prior Rate and Projected State Budget
(negotiated rate is a cap)
Delivering Capability (at a specified occupancy)
By Facility
Cap Set Prospectively, Rate Set Retrospectively
Cost Reimbursement
Licensure, Certification, and Accreditation
A. Terms of Contract, Delivered Services
B. Fiscal
MONITORING-
HCW: A. Desk Audit, Field Audit
B. Field Audit
MONITORING-
WHO: A. Self-Report, Cammunity Monitors, Performance
Audit Team (limited use)
B. Fiscal Audit Team
MONITORING
INFORMATION
USE-LINKAGES:
MONITORING
INFORMATION
USE-CHANGES IN
VENDOR BEHAVIOR:
CLIENT
PLACEMENT:
Compliance
A. Technical Assistance, Client Placement
B. Rate Changes
Case Manager
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LEVEL OF
COMPETITION:
REGIONALIZATION
POTENTIAL:
Limited Sources
Mixed: Single Service, One State Only, and Multiple
Services, One State Only
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Recently, State 1 has invited providers who are established in
other states to open facilities within its borders. This was just
beginning to occur during the study period (August - October, 1981).
Providers stressed that agency standards were lower than their own.
While standards enforcement was thus often a nuisance, frequent visits
by state staff and the long-standing relationships already established
severed to keep providers "on their toes." One program is open to state
review by choice and incorporates a self-monitoring process based on a
management-by-objectives system. This program occasionally hires
outside evaluators at great expense.
The rate-setting process of establishing a cap prospectively and
setting an actual rate retrospectively created an incentive to spend all
monies available. One provider felt that the state should allow a
surplus operating cushion as well.
At least one program operator had an excess bed capacity, and
believed that this was the norm for all similar providers in the state.
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D. STATE 2
1. Rate-Setting Agency
State 2 has a separate quasi-judicial rate-setting agency which
must approve all rates. The agency has a two-fold mission: to
constrain costs and to maintain the viability of the provider market.
Evidence of this dual mission can be seen in the opposition to "class
rates" based on vendor comparisons which might constrain costs, because
their use might be detrimental to the current provider market. Staff
see their role as instituting their opinion of good management and
substituting it for that of the vendors. According to one staffer at
the governor' s office, the mandate of the agency makes it as much an
advocate for providers as an executive agency.
Rate-setting agency staff were concerned that there was
insufficient funding to pay for the standards promulgated by state
agencies. This problem results from the tendency for standards to be
aspirational.
The rate-setting agency staff has been urging state agency staff to
establish standard service elements by which contracting and
rate-setting comparisons could be made. However, this standardization
has not yet occurred because vendors always believe their programs are
unique and they have had the power, so far, to prevent standardization.
The vendors in the state tend to be multiple-service, single-state
providers. Although they may be geographically limited, the providers
do overlap the regions and sub-regions of the state. This allows them,
according to one rate setting agency staff member, "... to threaten to
'take our business elsewhere,"' if state agency staff are too tough.
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The decentralization of services to sub-regions has resulted in "strong
grass roots political support for social services," as one agency
staffer analyzed it.
State agency staff responsible for contracting felt that the
rate-setting agency slows down rate increases when state agency budgets
are expanding and keeps rates high when state agency budgets are
constricting. State agency staff felt that one effect of the
rate-setting agency upon rates is that even when unit price contracts
are in effect, providers get a higher or lower rate in the future based
on allowed costs and actual utilization. This has the effect of
changing a unit price contract into a cost reimbursement contract.
The costs of vendors related only to their contracts with one state
agency are examined, even though multiple agency funding sources is the
dominant mode of operation. The agency has forced de facto cost sharing
upon providers, according to several providers, through selective
disallowances of costs. For example, until recently capital
expenditures were not an allowable cost.
State 2 has a requirement that contracts must be let out for
competitive bidding. Competitive bidding assumes multiple providers and
multiple consumers, but the reality is that the state is the primary
consumer and that providers may only be engaging in an oligopolistic
non-price competition, because the rate is independently set by the rate
setting agency.
2. Governor's Office
The cabinet level agency for human services within the Governor's
Office sets the terms of contracts for all contracted human services.
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While this cabinet level office in State 2 might have served as a
coordinating body, its functions appear to be more related to fiscal
oversight and resource allocation. One staff member questioned whether
the state could afford to pay for the standards for its services, given
the costs of compliance which providers pass along to the state. He
suggested that part of the problem that state agencies are having is
that they are "...still operating in an expanding economy nde and are
concentrating on contract development and not monitoring and
evaluation." Further, since state agencies had to develop vendors, most
human service providers are under five years old and are entirely
creatures of the state. However, the state agencies are stuck with
regulations that "...force competition when there really aren't any
competitors."
3. Accreditation Agency
State 2 has a separate accreditation agency which sets standards
for all programs with clients up to the age of sixteen. Most state
agencies use these standards for programs with clients up to and
including the age of twenty-two if they are also subject to the
accreditation agency standards. Several of the departments also have
accreditation standards for their own programs. It is unclear to
providers and to same state agency staff where the dividing line of
responsibility is between the departments and the separate accreditation
agency. At times, the accreditation agency and the departments have
promulgated conflicting standards. Providers indicated that the
accreditation agency had an inconsistent enforcement pattern and the
violations that were cited varied considerably between different
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surveyors.
It was also believed by accreditors that a provider could meet the
standards but still fail to provide quality service. The reasons for
this failure were:
1) High staff turnover prevented consistency of progranming
2) Agencies are effective with one type of client but sonetimes
not with a different type of client
3) Agencies may use ineffective modes of treatment
4) Some agencies are "closed programs" where no one will tell you
the "straight scoop"; the staff and clients are either afraid
or have bought into the treatnent modality
5) The "tone" of a provider's facility may not seem acceptable to
accreditors, but nothing objective can be found wrong
6) Providers with many clients who pay directly, are not as
reactive to pressure fram state agencies.
Deaccreditation or denial of accreditation is, however, rare throughout
the state, and the accreditation process is usually a process of vendor
improvement.
One staff member of the accreditation agency commented that if a
provider is "responsive," then it would be less likely to receive a
formal legal deficiency notice and, instead, would receive a month in
which to correct deficiencies. Of course, as one staff nember related,
the lack of sufficient legal backup means that the agency is much more
more likely to give providers additional time to make corrections
anyway, rather than follow a formal deficiency process that might be
indicated based on the number of deficiencies. Staff believed that the
process works because it is "...inportant for providers to know they are
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being watched." Good providers attempt to use the process to improve
their facilities.
Staff also indicated the there is no clear contracting system; the
state is not sure what it is buying, and providers are not sure what
they are supposed to provide.
4. General
The process of negotiating and establishing contracts in State 2
involved considerable paper work and several levels of bureaucratic
review. There had evolved a rationalization, according to state agency
staff in two departments, that the multiple reviews insured
accountability. This had recently been exposed as a myth by state
agency staff and independent conunity oversight monitors. As might be
expected, this copartmentalization of reviews fostered a situation in
which everyone thought someone else was performing the reviews.
The allocation of clients to services in the state is apparently
problematical with each service program trying to remain within budget
by switching clients into other programs or getting other programs to
pay part of the cost of care. The problem is most acute in children' s
services, where two providers indicated that somre one could talk to
children in their facilities and not be able to distinguish children
referred from the program for mental health for children, the program
for abused and neglected children, and the program for juvenile
delinquents.
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5. Substance Abuse
Drug abuse and alcohol abuse connunity facilities began as
self-help programs with ex-abusers as counselors. The current emphasis
on professional care staff is a response to initiatives from state
agencies and insurance companies as a means of guaranteeing
reinbursement. The cost of these programs rose because of this change
in delivery model, and because a professional management staff also
became necessary when dealing with the state and insurance
bureaucracies.
a) Drug Abuse Facilities
Group homes for drug abusers are funded by a division of the state
agency that also administers the mental retardation, mental health for
adults, and mental health for children programs. Due to adverse
conmunity pressure, there has never been a large number of providers.
According to one staff member, drug abuse facilities have always been a
private enterprise. In each region of the state there may be only one
or two providers. Moreover, the regions, according to central office
state agency staff, are not likely to share facilities. However,
according to state agency staff, while need exceeds the supply of
residential services, the current demand does not. There is no ready
pool of clients pressuring the conmunity residential system for slots.
A staff member from the state social service agency indicated that
the divisions of the state mental health agency attempt to renegotiate
rates downward when they buy part of a program. This generates
complaints about underfunding from providers who also have contracts
with other state agencies.
Provider staff indicated that the state standards lagged behind the
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Table 5f: STATE 2 Substance Abuse-Drugs
PATE
NEGOTIATION:
PRICING:
Formal Principles of Reimbursement (subject to bid
and negotiation based on state agency budget and
components of service)
Vendor Choice
REIMBURSEMENT:
PAYMENT
PERSPECTIVE:
CONTRACTING:
STANDARD-
SETTING:
MONI'lRING-
WHAT:
MONITORING-
HOW:
1. Delivering Inputs (approved line item budget)
2. Unit Pricing
Vendor Choice (depends on choice of pricing)
1. By Facility
2. Per Diem
Prospective (with current year and retrospective
adjustments)
Cost Reimbursement
Certification, Licensure, and Accreditation (inside
agency-primarily around components of the service)
A. Fiscal
B. Terms of Contract, All Expected Inputs Delivered
C. Quantity of Expected Services Delivered
A. Desk Audit
B. Field Audit
C. Desk Audit (verified by field audit)
MONITORING-
WHO: A. Self-Reports
B. Performance Audit Team
C. Self-Reports and Performance Audit Team
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1DNITORING
INFOMATION
USE-LINKAGES:
MONITORING
INFORMATION
USE-CHANGES IN
VENDOR BEHAVIOR:
A. Planning
B. Compliance
C. Planning
A. Rate Changes
B. Nothing: Done Irregularly
C. Rate Changes
CLIENT
PIACENlENT:
LEVEL OF
COMPEI'ITION:
REGIONALIZATION
POTENTIAL:
Case Manager
Limited Sources
Mixed: Multiple Services, One State Only, and
Single Service, One State Only
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internal standards of the providers and merely created more record-
keeping. Providers proposed goals for their programs, but, according to
one of the largest providers,, "...no one really measured whether the
goals as proposed.. .were achieved," Surveyors, instead, "focused in on
broad things."
Guided by a desire to expand, according to a multiple state
provider that started in drug abuse facilities, the vendor shifted the
population to be dealt with fran older to younger clients and across
state lines. Eventually, the provider became a general human services
agency with a diversified funding base that included contracts for
services with five states and the federal government.
b) Alcohol-Abuse Facilities
Alcohol-abuse programs are administered by the state health
department, many of whose other duties are regulatory. Group homes for
alcohol abusers were part of an existing community network before state
funding began. Many of the facilities started out as "rooming houses"
where ex-abusers would provide sleeping space for alcoholics trying to
recover.
State funding has been slow to increase. Initially, the welfare
department provided a very small stipend to residents. The alcohol
recovery hames had a great deal of trouble convincing state agencies to
give them a rate. The rate-setting commission could not give them a
rate unless they were licensed, so the providers went to the licensing
agency and helped them develop a licensing mechanism. The providers,
according to one home manager, faced adversity from every direction.
According to this provider, "The only thing the state people understand
169
is a program which follows the models they are used to; they don' t know
what to do with an innovation." The new legislation to provide
insurance for alcohol-related problems may create additional demand. In
the meantime, supply exceeds demand from the state' s point of view.
Since these facilities are now considered a type of health facility,
they are subject to certificates of need which may reduce the bed
supply.
The providers were instrumental in the development of new
standards, but there is now widespread concern among providers because
they cannot meet the standards under current funding restraints.
According to one provider, the standards were set high as a way of
getting the state to pay for an increase in quality, even though few if
any of the providers could meet the new standards. One state agency
staff member stated, "There is a loss between the licensing regulations
and what happens" because there is a "...real constraint not to
de-license programs."
The providers, according to the largest recovery home manager, are
caught in a dilemma. The state agency staff and insurers "...know the
program works better than anything else they [the state and the
insurers] have, but they insist on things like professional staff." The
providers want to be free to choose the type of staff which their
service model requires, but can not be if they are going to get the
funds they need to survive. "...as times go by, recovery hones will be
sucked into being just another institution."
Currently, the "competition" between homes is a non-price
competition. Based on a home's units of service, the state buys a
percentage of the facility at 95% capacity. The percentage of the
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PATE
NEGOTIATION:
PRICING:
REIMBURSEMENT:
PAYMENT
PERSPECTIVE:
CONTRACTING:
STANDARD-
SETTING:
MONITORING-
WHAT:
Table 5g: STATE 2 Substance Abuse-Alcohol
Prior Rate and State Agency Budget (rate is
essentially the same for all facilities)
Delivering Capability (at 95% occupancy)
By Facility
Prospective
Cost Sharing (state buys a fixed percentage of
units)
Certification, Licensure, and Accreditation (inside
agency - primarily around components of the service)
A. Fiscal
B. Services Delivered, Terms of Contract
MONITORING-
HOW:
MONITORING-
WHO:
MONITORING
INFORMATION
USE-LINKAGES:
MONITORING
INFORMATION
USE-CHANGES IN
VENDOR BEHAVIOR:
A. Desk Audit
B. Field Audit
A. Self-Reports
B. Performance Audit Team
A. Planning
B. Compliance
A. Rate Changes
B. Technical Assistance, Client Placenent
CLIENT
PLACEMENT: Case Manager
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LEVEL OF
COMPETITION:
REGIONALIZATION
POTENTIAL:
Multiple Sources (primarily in-state)
Single Service, One State Only
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facility that the state buys is relatively uniform, except for
historical differences. To encourage competition, the state is
considering buying a non-uniform percentage of facilities. However, one
staff member felt that a price competition is not possible, because the
unit of service is not well defined.
The provider association is an important actor particularly in its
role as a negotiator for the homes, according to a staff mxember of the
state agency.
6. Mental Health Facilities for Adults
Group homes for adults with mental health problems are administered
by a division of the state agency that also funds the mental
retardation, drug abuse, and mental health programs for children.
Demand for services exceeds the supply but due to processing delays for
clients as well as the incentives for providers to keep beds empty, the
group homes have a high vacancy rate. However, there are court orders
forcing deinstitutionalization and thereby increasing the demand for
services.
A staff mrember from the state social service agency indicated that
the divisions of the state mental health agency attempt to renegotiate
rates downward, when they buy part of a program. This generates
complaints from providers. However, a staff member of the division of
mental health services for adults stated that the division is
"...bending over backwards to develop and keep vendors." In fact, the
division is not waiting for coununity pressure to open facilities but
instead is agressively seeking new vendors. As there is no clause in
the division' s contracts to force vendors to take clients, there is no
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incentive for providers to fill a group home quickly.
Staff stated that sub-region state agency directors were not
protected by the state agency by giving them contracting guidelines so
they could avoid negotiating with providers entirely from a position of
weakness.
Standards were seen by one provider as excessive, but necessary
because of the high staff turnover. One criticism of standards was that
they focused in too much on the physical facility and external program
structure (e.g., staffing ratios). While adherence to the standards
would have some indirect effect on the quality of service, they more
directly raised costs, reduced flexibility, and engendered a wariness
towards innovation.
The state reimbursement policy further inhibited innovation and
expansion as there was constant downward negotiation of rates and
recapture of excess funds. One provider stated that most operators
"hedge" on their rate-setting agency reports because "... too many hours
of direct service reduces your rate, but too few hours makes you look
unproductive." The rate-setting policy was described as having "no
inpact on decisions, making administrators worry and having no im-pact on
quality of care."
Providers had a number of comments regarding the purpose and
effectivenss of deinstitutionalization. One respondent saw the role of
community facilities as a way of eliminating the two class system for
care; but he felt it had yet to work well. Another saw the development
of purchase-of-service contracting as a way for the state to cap mental
health funding, "bust" state employee unions, expedite the curtailment
of services, and create copetition. He felt that the state is now
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Table 5h: STATE 2 Mental Health-Adults
RATE
NEGOTIATION:
PRICING:
REIMBURSE4ENT:
PAYMENT
PERSPECTIVE:
CONTRACTING:
STANDARD-
SETTING:
MONITORING-
WHAT:
MONITORING-
HOW:
MONITORING-
WHO:
Formal Principles of Reimbursement, (subject to bid
and negotiation based on state agency budget and
components of service)
Vendor Choice
1. Delivering Inputs (approved line item budget)
2. Unit Pricing
Vendor Choice (depends on choice of pricing)
1. By Facility
2. Per Diem
Prospective (with current year and retrospective
adjustments)
Cost Reimbursement
Certification, Licensure
Fiscal
Terms of Contract
Quantity of Expected Services Delivered
Desk Audit
Field Audit
Desk Audit
Self-Reports
Performance Audit Team
Self-Reports
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MONITORING
INFOPMATION
USE-LINKAGES:
MONITORING
INFOR4ATION
USE-CHANGES IN
VENDOR BEHAVIOR:
CLIENT
PLACEMENT:
LEVEL OF
COMPEITION:
REGIONALIZATION
POTENTIAL:
A. Planning
B. Compliance
C. Planning
A. Rate Changes
B. Nothing - Done Irregularly
C. Rate Changes
Provider Choice
Limited Sources
Multiple Services, One State Only
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worried that collusion between providers will destroy a free,
competitive market, and that the state is attempting to "hom-ogenize"
contracts to allow for easier monitoring.
One respondent pointed out that conmunity residences were initially
easy to establish and fill, but that growing local resistance has made
it difficult to establish residences for more severely disturbed
clients.
7. Mental Health Facilities for Children
Group hcmes for children in need of mental health services are
administered by a division of the state agency that also funds the
mental retardation, drug abuse, and mental health for adults programs.
There has been a long history of community residential facilities, and
currently, the bed supply in such facilities exceeds the demand for
services.
A staff member from the state social service agency indicated that
the divisions of the state mental health agency attempt to renegotiate
rates downward, when they buy part of a program. This generates
complaints of underfunding fron providers who also contract with other
state agencies. According to a member of the staff of the division of
mental health services for children, if a provider comes in with a rate
that is too high, the division "enters into copetitive negotiation to
lower the rate."
One staff member emphasized that monitoring information may not be
very important, because the current vendors are so "politically
entrenched" that it is very difficult to change vendors or to modify
their behavior.
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RATE
NEGOTIATION:
PRICING:
REIMBURSEMENT:
PAYMENT
PERSPECTIVE:
CONTPACTING:
STANDARD-
SETTING:
MONITORING-
WHAT:
MONITORING-
HOW:
Table 5i: STATE 2 Mental Health-Children
Formal Principles of Reimbursement, (subject to bid
and negotiation based on state agency budget and
components of service)
Delivering Inputs (approved line item budget)
By Facility
Prospective (with current year and retrospective
adjustments)
Cost Reimbursement
Certification, Licensure, and Accreditation (outside
agency)
A. Fiscal
B. Terms of Contract, All Expected Inputs Delivered
A. Desk Audit
B. Qualitative Assessments
MONITORING-
WHO: A. Self-Reports
B. Client Feedback and Performance Audit Team
MONITORING
INFORMATION
USE-LINKAGES:
MONITORING
INFORMATION
USE-CHANGES IN
VENDOR BEHAVIOR:
CLIENT
PLACEMENT:
A. Planning
B. Copliance
A. Rate Changes
B. Technical Assistance, Client Placement,
Termination
Case Manager
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LEVEL OF
COMPETITION:
REGIONALIZATION
POTENTIAL:
Multiple Sources (primarily in-state)
Multiple Services, One State Only
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Providers' criticisms indicated an absence of continuity and
relevance between standards and practice. There is a "tight
relationship between on-going practices and formal standards," whereby
sub-regional differences in standards are merely resolved by adherence
to the standards of the largest contracting region or the most forceful
case manager." It was noted that the state faced a problem because the
"...same people who do reviews also ante up the bucks; so reviewers may
be reluctant to be too forceful." In a similar vein, staffing models
(ratios) were perceived as unenforceable because the state "knows it
can't afford to pay for them." One provider stressed that the
free-market competition notion was faulty, because the state is
responsible for client referral, and thereby for demand. This provider
expressed a preference for reimbursement contracts when there was a
problem of low occupancy.
8. Mental Retardation Facilities
Group homes for the retarded are administered by a division of the
state agency that funds the drug abuse, mental health services for
adults, and mental health services for children programs. Despite a
high vacancy rate, demand is considered greater than supply because
there is a ready pool of clients in institutions waiting to enter
comunnity residences. This queue is backed by court orders to push
people into conunity residences as quickly as possible.
State agency staff indicated that monitoring staff cite only those
problems that the legislature might provide funds to improve, i.e. ,
citing is done if it is politically expeditious. Further, staff felt
that there is a severe drawback to aggressive enforcement: closing
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facilities creates more problems than it solves because there are few
open beds for the displaced clients.
In the previous year, only three licenses out of 400 licensed
programs were revoked. There is a process for providers with
deficiencies to be given time to improve, so most providers are licensed
with deficiencies.
The state also has a monitoring program which compares the
aggregated client needs within a facility to the services available to
meet those needs. However, there is no link to the budget process for
making corrections, as there is in licensing.
The staff also brought out the "non-price" negotiation process as a
way of reducing input use, reducing costs, and getting more service time
within the state agency budget. They stressed the "free form" of the
negotiation process, which may even involve negotiating for or against
specific people.
Fiscal evaluations are only aimed at uncovering fraud, and an audit
occurs at a provider agency primarily "...in response to a situation
that is about to blow up." No studies of cost effectiveness are
undertaken, although the division of mental retardation has some of the
best data of all state agencies about their clients and provider
effectiveness.
State agency staff said that they encourage providers to "end-run"
the purchase-of-service system because it does not work very well.
Contracts are felt to be a game, and vendors may not deliver what the
purchase order states they will deliver.
They stated that there is increasing pressure from the "overhead
agencies" (presumably, the Governor' s Office, the Controller, the
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Table 5j: STATE 2 Mental Retardation
RATE
NEGOTIATION:
PRICING:
REIMBURSEMENT:
PAYMENT
PERSPECTIVE:
CONTRACTING:
STANDARD-
SETTING:
MONITORING-
WHAT:
Formal Principles of Reimbursement (subject to bid
and negotiation based on state agency budget and
comrponents of service)
Delivering Inputs (approved line item budget)
By Facility
Prospective (with current year and retrospective
adjustments)
Cost Reimbursement
Certification, Licensure, and Accreditation (Inside
Agency for Adults; Outside Agency for Children)
A. Fiscal
B. Terms of the Contract, All Expected Inputs
Delivered
MONITORING-
HCW: A. Desk Audit
B. Qualitative Assessments
MONITORING-
WHO: A. Self-Reports
B. Client Feedback and Performance Audit Team
MONITORING
INFORMATION
USE-LINKAGES:
MONITORING
INFORMATION
USE-CHANGES IN
VENDOR BEHAVIOR:
CLIENT
PLACEMENT:
A. Planning
B. Campliance
Rate Changes
Technical Assistance, Client Placement,
Termination
Provider Choice
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LEVEL OF
COMPETITION:
REGIONALIZATION
POTENTIAL:
Limited Sources
Mixed: Multiple Service, One State Only, and Single
Service, One State Only
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Attorney General, etc.) to drop the purchasing of services and to have
the state deliver the services directly because contracting is so
troublesome.
Provider staff indicated that at least part of the reason that
demand exceeded supply was that the state agency's reimbursement
philosophy makes current providers reluctant to expand or innovate. The
reimbursement philosophy pushes negotiations with providers to lower
providers, costs, to reduce the use of inputs, and to have the state
recapture any excess costs.
One provider saw the division of mental retardation in a real
regulatory bind, because it has single service and multiple service
providers. "The goals of single service agencies, where length of stay
is most important," differ fron those of multiple service agencies.
". . .where length of stay may not be as important, particularly if the
multiple service is a range of care."
9. Facilities for Abused and Neglected Children
Group homes for abused and neglected children are administered as a
part of the service program in the state social service agency. They
were previously administered by a division of the state welfare agency.
The state has changed its preferred treatment modality to one which is
not based on group residential care. This has resulted in an excess
of residential beds. Many facilities which provided this type of care
also provided residential special education services. Consequently,
these facilities are experiencing considerable pressure as the demand
for both types of residential care decline.
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State agency staff indicated that they often engage in a non-price
negotiation with providers, in which the number of units of service to
be purchased, the components of the service, or the job descriptions are
rewritten in order to reduce the state's costs.
They stated that they can not really enforce the standards because
the standards are not well developed. The state is attempting to
develop standards which would be valid for residential care. According
to one staff member, "Until we have standards, we cannot monitor."
While the ".. . .official policy is to monitor, ... no frequency is
specified." Consequently, monitoring is usually done when there is a
problem (as evidenced by newspaper stories about a facility). Case
workers occasionally visit providers, but they bring no monitoring
instruments and may or may not write down what they see. Primarily,
they are visiting a facility only to check on a client.
When three providers said the contracting system was inflexible, I
brought up the negotiation process used to modify service components and
rates. They reacted as though they did not know anything about the
negotiation process. One provider reacted as though he was being asked
a trick question aimed at determining if something illegal was going on.
Providers stressed that they were able to use the monitoring
process to get funding for improvements they wanted to make. One
provider stressed the relationship between licensing standards and
quality. This provider saw monitoring as a means of improving his
physical plant and therby improving the environment for care.
One provider cammented that the state does not tell providers what
services it wants delivered. Rather, a provider tells the state what
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RATE
NEGOTIATION:
PRICING:
REIMBURSEMENT:
PAYMENT
PERSPECTIVE:
CONTRACTING:
STANDARD-
SETTING:
MONITORING-
WHAT:
Table 5k: STATE 2 Abused/Neglected Children
Formal Principles of Reimbursement (agency buys
marginal units of service and accepts the rates
negotiated by other providers)
Unit Pricing
Per Diem
Prospective (with current year and retrospective
adjustments)
Unit Price
Certification, Licensure, and Accreditation (Outside
Agency)
A. Fiscal
B. Terms of Contract, All Expected Inputs Delivered
MONITORING-
HOW: A. Desk Audit
B. Qualitative Assessments
MONITORING-
WHO: A. Self-Reports
B. Client Feedback and Performance Audit Team
MONITORING
INFORMATION
USE-LINKAGES:
MONITORING
INFORMATION
USE-CHANGES IN
VENDOR BEHAVIOR:
A. Planning
B. Compliance
A. Rate Changes
B. Technical Assistance, Client Placement
CLIENT
PLACEMENT: Case Manager
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LEVEL OF
COMPETITION:
REGIONALIZATION
POTENTIAL:
Multiple Sources (primarily in-state, but crosses
state regions)
Mixed: Multiple Services, One State Only, and
Multiple Services, Multiple States
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type of program it has and the state decides how many units of service
to buy.
There is a "...fiction of rate-setting - what it really costs is
not what the department is willing to consider for costs." The provider
continues to contract with the state agency, however, because of its
long-standing comiLtment to service and its large endowmeant.
A multiple-service provider felt that the problem with contracting
with the state is that each state agency and the regions and sub-regions
want information packaged in a different way. This adds considerably to
administrative costs. Another asserted that as the state agency limits
the number of days of care they will pay for, the shape of the service
provided will be changed. There may no longer "... be roan for kids who
are exceptions to the rule." If the limits are too rigid fewer clients
will be served appropriately.
10. Special Education Facilities
The special education group home (residential care program) is run
by the state education department. The state had been a national leader
in special education. The results of legislative changes in the last
decade have been to shift the treatment modality and locus of response
to communities. This has created an excess supply of conmunity
residential services.
The state agency does not suspend providers as often as staff
mrembers think it should. In part, this is because disapproval is a
lengthy process and the agency has too small a staff to act tough.
Consequently, "... a provisional (approval) may be used when
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Table_51: STATE 2 Special Education
RATE
NEGOTIATION:
PRICING:
REIMBURSEMENT:
PAYMENT
PERSPECTIVE:
CONTRACTING:
STANDARD-
SETTING:
MONITORING-
WHAT:
Formal Principles of Reimbursement (subject to bid
and negotiation based on state agency budget and
components of service)
Delivering Inputs (approved line item budget)
By Facility
Prospective (with current year and retrospective
adjustments)
Cost Reimbursement
Certification, Licensure, and Accreditation (outside
agency and inside agency)
A. Fiscal
B. Terms of Contract, All Expected Inputs Delivered
MONITORING-
HOW: A. Desk Audit
B. Qualitative Assessments
MONITORING-
WHO:
MONITORING
INFORMATION
USE-LINKAGES:
MONITORING
INFOPMATION
USE-CHANGES IN
VENDOR BEHAVIOR:
CLIENT
PLACEMENT:
A. Self-Reports
B. Client Feedback and Performance Audit Team
A. Planning
B. Compliance
A. Rate Changes
B. Technical Assistance, Client Placement,
Termination
Case Manager
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STATE 2 Special EducationTable 5 1:
LEVEL OF
COMPETITION:
PEGIONALIZATION
POTENTIAL:
Multiple Sources (primarily in-state, but crosses
state regions)
Multiple Services, One State Only
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suspen(sion) might be a better option if a school has a lot of things to
correct."
One large provider staff member stated that he preferred the tough
compliance stance of the special edcuation division, because it forced
the rate setting agency to pay for changes. He also indicated that he
inmediately makes changes so that he can maintain good relations with
the contracting agencies. Another noted that as a result of standards,
providers are a safer place for clients and the food quality has
improved. It was noted that the problem with the state' s standards is
that they are drawn up quickly, and once written, are difficult to
change. The standards are also poorer because the state did not seek
input from providers. One provider thought that as the state agency
encreased emphasis on keeping clients within a sub-region for service,
competition would increase and many small providers would be driven out.
While the state' s standards require considerable paperwork of providers,
providers comply because there is an oversupply of residential beds.
11. Facilities for Juvenile Delinquents
Group homes for juvenile delinquents are administered by a state
agency which runs the juvenile justice program in the state. Many of
the current providers for all services started contracting with the
state when services for juvenile delinquents were deinstitutionalized,
but have since reduced or curtailed contract services due to reduced
demand, and because other clients are considered more desirable, having
less severe problems. The supply of services far exceeds the demand for
services and many providers are reducing the beds alloted to this
service.
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Several providers indicated that one of the best monitoring
mechanisms is the frequent visitation strategy of the juvenile
delinquency program. The providers believed that the relatively flat
organizational structure of the state agency allowed information about
providers to flow up and down rapidly.
Although the frequent caseworker contact with providers was often
mentioned by providers, it was not by state staff, who stressed the more
formal monitoring mechanisms. State staff emphasized their attempts to
make monitoring a more positive mechanism to be used for provider
improvement. Efforts were being made to use monitoring information as a
basis for technical assistance and for sharing good information
(positive program aspects) with other providers. Staff also stressed
the involvement of providers in the development of evaluation
instruments.
One provider suggested a concern about getting caught in
contradictory expectations between the rate-setting agency, the
accreditation agency, and state agency program staff. Another provider
suggested that the value of standards as they exist now is that they
force you to think about what it is that you do, but still felt that the
standards have little effect on what providers do.
It was noted that there is considerable variation among regions
regarding services requested and those that are affordable. Providers
adapt to "the craziness of state agencies rather than taking less kids
from one or another state agency." They agree to whatever regions and
sub-regions want in order to expedite the contract process. The need for
coordination in the development of standards was emphasized.
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The lack of clear standards is partly attributed to the
inexperience of the state negotiators. A provider felt that the
negotiation process is a "joke" because the ".. .agency says we have X
dollars . ." and the providers must determine and develop the service
those dollars can buy.
While purchase of service contracts seened to be the "only way to
survive," according to one provider, his agency could cover only sixty
percent of its actual costs at the rate provided by the state. This
provider was able to survive because it is a prestigious and
well-endowed institution. The rate-setting formula contains the paradox
that a provider gets a better rate if it has no endowment, but without
and endowment, providers must cut corners.
Providers felt that the state sought to buy the cheapest service
available, regardless of quality, as long as the facility is licensed
and accredited. Budget cuts seem always to come in the more expensive
program areas, which often serve the neediest clients. A related result
is that at least one provider takes children on the basis of the
anticipated resources to support the child, so that the most needy
clients are the least likely to be accepted.
Several weaknesses in state planning for the provider market were
noted. A provider who had diversified into other services felt that
there was no state planning behind existing diversification. The
impetus, in his view, was the initiative of individual provider staff
who could foresee service extension possibilities and the state' s
request for the start-up of a new program. Rates and regulations did
not seem to have an impact on diversification, while the ensuing
multiple contracts have allowed providers to pay higher salaries to
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Table 5m: STATE 2 Juvenile Delinquency
PATE
NEGOTIATION:
PRICING:
REIMBURSEMENT:
PAYNENT
PERSPECTIVE:
CONTRACTING:
STANDARD-
SETTING:
MONITORING-
WHAT:
Formal Principles of Reimbursement (subject to bid
and negotiation based on state agency budget and
components of service)
Unit Pricing
By Facility
Prospective (with current year and retrospective
adjustments)
Cost Reimbursement
Certification, Licensure, and Accreditation (outside
agency)
A. Fiscal
B. Terms of Contract, All Expected Inputs Delivered
MONITORING-
HOW: A. Desk Audit
B. Qualitative Assessments
MONITORING-
WHO:
MONITORING
INFORMATION
USE-LINKAGES:
MONITORING
INFORMATION
USE-CHANGES IN
VENDOR BEHAVIOR:
CLIENT
PLACMT:
A. Self-Reports
B. Client Feedback, Community Monitors and
Performance Audit Team
A. Planning
B. Compliance
A. Rate Changes
B. Technical Assistance, Client Placement,
Termination
Case Manager
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COMPETITION:
REGIONALIZATION
POTENTIAL:
Multiple Sources (primarily in-state, but crosses
state regions)
Mixed: Multiple Services, One State Only, and
Multiple Services, Multiple States
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administrative and supervisory staff. Somae providers stated that the
state agency has failed to meet its potential as a facilitator in
developing services to match client need.
Finally, one provider indicated that the state agency maintains a
"tight rein" by maintaining a close relationship between the central
office and case managers. Case managers relay perceptions of a program
upwards to central office staff. The provider staff are "always aware
that first impressions are important" in their relationship with state
agency staff. Public oversight, according to this provider, "provides a
pressure to run an adequate program."
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Chapter 6: Analysis of Survey Results
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A. Typology of the Provider Market
The typology of the provider market used in this analysis is based
on the level of competition and the degree of regionalization potential.
Ccpetition is a proxy measure of the ability of state agencies to
choose among providers. Regionalization potential is a proxy measure
of the ability of providers to choose among state programs. The level
of competition is more likely to be high when there are multiple sources
from which the state may choose, and the level of competition is more
likely to be low when there are sole sources or limited sources of
providers. There is a greater potential for regionalization where
providers can draw on multiple programs for clients. This would include
a single service in multiple states, multiple services in one state as
well as mutliple services in multiple states. There is a low potential
for regionalization where providers depend on one program in one state.
When state choice is high the state is not dependent on a few
providers. However, the state will face a problem of paying for the
high cost of overhead in myriad small providers. According to one state
agency official in State 2, this problem has reached such substantial
proportions that the state is considering operating its own community
facilities. The lesson learned from health care is that competition
under these conditions may actually increase the cost per slot.
When state choice is low, the state is dependent on the provider
market. The provider market is in a position to dictate the terms of
cost and quality.
Providers with high choice are likely to attempt to control their
case mix and program content so as to capture better rates, better
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TABLE 6a: Typology of
PIOVIDER CHOICE
HIGH
Single Service/One
State Only
Sole Source/Limited
Sources
Single Service/Multiple
States
Multiple Services/One
State Only
Multiple Services/Multiple
States
Sole Source/Limited
Sources
STATE CHOICE
HIGH
Single Service/One
State Only
Single Service/Multiple
States
Multiple Services/One
State Only
Multiple Services/Multiple
States
Multiple Sources Multiple Sources
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the Provider Market
clients, less regulation, and lower standards. These providers are not
very susceptible to state agency control.
Providers with low choice are more vulnerable to the demands of
state agencies since these providers are dependent on one state for
their existence. It would be expected that providers would attempt to
mitigate the state' s control.
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Table 6b: Competition LOw/Regionalization Potential Low
State 1 State 1 State 1
Mental Health Mental Drug Abuse
Retardation (Partially)
State 2
Drug Abuse
(Partially)
CONDITIONS
Resources Comnitted to Few Considerable Moderate Few
Monitoring
Set of State Agency Simple Intermediate Set Simple Intermediate
Actors
Relationship with Active Active Active
Legislature Relationship Relationship Not Active Relationship
Control Objective Cost Mixed Mixed Cost
MECHANISMS
Rate Negotiation Prior Rate and Formal Principles Prior Rate and Formal Princi-
State Agency of Reimbursement State Agency ples of Reim-
Budget Budget bursement
Pricing Delivering Resources Delivering Delivering Inputs
Capability Consumed Capability or Unit Pricing
Reimbursement Facility Per Diem Type of Case Facility or
Per Diem
Payment Perspective Prospective Prospective Retrospective Prospective
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State 1
Mental Health
State 1
Mental
Retardation
State 1
Drug Abuse
(Partially)
State 2
Drug Abuse
(Partially)
MECHANISMS cont' d
Contract Process Cost Sharing Cost Reimbursement Cost Reimbursement Cost
Reimbursement
Standards Certification, Certification, Certification, Certification,
Licensure, Licensure, Licensure Licensure
Accreditation Accreditation Accreditation
Monitoring- Terms of the Fiscal, All Terms of the Terms of the
What Contract, Fiscal, Expected Inputs Contract, Fiscal, Contract, Fiscal,
Quantity of Ex- Quantity of Quantity of Ex-
pected Services, Expected pected Services,
All Expected Services All Expected
Inputs Inputs
Monitoring- Desk Audit, Desk Audit, Field Audit, Desk Audit,
How Field Audit Field Audit, Qualitative Field Audit
Qualitative Assessments
Assessments
Monitoring- Self-Reports, Joint Fiscal/ Fiscal Audit Team, Self-Reports,
Who Fiscal Audit Performance Performance Performance
Team, Comnu- Audit Team, Audit Team, Audit Team
nity Monitors Fiscal Audit Cormunity
Team Monitors
Client Placemaent Provider Choice Provider Choice Case Manager Case Manager
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Table 6b
State 1
Alcohol Abuse
State 1
Abused/Neglected
Children (Partially)
State 2
Mental
Retardation
(Partially)
CONDITIONS
Resources Conitted to Moderate Few Moderate
monitoring
Set of State Agency Simple Simple Camplex
Actors
Relationship with Not Active Not Active Active Relationship
Legislature
Control Objective Mixed Cost Mixed
MECHANISMS
Rate Negotiation Prior Rate Prior Rate and Formal Principles
and State Agency State Agency of Reimbursement
Budget Budget
Pricing Delivering Delivering Delivering Inputs
Capability Capability
Reimbursemrent Facility Facility Facility
Payment Perspective Prospective Retrospective Prospective
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Table 6b
State 1
Alcohol Abuse
State 1
Abused/Neglected
Children (Partially)
State 2
Mental
Retardation
(Partially)
MECHANISMS cont' d
Contract Process Cost Sharing Cost Reimbursement Cost Reimbursement
Standards Certification, Certification, Certification,
Licensure Licensure, Licensure
Accreditation Accreditation
Monitoring- Terms of the Terms of the Contract, Terms of the Contract
What Contract, Fiscal, Fiscal, Delivered Fiscal, All Expected
Quantity of Ex- Services Inputs
pected Services
Monitoring- Field Audit, Desk Audit, Desk Audit,
How Qualitative Field Audit Qualitative
Assessments Assessments
Monitoring- Fiscal Audit Team, Self-Reports, Self-Reports,
Who Performance Audit Team, Fiscal Audit Client Feedback,
Team, Connu- Team, Performance Performance
nity Monitors Audit Team (Limited Audit Team
Use), Conmmnity
Monitors
Client Placement Case Manager Case Manager Provider Choice
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Table 6b
Table 6c: Competition Low/Regionalization Potential High
State 1 State 2
Drug Abuse Mental Health
(Partially) Adults
State 1
Abused/Neglected
Children (Partially)
CONDITIONS
Resources Conmitted to Moderate Few Few
monitoring
Set of State Agency Simple Intermediate Set Simple
Actors
Relationship with Not Active Active Not Active
Legislature Relationship
Control Objective Mixed Cost Cost
MECHANISMS
Rate Negotiation Prior Rate and Formal Principles Prior Rate and
State Agency of Reimbursement State Agency
Budget Budget
Pricing Delivering Delivering Inputs Delivering
Capability or Unit Pricing Capability
Reimbursement Type of Case Facility or Per Diem Facility
Payment Perspective Retrospective Prospective Retrospective
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State 1
Drug Abuse
(Partially)
State 2
Mental Health
Adults
State 1
Abused/Neglected
Children (Partially)
MECHANISMS cont' d
Contract Process Cost Reimbursement Cost Reimbursement Cost Reimbursement
Standards Certification, Certification, Certification,
Licensure Licensure Licensure, and
Accreditation
Monitoring- Fiscal, Quantity of Terms of the Terms of the
What Expected Services Contract, Fiscal, Contract, Fiscal,
Quantity of Delivered Services
Expected Services
Monitoring- Field Audit, Desk Audit, Desk Audit,
How Qualitative Field Audit Field Audit
Assessments
Monitoring- Fiscal Audit Team, Self-Reports, Self-Reports, Fiscal
Who Performance Audit Performance Audit Team,
Team, Conunity Audit Team Performance
Monitors Audit Team (Limited
Use) , Conrmnity
Monitors
Client Placement Case Manager Provider Choice Case Manager
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Table 6c
Table 6c State 2
Drug Abuse
(Partially)
State 2
Mental
Retardation (Partially)
CONDITIONS
Resources Comnitted to Few Moderate
Monitoring
Set of State Agency Intermediate Set Complex
Actors
Relationship with Active Active
Legislature Relationship Relationship
Control Objective Cost Mixed
MECHANISMS
Rate Negotiation Formal Principles Formal Principles
of Reimbursement of Reimbursement
Pricing Delivering Inputs Delivering Inputs
or Unit Pricing
Reimbursement Facility or Per Diem Facility
Payment Perspective Prospective Prospective
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Table 6c State 2
Drug Abuse
(Partially)
State 2
Mental
Retardation (Partially)
MECHANISMS cont' d
Contract Process Cost Reimbursement Cost Reimbursement
Standards Certification, Certification,
Licensure, Licensure,
Accreditation Accreditation
Monitoring- Terms of the Terms of the
What Contract, Fiscal, Contract, Fiscal,
Quantity of All Expected Inputs
Expected Services,
All Expected Inputs
Monitoring- Desk Audit, Desk Audit,
How Field Audit Qualitative Assessments
Monitoring- Self-Reports, Self-Reports,
Who Performance Audit Client Feedback,
Team Performance Audit Team
Client Placement Case Manager Provider Choice
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Table 6d: Competition High/Regionalization Potential Lw
State 2
Alcohol Abuse
CONDITIONS
Resources Cormitted to Few
Monitoring
Set of State Agency Intermediate
Actors
Relationship with Active
Legislature Relationship
Control Objective Cost
MECHANISMS
Rate Negotiation Prior Rate and
State Agency
Budget
Pricing Delivering Capability
Reimbursement Facility
Payment Perspective Prospective
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Table 6d State 2
Alcohol Abuse
MECHANISMS cont'd
Contract Process Cost Sharing
Standards Certification,
Licensure,
Accreditation
Monitoring- Fiscal, Delivered
What Services
Monitoring- Desk Audit,
How ' Field Audit
Monitoring- Self-Reports,
Who Performance Audit
Team
Client Placement Provider Choice
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Table 6e: Competition High/Regionalization Potential High
State 2 State 2
Juvenile Abused/Neglected
Delinquency Children
CONDITIONS
Resources Cormitted to Considerable Moderate
Monitoring
Set of State Agency Ccplex Camplex
Actors
Relationship with Not Active Not Active
Legislature
Control Objective Mixed Mixed
MECHANISMS
Rate Negotiation Formal Principles Formal Principles
of Reimbursement of Reimbursement
Pricing Unit Pricing Unit Pricing
Reimbursement Facility Per Diem
Payment Perspective Prospective Prospective
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Table 6e State 2
Juvenile
Delinquency
State 2
Abused/Neglected
Children
MECHANISMS cont'd
Contract Process Cost Reimbursement Unit Price
Standards Certification, Certification
Licensure, Licensure,
Accreditation Accreditation
Monitoring- Fiscal, All Fiscal, All
What Expected Inputs Expected Inputs
Monitoring- Desk Audit, Desk Audit,
How Qualitative Qualitative
Assessments Assessments
Monitoring- Self-Reports, Self Reports,
Who Client Feedback, Client Feedback,
Performance Audit Performance Audit
Team, Community Team
Monitors
Client Placement Case Manager Case Manager
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Table 6e State 2
Mental Health
Children
State 2
Special
Education
CONDITIONS
Resources Cornitted to Moderate Considerable
Monitoring
Set of State Agency Canplex Ccplex
Actors
Relationship with Active Active
Legislature
Control Objective Mixed Program
MECHANISMS
Rate Negotiation Formal Principles Formal Principles
of Reinbursement of Reimbursement
Pricing Delivering Inputs Delivering Inputs
Reinbursemnt Facility Per Diem
Payment Perspective Prospective Prospective
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Table 6e State 2
Mental Health
Children
State 2
Special
Education
MECHANISMS cont'd
Contract Process Cost Reimbursement Cost Reimbursement
Standards Certification, Certification,
Licensure, Licensure,
Accreditation Accreditation
Monitoring- Fiscal, All Fiscal, All
What Expected Inputs Expected Inputs
Monitoring- Desk Audit, Desk Audit,
How Qualitative Qualitative
Assessments Assessments
Monitoring- Self-Reports, Self Reports,
Who Client Feedback, Client Feedback,
Performance Audit Performance Audit
Team Team
Client Placement Case Manager Case Manager
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B. Analysis of General Trends
An analysis of the mechanisms shows several general trends. Rate
negotiation based on prior rates or the use of formal principles of
reimbursement were prevalent. Pricing by delivery of capability and the
delivery of inputs were dominant. The use of more evolved mechanisms
was virtually non-existent. Perhaps this can be tied to the dominance
of prospective payment. More evolved pricing mechanisms might require a
retrospective payment in order to take into consideration changes in the
relative status of providers. Reimbursement by facility was also
dominant. Reimbursement by type of case or specific client was
essentially non-existent. Even though a prospective payment mechanism
was used much more than expected the use of current year adjustments
from the inflated base year rate may blunt much of the presumed
effectiveness of a prospective payment mechanism. There was very little
use of reimbursement by type of case or by specific person. Cost
reimbursement contracting was much more prevalent than had been
expected. There was very little use of process and output standards.
The lack of performance standards (that is, process/output
standards) may account for the lack of performance oriented contracts
and the lack of pricing by improvements to service, level of quality, or
relative efficiency. As a result there was no need for monitoring which
included cost/performance comparisons. The monitoring conducted was
primarily concerned with fiscal aspects and expected inputs.
Consequently, there was no need to use more sophisticated methods
such as constructed measures and testing as a means of gathering
monitoring information. This in turn would account for the lack of use
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of joint fiscal/performance audit teams and third party monitors. There
was little use of market mechanisms for client placement and a much
stronger use of client placement through case managers and through
provider choice. This may be the result of monitoring which emphasizes
fiscal aspects and inputs, resulting in few choices and little
performance information available for making choices.
For the most part, the mix of particular control mechanisms found
in the trends appears to follow the directions indicated by the signed
digraphs. The exceptions are noted below and many can be categorized as
related to contracting. The predicted effect of contracting on client
placement appears to have not followed the preferred directionality in
the case studies. The effects of contracting on monitoring-what and
monitoring-how also appear to have not followed the preferred direction-
ality. In addition, the high level of vendor changes based on the
monitoring information should have generated a higher level of
monitoring than was the case.
To assess the sign of the relationships in the case studies, each
service was put on a graph. It was not expected that the relationships
could be fully verified empirically because:
1) the variation in the axes was increased to find relationships,
but not all of the variation was present in commnity social
services
2) the relationships represent a logic about choosing options of
a mechanism that may not be present in the way options are
currently chosen.
Indeed, these two factors form a significant part of the rationale
for this study, so it would be quite surprising and disappointing if the
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relationships were verified empirically, and I would not have had a
challenging dissertation topic.
The purpose of the case studies is to illustrate the variation and
relationships of current practices. An explanation for the variance
between the preferred and empirical relationships is given to suggest
the means by which mechanisms are now chosen. These explanations are
not intended to supplant the more logical explanations in Chapter 3.
As in the graphs constructed in Chapter 3, the x-axis indicates the
independent control mechanism (tail of the arrow) and the y-axis
indicates the dependent control mechanism (head of the arrow) . The
abbreviation at each data point indicates the state and the service.
In order to retain the typology of the provider market in the
graphs, the data point's symbol will be different for each type of
provider market. The key on the graphs indicates the symbol for each
type of provider market. If more than one service was found at a point
on the graph, the symbols were vertically aligned at the point. The
symbol in the middle of this line is on the data point.
When options on an axis were not mutually exclusive, such as
monitoring, the option farthest to the right on the axis is used. Many
times the options on this type of axis are cumulative. This means that
if the option farthest to the right is located, the options to its left
exist as well. However, this cumulative effect does not always prove
true. In some cases involving monitoring mechanisms, the highest
option of the independent mechanism was associated with a dependent
mechanism that was not the highest option present; and the highest
option of the dependent mechanism was associated with an option of the
independent mechanism which was not the highest option present. Both
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sets of options are presented in the graphs.
All double headed arrows in the signed digraphs had the same sign
at both ends in this analysis, so only one graph was used to display the
relationship. When two, three or four options for a mechanism existed,
the spacing between options was adjusted. Cost-oriented contracting and
performance-oriented contracting were placed on the same axis when they
affected other mechanisms or the provider market in the same way, or
were affected in the same manner by those variables. The same is true
for input standards and process, output and outcome standards.
The drug abuse facilities and the facilities for abused and
neglected children in State 1 were considered to have a retrospective
payment perspective, even though the rate cap was set prospectively,
because the actual determination of the current year' s rate is done in a
following year and adjustments are then made in the prior year's rate.
Facilities for abused and neglected children in State 1 were usually
inspected by a fiscal audit team with only rare use of a performance
audit team, so the highest level of monitoring-who was considered to be
a fiscal audit team.
Unfortunately the pattern can not be established for thirteen
relationships. For six of these, no instances of performance
contracting or process, output and outcome standards were present in the
case study states. The other seven relationships were not clearly
postive or negative. The relationships between pricing and client
placement (Graph 6a) , and monitoring-what and client placement (Graph
6b) exhibited a horizontal pattern indicating insufficient variation in
the dependent mechanism, client placement.
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The relationships between standards and pricing (Graph 6c) and
input standards and regionalization potential (Graph 6d) exhibited a
vertical pattern indicating insufficient variation in the independent
mechanism, input standards (all standard-setting practices used input
standards).
The relationship between the level of competition and rate
negotiation (Graph 6e) was also indistinguishable because there was
insufficient variation in the level of those variables; the rate
negotiation axis exhibted only the extremes of prior rate and formal
principles of reimbursement. The relationship between standards and
monitoring-what (Graph 6f) indicated that there was insufficient
variation in both axes to allow a positive or negative pattern to form.
Finally, the relationship between monitoring information use-vendor
changes and monitoring-who (Graph 6g) exhibited significant variation,
but no pattern was apparent.
This review indicated that the axes for standards, client
placement, and perhaps, rate negotiation should be reviewed and adjusted
so that a larger variation in the axes would be possible.
Five relationships showed opposite directionality to the preferred
relationships established in Chapter 3: pricing and rate negotiation;
contracting and monitoring-what; contracting and monitoring-how;
cost-oriented contracting and client placement; and input standards and
competition. The positive relationship between pricing and rate
negotiation (Graph 6h) contradicted the pattern found in the literature
from other states in Chapter 3, so it is difficult to determine how to
interpret this pattern.
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Graph 6e: Level of Competition and Rate Negotiation
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It is tempting to dismiss the three contracting relationships due
to the restricted variation of contracting in the case study states.
However, the negative relationships between contracting and
monitoring-what (Graph 6i) and mnitoring-how (Graph 6j) may very well
indicate that the emphasis on cost reimbursement and cost sharing
reduced the perceived need for monitoring, which might be greater if
providers were taking more risks (fixed price or performance contracts).
The other contracting relationship which exhibited the opposite sign
from what was expected, cost-oriented contracting and client placement
(Graph 6k), suggested that providers gained more control over who they
accepted when they were in a contracting system which required them to
take fewer financial risks through cost reimbursenent contracting. This
finding suggested that a provider dominated contracting system existed
for some services.
Although the relationship between input standards and competition
(Graph 61) did not match the preferred relationship in the signed
digraphs, this failure may be instructive from a conon sense point of
view. Rather than the increasing input standards diminishing the
possible competition, an increasingly competitive market may actually
induce providers to cheat the contracting system which in turn causes
state agencies to attempt to increase their control by increasing the
number, detail and types of input standards, as the bureaucratic process
model predicts.
The remaining relationships were confirmed (see Graphs 6m-6w).
Examining the relationships between conditions and mechanisms in
the tables generated two findings. The first finding was that when
providers had an active relationship with the legislature, rate
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negotiation through formal principles of reimbursement was more likely
to be present. Interestingly, the use of cormunity presence as a
monitoring mechanism was associated with the lack of an active
relationship with the legislature. This suggested that when mechanisms
in general are more formalized or camplex, providers were more likely to
seek legislative assistance. Conversely, it may suggest that when, for
historical reasons, active relationships exist, providers and/or state
agencies formalized their relationships. The evidence fron services to
the mentally retarded in State 1 was that an active relationship with
the legislature caused the formalization of processes.
The second finding was that the resources committed to monitoring
had a substantial impact on the "how" and "who" of monitoring. That is,
where more resources were cammitted to monitoring there was a higher
level (right side of the axis) of how monitoring was done and who did
the monitoring. Where there were fewer resources committed to
monitoring, there was a lower level of how monitoring was done and who
did the monitoring. While this is comon-sensical, what was interesting
was that in both cases the variation was only between the left-side and
the middle of the axis. Further, the commitment of fewer resources to
monitoring was associated with a cost control objective, while
committing considerable resources to monitoring was associated with a
mixed objective or an emphasis on program content. In all likelihood,
this was because fiscal monitoring procedures are simpler and the
monitoring protocols were developed long ago. This makes fiscal
monitoring easier and more precise. It is unclear, however, whether the
cost control objective was adopted and consequently used fewer
resources, or whether the lack of resources made a cost control
objective the only possible choice.
C. Use of Monitoring Information
The primary use of information appeared to be oriented to
procedural and contractual changes of such things as the rate, the units
of service purchased, and problems in specific agencies. Consequently,
data were sent to compliance enforcement agencies and rate-setting
bodies. Nowhere, however, was the information about quality used to
change the rate. Rather, information about over/under spending was used
to change the rate. Monitoring information appeared to stay within
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channels: fiscal information went to rate setting and other fiscal
staff; program information went to program staff.
In only one state agency was monitoring information used to revise
program standards and state agency practices. Apparently, the
information always flows in one direction: to state agencies which then
recommend changes in provider behavior, rather than analyzing the
context in which providers act.
D. Multiple-State Providers
Multiple state providers were found as partial parts of the market
in drug abuse services in State 1, and in services to abused and
neglected children, and juvenile delinquents in State 2. After the
study period, services to abused and neglected children in State 1 began
using multiple state providers, although there still remained very
limited sources fram which the state could contract for services. It
was expected that state agencies would make special provisions if they
were contracting with multiple state providers and the relative freedom
from state pressure these providers might enjoy. State agencies in
program areas where multiple state providers were found did not appear
to treat them differently. There did tend to be moderate to
considerable resources cormuitted to monitoring with an associated mixed
objective control system. Client placement by a case manager was also
more prevalent. All three of these factors could be attributed to
general trends.
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Chapter 7: Inplementation Models as Models of Change
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Making changes is a matter of strategies and tactics. The imple-
mentation models represent the strategies for deciding which tactics are
most appropriate under different conditions. The control mechanisms
represent the tactics through which any changes must be implemented.
To change the current contracting system requires an understanding
of its current milieu, and a set of propositions which indicate the
likely intervention areas. Elmore' s sunmary of the models of
implementation are a good place to begin if one recognizes sone of the
models' limiting problems. These models ignore the level of
hierarchical structure and consider intra-group, inter-group,
interorganizational and intergovernmental relations in similar ways.
The systems management model is used to structure decision-making
problems intra-organizationally. The bureaucratic process model is most
often used to explain worker-versus-management problems. The
organizational development model is usually used to explain intra-group
and inter-group relations. The bargaining and negotiation model is
often used to explain problems at every level from inter-personal
relations to inter-group relations to inter-governmental relations.
Since changes may be made at many hierarchical levels, the choice of the
intervention point may influence the choice of an implementation model
for guidance.
One problem with the four models is that they are not prescriptive
to the same degree. The systems management model is primarily
normative. The bureaucratic process and the bargaining the negotiation
models are primarily descriptive. The organizational development model
can be both descriptive and normative. Consequently, if one takes a
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snapshot of a problem within an organization, there will be clearly
defined elements capable of interpretation within all four models. This
should not be surprising. Models are simply alternative abstracts of
reality. They can not encompass all aspects of reality and remain a
shorthand for it. Instead, each model has a different method of
abstraction and emphasis.The goal is to choose the model which allows an
agent to effect the most change with the least disruption within any
specific context.
When using these four models to explain reality, it may be
necessary to use more than one model. In the example below, the
routines found in a bureaucratic process model were continued, because
the street-level bureaucrats correctly perceived that the state had a
poor bargaining position. A study of the special education reform law
in Massachusetts (Weatherly, 1979) illustrates these principles. State
bureaucrats were given a law which they did not have the resources to
implement. Knowing this, street-level bureaucrats in local school
systems were able to distort the policies to their ends. Despite an
equalizing formula, rich school districts fared better monetarily under
the law than poor ones, because they had the resources and
sophistication to challenge funding decisions.
It is possible to project the behavior of state agencies and the
responses of providers using the four implementation models. State
agencies, according to the systems management model, attempt to clarify
and objectify goals and standards and to develop a reward and punishment
system for effecting change, relying on feedback about provider
standards or other parts of the control system while emphasizing
the coordination of the tasks of all actors within the control system.
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State agencies and providers would review contract objectives and
standards so that both sides would be sure that they are attainable.
State agency staff would review the feedback loop to insure that the
information suggests specific actions. State agencies would insure that
the reward/punishment incentives were sufficient to change provider
behavior. This might be implemented through the use of the options on
the right side of the axes for pricing, standard-setting,
monitoring-what, and the use of performance contracting. Providers
would demand more discretionary control over resource use as a means of
improving performance.
Providers, according to the the bureaucratic process model, are
determined to maintain the service they have traditionally provided,
even though the state requires a different service. State agency
personnel would respond with increased monitoring and auditing, more
detailed standards, and more frequent involvement of state agency
personnel in the internal policies of providers. Providers would react
by becoming procedure oriented and would work "by the book," or would
actively subvert the system.
Providers, according to the organizational development model, must
own the program, agree to the standards, and be an integral part of the
work group that develops the standards. Standards and monitoring that
emphasize only the state's point of view will have a detrimental effect
on provider performance. State agencies' allocation to providers should
cover not only basic costs, but offer some excess funds which may
facilitate innovation by the providers. State agencies would give
direct feedback to providers and allow them the opportunity to resolve
negative feedback themselves.
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In the bargaining and negotiation model, state agencies develop
more detailed and complex standards than they can expect to be able to
enforce. Monitoring and the use of monitoring information is designed
only for superficial purposes as a threat. Providers attempt to
minimize the threat of state agencies imposing standards by appealing to
the legislature and by contending that they have superior program
knowledge. State agencies use resource allocation as a threat.
Providers may attempt to neutralize this threat by political pressure
and by lobbying to formalize the way in which resources are allocated.
There is to at least partial evidence to support all four
implementation models. In the systems management model it appears that
the states have not allowed providers to become responsibility centers
accountable for their output but instead have concentrated on internal
provider operations. As might be expected, the providers have demanded
more discretion and greater internal control over what resources they
use to accomplish any given ends. There are no clearly specified
objectives as evidenced by performance standards, and there seems to be
no objective means of measuring actual performance in use in the control
system. Since providers indicate that their own standards exceed those
of the state, it could be argued that the state's controls are not
sufficient to hold providers accountable. Lastly, the feedback in the
system does not appear to provide state agencies with the information
required to allow the control system to be self-correcting.
The bureaucratic process model also appears to be supported by the
responses of providers. Providers are able to turn the states' attempts
to enforce new routines through the use of monitoring into a mans for
paying for changes that providers want, thereby reinforcing the provider
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service orientation. There is little evidence that providers are unable
to deliver a service that is the same service that they have always
delivered (or a preferred more expensive version) with the exception of
substance abuse services in both states. The bureaucratic process model
also appears to describe state agencies aptly, particularly State 2.
State 2 appears to have become procedure-oriented. This is evidenced by
concentration on layers of bureaucracy and increased paperwork as a
mveans of control.
The organizational development model stresses consensus building
and acccaodation which has not occurred in the control system. For
example, the non-price negotiations which state agencies carry on with
providers appear to be one way---the state agency's. Providers do not
"own the standards" which mitigates the potential effectiveness of the
control system.
The bargaining and negotiation model gets substantial support frcn
the study. For example, State 2 appears to have developed a more
detailed set of standards than it can truly enforce. What is cited in
some services during the monitoring process becomes a mental game where
providers attempt to get improvements paid for and state agencies only
cite improvements that they think the state legislature will fund.
State agency staff acknowledge that they cannot really de-accredit
providers despite tough licensing and accreditation laws. The non-price
negotiations can, in fact, change not only the components of the service
but the rate for the service so that the state attempts to get a lower
rate for the same service while providers attempt to keep the same
revenue but deliver fewer units of service.
It is often possible to look at the same piece of evidence and
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interpret it differently based on the four models. For example,
providers suggested in both states that there was a "lack of clear
standards." Following the systems managenent model it might be
suggested that the standards were not objective and measurable, and that
this created the problem. Following the bureaucratic process model it
might be suggested that new standards too different from current
practices would not be implementable. Using the organization
development model it could be suggested that the problem with the
standards is simply that providers had not participated in the process
and therefore did not agree to follow the standards. Using the
bargaining and negotiation nodel it could be suggested that there are
really two sets of standards, state standards and provider standards,
and that there is an on-going battle as to which standards will prevail.
As another example, many providers in States 1 and 2 contended that
their own standards were tougher than the state' s standards. Using for
example the bureaucratic process model, this could be interpreted as
meaning that providers declined to change their routine becuase they
feel their current routines are better. In the organizational
development model, this statement may indicate that providers are
chortling because they know that if the state had checked with them
first, they could have helped develop more meaningful standards. In
bargaining and negotiation, the statement could mean that providers are
indicating that they have won the negotiation process and are attempting
to induce the state to accept their viewpoint. Under systems
management, it could be suggested that the state was not able to inter-
pret its feedback about too few vendors being cited, so that it could
change state standards to make them more appropriate for improving care.
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The actors in a contracting system may view their world in a way
which appears to match one of the models. The overwhelming evidence
appears to support bargaining and negotiation as the model being
implicitly used by participants in State 2. Virtually all monitoring
processes in State 2 are based on the differences between what the state
is entitled to do and what it actually does. The state agencies
recognize that they do not have the resources to accomplish their
mission and use the more severe compliance procedures mostly as a
threat. However, it often appears that the state agencies would not use
the more severe compliance procedures if they did have the resources,
because they recognize their dependence on the providers.
In State 1, the evidence supporting a prevalent implicit model is
less clear. Stability appears to be a dominant concern. Even the
stress on community monitors could be seen as a traditional voluntary
sector concern for community involvement. However, the role of
community monitors was clearly as a means of generating information for
and about providers. This pushes one toward the systems management
model' s emphasis on feedback. Consequently, the implicit model appears
to be a mix of routines from bureaucratic processes and feedback from
system' s management.
When using the models as strategies, the choice of control
mechanisms may create a system which resembles one of the other models.
For example, in following the systems management model, attempts to
clarify the reward/punishment incentives may easily result in more
detailed monitoring procedures which may create a situation where
providers believe the state is intervening in the internal operations
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of their agency, which presents a situation best analyzed by the
bureaucratic process model, or if bargaining about state intrusion
occurs, by the negotiation model. In following the edicts of the
organizational model, the process of keeping all actors involved and
discussing the control system may evolve into a bargaining process best
described by the bargaining and negotiation model. Accepting a lessened
emphasis on detailed procedures, as best described by the bureaucratic
process model, may well evolve into an active dialogue between the state
and providers which may fall under the organizational development model.
Finally, one way of strengthening a state agency' s bargaining position
would be to issue extremely detailed input standards which might shut
off negotiation, in a relationship best described by the bureaucratic
process model.
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Chapter 8: Sunmary And Future Research
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A. Sumary
Literature from human services, defense and public works was used
to develop relationships between the control mechanisms and the provider
market as well as among each of the control mechanisms. These
relationships represent the first time the entire contracting system has
been viewed holistically.
The preferred relationships were compared to the control mechanisms
found in six states. This review was based on materials concerning
these states. Overall, the preferred relationships matched three of the
six relationships it was possible to establish in the six states. One
relationship had an opposite directionality to the preferred
relationship, and two actual relationships were neither positive nor
negative.
The preferred relationships among control mechanisms were combined
in the most effective ways within three different constraints: few
monitoring resources; rate negotiation by bidding and client placement
by guaranteed areas; and pricing by relative efficiency. These three
constraints were chosen for particular reasons. The reality of funding
for many services is that monitoring is not a high priority budget item.
In many states, contracts for all items must be established according to
bidding procedures. Finally, the use of comparisons among providers for
establishing rates has been promoted as a tool for increasing their
efficiency.
The preferred relationships were then compared to the mechanisms in
two states that were studied in detail. These two states had very
different provider markets which was the basis for choosing them. In
addition, one state had a centralized case allocation process and an
256
emphasis on informal means of monitoring, while the other had a
decentralized case allocation process and an emphasis on formal means of
monitoring.
Two things were apparent in these case study states. First, the
amount of actual variation in the control mechanisms fell far short of
the potential variation. The pricing, reimbursement, standards and
monitoring mechanisms tended to be low-end control mechanism options
(left-side of the axes); client placement was effected either by case
managers' efforts or providers' choice; contracting occurred primarily
through cost reimbursement; payment perspective was usually prospective;
and rate negotiations were settled by options at either end of the axis.
Less variation occurred within the case study states when compared to
other states researched in Chapter 3.
Second, the preferred relationships in the signed digraphs matched
the majority of actual relationships in the case study states with a few
exceptions: most notable, the relationships between contracting and
three other control mechanisms. In fact variation in control mechanisms
throughout the case study states was limited which reduced the
possibility of establishing a pattern.
Working the responses given in the case studies into a larger
framework proved more interesting than expected. Four models of
implementation were chosen to provide a strategy to guide decisions
about which mechanisms should receive the most emphasis. Each model did
not generate the same advice for how and when to intervene in the
contracting process to make improvements. The same data was interpreted
in very disparate ways by the four models. The assumptions of all four
models were supported by the responses in the case study states, so no
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model could be preferred by the weight of the evidence. In following
the propositions of any of the models, one would ultimately find oneself
in a situation best described by a different model.
Consequently, the choice of a model to guide the points of
intervention in a contracting system remains an art without well-defined
parameters. The choice may rest primarily on personal preferences
without explicit criteria for guidance. Nevertheless, these models are
extremely helpful from both explanatory and normative viewpoints.
My bias is the systems management model with which I have had
success in improving contracting systems. I believe the explanatory and
normative aspects of the model create a superior structure for making
changes. The model creates a structure that is less dependent on
personal idiosyncracies for making changes than other models.
The systems managenent model has been adopted in special education
as a way of standardizing and improving service delivery. The model' s
use in education has proven to be capable of absorbing features of other
models. For example, the necessity for mutually determined standards
has allowed systems management to capture a positive attribute of the
organizational development model. A similar benefit might accrue to the
contracting process if state agencies adopt mutually determined
behavioral objectives for changing vendor staff behavior as well as
changing state agency staff behavior.
This research has established a complex set of relationships among
control mechanisms and the provider market. While additional research
is needed to increase the variation in the control mechanisms, the
proposed set of relationships are a good first step and will prove
useful to providers and state agencies.
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B. Future Research
Future research should focus on expanding the variation in the
control mechanisms, studying the effects of using the four
implementation models as change models, and quantifying the interrela-
tionships among the endogenous and exogenous variables. The variation
in the control mechanisms could be expanded definitively by finding
examples of the use of control mechanisms that are on the right side of
the axes for standards, monitoring (what, how, who) , the method of
pricing and contracting. A second method of expanding the variation
would be to study types of states unlike the case study states, such as
large contracting states - New York, for example - and states where
contracting is not widely used. In both types of states it is possible
that the provider market would be different fram the case study states.
The four models of implementation are used to suggest areas of
change. However, it is unclear how fruitful using the implementation
models as change models would be. Two options for study would be to
analyze the effects of using an implementation model which matches the
implicit model in use, and to analyze the effects of using an
implementation model which differed from the implicit model. This
variation might occur naturally, because a new manager may or may not
share the prevalent implicit model.
The area of future research which could be most helpful to state
agency managers and to providers would be to build a model of the varied
interrelationships which exist among the control mechanisms and the
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provider market. It is unlikely that such a model could be definitive,
given current knowledge about the effects of ndel use and such inter-
relationships. Rather, the model would represent a next step after the
signed digraphs and could generate likely best choice mechanisms after
the provider market and other constraining variables have been
determined.
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